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Page  37,  paragraph 4,  end of paragraph  to  read 
as follows  : 
" •• ,  to  a  nl.U!lber  of former  French,  Italian, 
Dutch  and Belgian colonies.  (1) 
(1)  See  Annex  IV  to  EEC  Treaty." 
Page  46,  paragraph  2,  line 5,  delete  the  words 
"Group  B". 
Page  66,  after paragraph 3,  insert a  new  sub-heading, 
underlined  and  worded  as  follows  : 
"Other provisions" 
Page  113,  paragraph 1,  line  2,  delete brackets and 
amend  to  read  : 
"Customs  concessions  in respect of fats  and 
oils imported  into the  Community  are  even 
more  difficult  to  justify  ••••  " This  Study,  presented by  the  Rapporteur Mr  Aldo  ROMOLI, 
was  adopted  unanimously  (with  two  abstentions)  by  the  Section for 
External  Relations at its meeting  on  8  December  1981. 
At  its Plenary Session on  27  and  28  January  1982,  the 
Economic  and  Social  Committee,  under  the  Chairmanship  of 
Mr  Tom~s ROSEINGRAVE,  decided  to  forward  this  Study  to  the  Council 
and  the  Commission  of the  European Communities. Preface 
The  Economic  and  Social  Committee 'a  Study  is  the 
first  time  a  Community  Institution  has  ever  attempted  to  draw 
up  a  conspectus  and  assessment  of  the  European  Community's 
External  Relations,  one  of  the  most  important  aspects  of  the 
unfolding  venture  that  began  thirty  years  ago  with  moves  to 
integrate  the  societies  of  Western  Europe.  The  study  is  of 
interest  from  more  than  one  point  of  view.  Firstly it has  been 
drawn  up  by  members  of  a  Community  Institution,  so  it  is 
particularly  accurate  and  reflects  the  positions  of  the 
Community.  At  the  same  time,  however,  the  authors  of the  Study 
- as  observers  rat;7er  than  participants  in  the  action  taken  by 
other'  Community  Ir.st1:tutions  under'  Treaty  obUgations- have 
used  their  particu:ar  vantage-point  to  draw  a  lucid,  objective 
picture  of  the  sit~ation  and  reach  conclusions  which  - without 
[all1·.n~7  into  the  trap  of  either  trumpet-blow-ing  or  dogmatic 
scepticism  - make  it possible  for  the  reader  to  draw  important 
lessons  from  the  experiences  of  the  past.  Last  but  not  least 
the  Study,  carried  out  as  it  is  by  representative  figures  of 
social  and  economic  life  in  the  ten  Member  States,  will  be  an 
important  discussion  paper  for  those  called  upon  to  conduct 
the  Community's  external  relations. 
The  approach  adopted  by  the  Study  in  examining  EEC 
external  relations,  i.e.  a  "geographical"  approach  allied  to 
an  analysis  of  the  coherence  existing  between  the  Community's 
external.  and  internaL  poticiea,  is  particularly  original  and 
fru·itfuL  because  it  provides  a  comprehensive  picture  of  the 
Community's  actions  and  a  precise  indication of consistencies, 
inconsistencies  and  shortcomings. is  that 
perhaps 
should 
-2-
The  fundamental  lesson  to  be  drawn  from  the  anaZysis 
the  Community  has  long  been  hesitant  (and  is  stilL 
nesitant  today)  in  fully  realizing  what  its  role 
be  in  the  world  vis-a-vis  the  other  industrialized 
powers,  the  less-developed countries  or state-trading nations. 
Although  the  Community  has  undoubtedly  achieved  successes  in  a 
variety  of  areas  so  that  it  has  rapidly  come  to  be  considered 
by  its  partners  as  a  vital  element  in  maintaining  the 
intepnational  political  and  economic  equilibrium,  it  has  not 
always  managed  to  achieve  consistency  of action.  In  shoPt,  I 
would  say  that  the  Community  has  been  a  positive  factor  in  the 
development  of  international  relations  when  it  has  been 
cleap-sighted  and  coul'ageous,  but  has  failed  when  doubts  and 
centrifugal  tendencies  have  prevailed. 
tance 
future 
The  need  fo:r  courage,  however, 
at  a  time  when  the  Community  is 
and  having  to  take  essential 
is  of  vital  impor-
pondering  about  1:ts 
decisions  about  the 
fuPtheP  development  of  existing  policies  and  the  imple-
mentation  of  new  ones  especially  in  the  light  of  the  possible 
accession  of  further'  Mediterranean  countries  which  is  bound  to 
give  a  new  dimension  to  the  Community's  external  relations.  In 
fact  the  changes  which  are  now  taking  place  within  the 
Community  and  which  will  be  completed  with  enlargement,  will 
have  important  repercussions  on  the  Community's  externa~ 
relations  with  the  industrialized  cou"ltries  and,  more  par-
ticu~ar~y,  the  Mediterranean  and  other>  less-developed  coun-
tr>ies. 
As  the  ESC's  Study  has  quite  rightly  brought  out, 
internal  and  externa~ 
interodependent  >  so  more 
their  interactions. 
policies  are  becoming  increasingly 
and  more  attention  must  be  paid  to 
Lorenzo  NATALI 
Vice-President  of the  Commission 
of  the  European  Communities I  N  D  E  X 
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APPENDICES - 1  -
INTRODUCTION 
The  Section for External  Relations  has  prepared  this 
Study  on  the  Community's  external  relations  in  order  to 
provide  Committee  members  with  a  general  picture  - a  survey of 
events  over  the  past  20  years  of  relations  between  the 
Community  and  the  rest  of- the  world,  and  in order to assess  to 
what  extent  the  development  of  external  relations  has  been 
consistent  both  in  itself  and  with  the  development  of  the 
Community's  domestic  policies. 
The  Study  deals  solely with  the  areas  covered  by  the 
EEC  Treaty,  and  is divided  into chapters.  The  opening  chapters 
define  the  position  of  "external  relations"  within the  Treaty 
of  Rome,  and  trace  the  broad  lines  along  which  Community 
action has  subsequently  developed. 
Chapters III,  IV  and  V  examine  the  Community's  rela-
tions  with  industrialized,  developing  and  State-trading  coun-
tries. 
Their  purpose  is  to  provide  a  summary  of  past 
successes  (and  failures)  in  this  field,  and  to  identify  the 
unresolved  issues  to  which  the  Community  will  have  to  address 
itself in the  years  ahead. 
There  may  be  some  lack  of uniformity  in  the  drafting 
of  the  Study,  due  to  the  problems  of  campi ling  facts  and 
figures  on  the  myriad  of  agreements  which  have  been  signed 
with  third countries  :  to date  no  steps  have  been  taken by  the 
Community  to publish  systematic reports  in this field. - 2  -
The  Study  Group  adopted  the  procedure  of  holding 
discussions  on  each  topic  in  the  light  of  documents  drawn  up 
by Committee officials.  Individual  study-group  members  submit-
ted  papers,  and  some  meetings  were  attended  by  Commission 
representatives.  The  Rapporteur  then drew  up  summary  reports. 
Chapter  VI  analyses  the  interaction between  the  Com-
munity's  external  relations  and  major  domestic 
covering  the  whole  spectrum  from  industrial, 
agricultural  policies  to  regional,  social  and 
policies. 
policies, 
energy  and 
employment 
This  new  approach  enabled  progress  to  be  made  and 
allowed  verification  of  the  points  made  in  the  chapters  on 
geographical  areas. 
The  aim  of  the  Study  is not  to  lay  down  pointers or 
recommendations  for  future  policies  :  it is concerned only  to 
record  th~  facts,  as  objectively  as  possible,  and  to point  to 
any  areas  of  conflict  within  the  scope  of  the  Community's 
activities. 
However,  readers  will  find  that  the  concern  to  gi-
ve  a  faithful  summary  of  discussions  has  in  some  cases  led  to 
inclusion  of  substantive  assessments  ?nd  opinions,  and  of 
pointers  as  to  possible  courses  of  action.  Such  elements  have 
been  left  in  the  text,  on  the  ground  that  they  make  for  a 
deeper  insight into problems  of  a  complex nature. 
In  its  final  section,  the  Study  faces  the  history 
and  causes  of the  most  blatant  examples  of  incoherence  in Com-
munity policy. - 3  -
There  are  two  deliberate  omissions.  The  first  of 
these  is  the  specific  question  of  international  monetary  and 
financial  relations,  which  does  much  to  shape  relations 
between  the  Community  and  third  countries.  ·rhe  Study  merely 
touches  upon  this  subject,  which  in  view  of its complexity  is 
a  matter for  more  specialized authorities. 
The  second omission is the  question of links between 
the  Community's  external  policy  and  that  of  individual  Member 
States.  Once  again,  to  include  a  discussion  of  such  a  thorny 
issue  would  have  required  meticulous  research  and  data  which 
was  not  readily  available,  and  this  would  probably  have 
further delayed  the  already  long  gestation of  the  Study. 
The  problem  is  briefly  mentioned  at  several  point 
s,  particularly in  the  final  part of  the  Study,  which  outlines 
possible  reasons  for  short-comings  in  the  Community's  ex-
ternal- relations policy. 
The  Section  feels  that  this  sut>ject  is  fundamental 
to  an  understanding  of  many  aspects,  weaknesses  and  con-
straints  of  the  Community's  external  policy.  It  therefore 
considers  that  the  Economic  and  Social  Committee  should,  if 
possible,  undertake  a  specific examination of  the  issue. 
* 
*  * 
CHAPTER  I 
EXTERNAL  RELATIONS  IN  THE  TREATY  OF  ROME 
Article  2  of  the  Treaty  of  Rome  lays  down  that  the 
Community's  task  is  to  promote  a  harmonious  development  of 
economic  ac ti  viti  es,  a  continuous  and  balanced  expansion,  an 
increase  in  stability,  an  accelerated  raising  of  the  standard 
of living  and  closer relations  between  the  States belonging  to 
it. - 4  -
According  to  the  Treaty  this  goal  is to be  achieved 
by  setting  up  a  common  market  and progressively approximating 
the  economic  policies of  Member  States. 
Article  3  lists inter alia the  following  measures  to 
be  taken  to  achieve  these  objectives 
- establishment  of  a  common  customs  tariff; 
- establishment of  a  common  commercial  policy; 
- association  of  the  overseas  countries  and  terri-
tories. 
The  prime  objective  of  a  Customs  Union  was  achieved 
at  the  end  of  the  transitional  period  with  the  establishment 
of  a  common  customs  tariff  and  the  abolition  of  internal 
customs  duties  and  of  other  constraints  and  restrictions  on 
trade  between  the  Member  States. 
The  development  of  a  common  comr.lercial  policy  was 
confined  during  the  transitional  period to coordination by  the 
Member  States  of  their  trade  relations  with  non-member  coun-
tries  and  adjustment  of  tariff  agreements  and  liberalization 
procedures  for  external  trade,  in  accordance  with  the  proce-
dures  laid  down  in Treaty Articles 110  and  111. 
During  the  same  period,  the  Community  Institutions 
also  took  up  their  responsibilities  as  regards  participation 
in the  work  of international  economic  organizations  (in accor-
dance  with  Treaty  Articles 116,  229  (UN,  GATT),  230  (Council 
of Europe)  and  231  (OECD)). - 5  -
Article  113  was  implemented  as  from  1970;  this pro-
vides for  the  introduction of  a  common  commercial  policy based 
on  uniform  principles  and  affording  a  basis  for  measures  in 
many  fields  :  tariff;  standardization of measures  liberalizing 
external  trade,  export  policy  and  measures  to  protect  trade 
such  as  those  taken  in  case  of  dumping  or  subsidies;  conclu-
sion of  agreements with non-member countries. 
Under  Article  238  the  Community  also  concluded  with 
several  third  States  or  unions  of  States  agreements  esta-
blishing  an  association  involving  reciprocal  rights  and obli-
gations,  common  action  and  special  procedures. 
The  last  decade  has  seen  a  further proliferation of 
mixed  agreements  of  extremely  varied  content,  some  being  of  a 
new  type  not  envisaged  by  the  authors of  the  Treaty. 
The  Community  has  in  fact  found  it  necessary  to 
adopt  a  constantly  changing  interpretation  of  the  whole 
concept  of  commercial  policy,  because  of  the  growing external 
pressures,  particularly  (but  not  exclusively)  from  the  deve-
loping countries. 
Progressing  from  purely  tariff,  and  then  commercial 
agreements,  the  Community  accordingly  turned  its attention to 
the  requirements  of  greater  economic  collaboration  and  co-
operation  in the  development  of  the  poorest  countries,  and  the 
need  to  contribute  to  stable  international  economic  develop-
ment,  through  institutionalized negotiations  and  consultations 
with  non-member  countries,  and  bilateral  and  multilateral 
agreements  which  are  not  solely  economic  but  which  also  are 
indirectly  political  or  relate  to  specific  fields  (environ-
ment,  health,  scientific  and  cultural  cooperation,  etc). - 6  -
Doubts  about  whether  such  agreements  went  beyond  the 
Treaty  were  resolved  by  a  ruling,  handed  down  by  the  Court  of 
Justice  in  1971  and  subsequently  underpinned  by  other  Court 
rulings,  which  made  it clear that  any  external  implications  of 
matters  regulated  by  domestic  Community  rules  fall  within  the 
purview of  the  Community  Institutions. 
In  other words,  any  fields  and  matters  for which  the 
Community  lays  down  rules  are  potentially  areas for  Community 
external  measures.  The  sole  constraint  is  that  such  external 
measures  must  be  necessary  in  order  to  further  a  Treaty 
objective. 
The  Member  States  have  voluntarily  accepted  this 
gradual  widening  of  the  Community's  remit  by  ad  hoc  Council 
decisions  and  not  a  qualified majority,  (though  unanimity,  was 
required  for these). 
In  practice,  therefore,  the  Community  has  anticipa-
ted  the  solution  laid  down  in Article  235,  which  states  that 
"If  action  by  the  Community  should  prove  necessary  to  attain 
one  of the  objectives of the  Community  and  this Treaty has 
not  provided  the  necessary  powers,  the  Council  shall,  acting 
unanimously  on  a  proposal  from  the  Commission  and  after con-
sulting  the  Assembly,  take  the  appropriate  measures". 
The  Paris  Summit  Conference  of  Heads  of State or of 
Government,  held  in  1972,  called  for  the  direct  use  of 
Article  235  for  action  programmes  unanimously  agreed  by  the 
Member  States. 
One  of  the  new  objectives,  namely  gradual  {albeit 
longterm)  progress  towards  political  union  of  the  Member 
States,  undoubtedly  constitutes  a  fundamental  change  in  the 
whole  approach  to  the  external  relations  of  the  Community. 
* 
*  * - 7  -
CHAPTER  II 
THE  GENERAL  DIRECTION  AND  THE  DEVELOPMENT 
OF  THE  EEC 1s  EXTERNAL  POLICY 
The  difficulties encountered  by  the  Community  in its 
attempts  to  move  towards  political  integration  and  to  for-
mulate  a  common  external  policy  in the  conventional  sense,  are 
well  known. 
However,  twenty  years after its foundation,  the  Com-
munity  now  plays  a  leading  role  on  the  international  scene. 
It  is  the  major  international  trading  bloc;  it has  laid  down 
independent  guidelines  for  economic  (and  not  just commercial) 
policy  and  above  all  for  cooperation;  it has  achieved  signi-
ficant  results  in  relations  with  individual  countries  in all 
continents;  it enjoys  growing  prestige  in  international  orga-
nizations. 
These  achievements  are  the  result  of  an 
11economic 
diplomacy"  which  has  had  direct  and  indirect  consequences  at 
the  political  and  other  levels  and  has  strengthened  the 
position  of  the  Community  institutions  both  within the  Commu-
nity and  at  world  level. 
To  arrive  at  these  achievements  the  Community  follo-
wed  a  number  of  guidelines,  some  of  them  derived  from  general 
provisions  of  the  Treaty  and  others  evolved  slowly  in  the 
Council.  In  the  Counci  it  became 
measures  taken  vis-a-vis  the  rest 
compatible  and mutually consistent. 
increasingly  obvious  that 
of  the  world  had  to  be - 8  -
At  the  Hague  Summit  of  1969  the  representatives  of 
the  national  governments  decided  in  future  to  have  regular 
exchanges  of  information  and  periodical  consul tat  ions.  These 
meetings  have  become  institutionalized. 
Following  the  Paris  Summit  of  1972  it  was  decided 
that  the  objectives of  the  Community's  external  activities and 
of political  cooperation  in pursuit  of European  Union  would  be 
examined  and  fixed  at regular discussions  between  the  heads  of 
State or of Government  meeting as  the  European  Council. 
This  pragmatic  but  politically  oriented  approach 
sparked  off  a  phase  of  intense  Community  ac ti  vi ty  on  the 
international  front,  which  was  further  heightened  by  the 
accession  of  the  United  Kingdom  with  its manifold  traditional 
international  ties. 
The  guidelines  for  this  development  were  in parti-
cular 
Preservation of world peace  (reaffirmed  at  The  Hague  in 
1969;  1975  declarations  by  the  European  Council  on  the  need 
to pursue  detente;  declaration  by  the  Council  on  the  United 
Nations  in  1975); 
- Safeguarding  freedom  in  Europe  :  declaration  on  the  role  of 
the  EEC  and  the  free  peoples  of  the  European  nations,  Bonn 
1961;  declaration  on  accession  to  the  European  Convention 
for  the Protection of Human  Rights  and  Fundamental  Free-
doms,  Luxembourg  1977; - 9  -
- Princ~ple that  the  Community  is open  to all European  nations 
that  share  its ideals and objectives of representative  demo-
cracy  and  respect  for  human  rights;  declaration  on  the 
"European  identity",  Copenhagen  1973; 
- Identification and  defence  of  the  essential  common  inte-
rests of the  nine  Member  States,  having  regard  to  their  na-
tional  diversity  (The  Hague  declaration,  1969); 
Solidarity with  developing  countries  {a)  Community  decla-
ration  of  its  11determination  . . .  to  increase  its effort  in 
aid  and  technical  assistance  to  the  least  favoured  peoples" 
(Paris,  1972)  with  the  clearly stated political  intention of 
intensifying  the  dialogue  with  the  Third  World  and  (b)  the 
declaration  identifying  interdependence  as  motivating  force 
for  development  aid  (Luxembourg  1981); 
Support  for  a  free  trade  approach  to  trade  in manufactures 
and  to  international  economic  relations  in general:  This ap-
proach  has  led  the  Community  to  play  an  active  part  in 
specialist international  organizations  such  as  GATT; 
- Affirmation  of  the  need  to create better terms  of inter-
national  competition based  on  reciprocity and  fairness.  This 
guideline  was  developed  in  Community  action  in  GATT,  espe-
cially in the  Tokyo  Round negotiations; 
- Identification and  affirmation of  the  need  for  the  Communi-
ty  to  have  its own  specific policies  in various  sectors not 
solely  on  the  customs  union  and  agriculture  but  also  on 
transport,  commodity  supplies,  energy  and  other  sectors 
specified by  the  Council; - 10  -
- Recognition  of the  need  for  the  Community  to protect its do-
mestic  economy  as  a  result  of  the  deepening  economic  crisis 
in  the  world  over  the  last  few  years,  as  well  as  various 
economic  onslaughts  from  abroad,  though  the  aim  would  be  to 
restore  the  conditions  for  a  return  to  maximum  freedom  of 
international  trade  as  soon as possible. 
* 
*  * - 11  -
CHAPTER  III 
THE  COMMUNITY'S  RELATIONS  WITH 
INDUSTRIALIZED  COUNTRIES 
3.0  INTRODUCTION 
The  policy  governing  the  Community's  relations  with 
the  industrialized  nations  is  essentially  a  1;rading  pol icy 
geared  to  the  expansion of  free  trade  in an  open world  market. 
The  principle operating  instrument  for achieving  and 
maintaining  this  objective  is  GATT,  to  which  all  the  OECD 
countries  and  a  1 arge  proportion  of  the  developing  countries 
are parties. 
In  the  case of the  EFTA  countries,  the  Community  has 
seen  fit  to  make  an  agreement  establishing  a  genuine  free 
trade  area.  It  has  also  proved  desirable  to  enter  into 
agreements  with  other  industrialized countries  outside  Europe 
(Canada,  Australia  and  New  Zealand)  in  order  to  regulate 
specific aspects  of  relations between  them  and  the  Community. 
World  trade  is unquestionably  the  mainspring  of  much 
of  the  Community's  activity and  growth. 
Figures  showing  the  volume  of  trade  between  the  Com-
munity  and  the  rest of  the  world  are  appended  in summary  form. 
These  indicat·e  that  trade  with  the  industrialized  countries 
(excluding  trade  between  Member  States}  is  on  a  scale  far  in 
excess  of  that  of  trade with  the  other areas. 
However,  if  reference  is  made  to  historic  figures 
for  trade  between  the  Community  and  the  industrialized  coun-
tries,  it  is  apparent  that  there  has  been  a.relative  decline 
iri  the  Community's  position in recent years. - 12  -
It  was  accordingly  felt  appropriate  to  start  this 
review  of  the  Community's  external  relations  with  some  refe-
rence  to  the  industrialized nations,  which  will  play  a  vital 
part  in  the  Community's  future 
economic  front. 
3.1.  RELATIONS  WITH  EFTA 
and  not  merely  on  the 
EFTA  (The  European  Free  Trade  Association)  cele-
brated  its twentieth  anniversary  in  June  1980.  It now  has  six 
full  members  (Iceland,  Norway,  Sweden,  Austria,  Switzerland 
and  Portugal)  and  one  associate  member  (Finland).  The  UK  and 
Denmark  left in late  1972  to  join the  EEC  on  1  January  1973. 
The  seven countries have  a  total  population of  about 
40  million  and  are  a  significant  force  in world  trade  and  the 
world  economy.  In  1979  their total  exports  were  worth  98,300 
million dollars  and  their imports  110,400 million dollars  (*). 
The  EEC  is  by  far  the  most  important  of  EFTA's  trading 
partners  taking  51%  of  the  latter's  exports  and  supplying 
55.6% of its imports. 
When  Denmark,  Ireland  and  the  United  Kingdom  joined 
the  EEC,  free-trade  agreements were  negotiated  between  indivi-
dual  EFTA  countries  on  the  one  hand  and  the  EEC/ECSC  on  the 
other.  These  agreements  culminated  in  the  formation  of  an 
industrial free-trade  area covering  the  sixteen nations of  the 
two  blocs with  their three hundred million inhabitants. 
( *)  With  2, 750  dollars'  worth  of  goods  imported  for  each  in-
habitant,  EFTA  is  the  world 
1 s  leading  economic  bloc  in 
terms  of per capita  trade. - 13  -
Cooperation  between  EFTA  countries  and  the  EEC  has 
thus  become  a  keystone  of  European  interdependence.  In  its 
relations  with  EFTA  the  European  Community  has been guided  by 
two  basic  principles  :  firstly,  it  is  open  to  all  countries 
wishing  to play  a  part  in European  integration,  secondly,  free 
and  expanded  trade  and  economic  relations  on  the  basis  of 
reciprocity  and  fair competition. 
This  has  ensured  fundamental  consistency  between 
concrete action and  the  Community's  long-term objectives. 
The  sharp  increase  in trade  between  EFTA  and  the  EEC 
is the  clearest sign of cooperation between  the  two  blocs  (*). 
The  two  parties  have  endeavoured  to  remove  tariff 
barriers,  quantitative  restrictions  and  non-tariff  barriers. 
Of  course  not  all  ::;hese  tasks  have  been  completed  and  there 
are still problems  ]n specific fields  such  as  two-way  trade  in 
.sensitive  products  (including  agricultural  produce),  the 
drawing-up  of  rule~  of  origin,  cooperation  in  the  difficult 
field  of  fisheries,  etc. 
European  free  trade  is  therefore  a  reality  despite 
the  existence  of  "Community  preference",  which  means  that  the 
EEC  is  an  entity  with  member  countries  having  mutual  obliga-
tions  and  rights  that  cannot  be  extended  to  non-member 
countries. 
EFTA  countries  have  had  to  accept  this  situation, 
which  puts  them  on  a  rather different footing  from  that of  the 
EEC  Member  States,  and  they  have  been  flexible  and  pragmatic 
in  adapting  their  relations.  In  some  cases  EFTA  countries' 
policies have  moved  spontaneously  towards  those  adopted  by  the 
Community. 
(*)  See  tables in Appendix. - 14  -
The  most  striking  example  of  this  is  to  be  seen  in 
monetary  matters  where  some  EFTA  countries.  have  voluntarily 
geared  their  exchange-rate  policies  to  the  European  Monetary 
System.  This  has  led  to  a  marked  degree,  to  stabilized 
exchange parities throughout  most  of Europe. 
A  certain  amount  of  spontaneous  coordination between 
EFTA  countries  and  the  EEC  is  also  taking  place  in external 
trade  policy.  The  two  blocs,  for  example,  share  a  common 
concern  about  Japanese  exports.  Existing  cooperation  agree-
ments  have  thus  been  acquiring  greater  scope  and  importance 
with  the  passage  of  time. 
The  enlargement  of  the  Community  through  the  acces-
sion  of  Greece,  and  the  future  accession  of  Spain  and 
Portugal,  offers  EFTA  countries  new  possibilities  of  trade 
relations.  Thus  the  free-trade  agreement· signed  between  EFTA 
and  Spain  in  1980  is  similar  (partly  even  in  content)  to  the 
agreement  signed  previously  between  Spain  and  the  Community. 
As  a  result  of  the  adjustments  made  to  free-trade  agreements 
in connection with  Greece's accession  the  EFTA  countries enjoy 
facilities  which  would  probably  have  been  hard  to  obtain 
otherwise. 
nity 
Furthermore, 
could  directly 
the  "second  enlargement"  of  the  Commu-
affect  EF.TA  countries  insofar  as  the 
Community  will  need  to  find  a  new  balance  between  Mediterra-
nean  Europe  and  the  central and northern regions  of Europe. 
The  interdependence  of  EFTA  and.  the  Community  is 
becoming  more  and  more  pronounced.  Increasingly close ties are 
being  forged  consistent  with  the  specific  situation  and 
interests of  the  individual partner countries and  the  Communi-
ty.  This  development  i~ of vital  importance  to  the  future  of 
Europe.  Systematic  consultations,  as  well  as  (sometimes  in-
formal  and  non-institutionalized)  meetings  and  analyses  of  -- 15  -
mutual  problems,  have  been  of  great  importance  in  this 
respect.  There  have,  for  example,  been  regular  contacts 
between the  Economic  and  Social  Committee  and  EFTA's  Consulta-
tive Committee  since  1975. 
3.2.  RELATIONS  WITH  THE  UNITED  STATES 
In  importance  and  size,  the  USA  represents  the 
world•s  leading  market,  rich  in  raw  materials  and  with 
advanced  technologies  at  its  disposal.  It  is  a  country 
remarkable  in  its  tenacity,  its  ability  to  get  things  done, 
its capacity for overcoming adversity and its receptiveness  to 
trends  in competitiveness. 
The  Community  is the  USA's  leading  trade partner  (as 
regards  both  imports  and  exports)  but  above  all  it is  linked 
to  that  country by  a  mutual  solidarity founded  on deep  affini-
ties  of  culture,  history,  traditions  and  social  and political 
values  - a  community  of  interests  that forms  the  corner-stone 
on  which  the  progress  and  indeed  the  whole  future  of  the 
Western  World  is based. 
Nevertheless,  economic  relations  between  the  two 
areas  have  continued  to  generate  difficulties  and  complex 
problems.  One  revealing 
trade  deficit  vis-a-vis 
$25,000  million  in  1980, 
terioration  . 
symptom  is  the  Community • s  growing 
the  USA  $9,300  million  in  1979, 
and  prospects  of  a  further  de-
Economic  competition  between  the  USA  and  the  Commu-
nity is intensifying both  on  their respective  home  markets  and 
on  third  country  markets.  In  the  past  there  have  not  been  any 
real  bilateral  commercial  negotiations  or  agreements  between 
the  EEC  and  the  USA  (as  there  have  been  between  the  EEC  and 
other third countries).  Relations  between  the  Community  Insti-
tutions  and  the  USA  have  remained within the  sphere of regular - 16  -
ongoing  consultations,  institutional  contacts  (Western  econo-
mic  summits,  contacts  between  the  Commission  and  the  US 
authorities,  meetings  between  the  European  Parliament  and  the 
Congress)  and multilateral  discussions  and negotiations within 
the  framework  of  the  OECD,  GATT  and  other  international 
economic  organizations  (IMF,  UNCTAD,  specialist  agencies, 
etc. ) . 
To  get  at  the  root  of  the matter it is necessary to 
establish whether economic  relations between  the  Community  and 
the  USA,  which  are  characterized  by  points of  convergence  but 
also  by  areas  of  friction  and  crises,  are  determined  in  the 
main  by  s true  tural  factors  that  can  be  regarded  as  "natural'' 
(i.e.  based  on  the  greater  efficiency  or  competitiveness  of 
one  of  the parties),  or whether "artificial",  anomalous  advan-
tages  are  operating,  involving  direct  and  indirect  protec-
tionist distortions. 
We  should  focus  our  attention  on  this second aspect 
in order to assess  the  effectiveness and  coherence  of  the  Com-
munity's policies  towards  its American  trade  partner. 
It is a  well  known  fact  that,  as regards  technology, 
efficiency  and  productivity  in  many  high-technology  sectors 
and  in  farming,  the  USA  has  been  the  world  leader in  the past 
and will  remain  so  for  a  long  time  to  come.  This has not,  how-
ever,  prevented  the  USA  from  engaging  in direct  and  indirect 
forms  of  protectionism  against  foreign  competition,  thanks 
among  other  factors  to  the  ·zeal  of  a  capable  and  efficient 
Administration. - 17  -
The  new  GA'l"l'  arrangements  ( *)  that  came  into  force 
at  the  beginning  of  1980  have  curbed  some  of  the  less-justi-
fiable  protectionist  practices  of  the  US  Administration  (abo-
lition of  the  American Selling Price  system,  customs  valuation 
rules,  introduction  of  the  principle  whereby  material  injury 
has  to be  proved,  rules governing  the application of  anti-durn-
ping  measures  and  countervailing  duties  in  the  case  of 
subsidies,  and  other rules}. 
But  there  are still areas  subject  to distortions  and 
artificial  conditions  which  have  considerably  helped  US  ex-
ports  to  the  European  market. 
A  few  examples will clarify the  situation  : 
maintenance  of  a  system  of  administered  prices  for  natural 
gas  produced  i.  ·1  the  USA  (price  levels  kept  considerably 
below  correspo11ding  international  prices).  This  greatly 
reduces  the  production  costs,  relative  to  their  Community 
compt,ti tors,  of'  US  sectors  that  are  large  consumers  of 
hydrocarbon  feedstocks  (petrochemicals,  fibres,  fertilizers, 
etc.)  and  of  US  energy-consuming  sectors.  Recently,  up  to 
January  1981,  the  situation  was  even  worse  in  that  the 
prices  of  domestic  crude  oil  were  also  regulated.  The  new 
Reagan  Administration  is,  however,  aiming  for  gradual  abo-
lition of  such controls on domestic  energy prices; 
(*)  Both  the  United States and  the  European  Community  worked 
very hard to ensure  the  success  of  the  Tokyo  Round  nego-
tiations. - 18  -
persistence  of  oligopolistic  advantages  in  some  sectors 
(e.g.  minerals,  phosphate  fertilizers)  in  relation  to  con-
ditions  on  the  international  market,  sometimes  combined with 
dumping  and  the  pushing  of exports; 
- notwithstanding  the  Tokyo  Round  tariff cuts  (which will not, 
however,  become  fully  effective  until  1988),  persistence of 
considerable  differences  between  EEC  and  US  tariffs  for 
certain products  (up  to  25%  for certain kinds  of  textiles); 
- strong  direct  and  indirect  government  support  for  resear·ch 
and  innovation,  of which  extensive  use  is made  in the  USA  by 
many  advanced  technology  sectors. 
- maintenance  of  the  Buy  American  Act,  (which  guarantees 
preference  for  US  products  in  government 
sumer  protection  legislation  and  rules, 
visions  relating  to  quality  standards, 
purchasing),  con-
complicated  pro-
and  regulations 
concerning  health  and  safety,  toxicology,  the  environment, 
etc.  All  of  these  factors  form  real  non-tariff barriers  to 
imports  into  the  USA; 
- indirect  aids  for  US  exports  through  tax  reliefs  and  tax 
deferment  under  the  DISC  (Domestic  International  Sales 
Corporation)  provisions,  which  are  of  doubtful  legality 
under  GATT  rules; 
- government  support,  subsidies and assistance  for  US  agricul-
ture,  which  already  has  an  extremely  large  production 
capacity  combined  with  high  productivity,  making  it  very 
competitive  on all world  markets. - 19  -
The  USA  has  been  equally  critical  of  the  Community. 
It  must  riot  be  forgotten  that  the  United  States  has  always 
been  highly  critical  of  the  Common  Agricultural  Policy  on 
grounds  of  principle  although  it  has  introduced  its  own 
intervention,  aid  and  support  schemes  which  have  produced 
results similar to  those of  the  CAP  (*). 
US  dissatisfaction is  not  restricted  to  the  CAP  but 
extends  to  the  increasingly  advantageous  export  credit  ar-
rangements,  offering  exporters  special  interest  rates  below 
those  of  corresponding  US  facilities. 
The  further  increase  of  Community  steel  exports  to 
the  USA  in  1980  is  a  further  source  of  vexation.  The  main 
causes  of  this  increase  are  held  to  be  dumping  by  the 
Community  and,  in particular,  manufacturing  subsidies. 
All  the~;e  artificial  advantages  enjoyed  by  US  pro-
ducers  are  of  course  compounded  by  the  natural  advantages 
peculiar  to  the  u~~  economy,  e. g.  a  huge  domestic  market  which 
favours  economies  of scale,  rising industrial  and  agricultural 
productivity  and,  in  some  cases,  lower  factor costs  (e.g.  the 
lower  cost  of  labour  and  borrowing  in  the  years preceding  the 
Reagan  Administration's  new  economic  policy). 
(*)  The  Community  seems  to be  adopting rather  incomprehensible 
policies  and  practices  with  regard  to  imports  of  some  US 
agricultural  products  - imports which  are very competitive 
with  certain  Community  products  supported  under  the  CAP 
(e. g.  imports  of  oil-seed  for  margarine  conflicting with 
support  for  the  production  of  butter  and  olive oil in the 
Community,  or  imports  of  cereal  substitutes  conflicting 
with  support  for  cereals  grown  in  the  Community,  etc. 
These  are  problems  which  will  be  discussed  in  a  later 
chapter). - 20  -
Given  that  the  US  products  are  so  competitive,  EEC 
exports  into  the  USA  do  not  seem  to have  established a  secure 
and  lasting  foothold  in  certain markets,  subject  as  they  are 
to  dumping  investigations and  procedures,  and  allegations  that 
they  receive  government  support  not  admissible  under  GATT 
rules. 
Account  should  also  be  taken  of  the  procedural 
difficulties  and  the  cost  to  European· operators  of  taking 
legal action in the  USA  to defend  their interests. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  Community  market  (with  the 
exception  of  agricultural  products)  is  much  more  open  to,  and 
penetrable  by,  foreign  competition  than  the  US  market.  In  some 
instances,  the  level  of  penetration  by  US  products  {for 
example,  synthetic  fibres,  textiles,  fertilizers),  is  giving 
rise  to  serious  concern  in  the  Community.  The  Community 
authorities  give  a  literal  a  posteriori  and  defensive  inter-
pretation to  the  GATT  rules and  confine  themselves  in the  main 
to  defence  against  dumping. 
As  has  already  been  stated,  the  US  Administration 
shows  greater flexibility  and  greater  dynamism  and  inventive-
ness  in  its actions;  it does  not  hesitate  to  make  use  of  all 
the  possibilities  offered  by  the  international  agreements  in 
force  (e. g.  temporary  duties,  surveillance  measures,  etc.), 
and  does  not  rule  out  pragmatic  and  effective  pressure  calls 
for  inter-governmental  consultations  and  other forms  of action 
aimed  basically  at  (a)  curbing  third  countries'  freedom  to 
export  and  (b)  imposing  on  them  forms  of  voluntary  restraint 
and  direct  and  indirect export  quotas. - 21  -
Other  problems  in  the  not  always  peaceful  relations 
between  the  Community  and  the  USA  lie  in  the  monetary  and 
financial  spheres,  in  competition  (and  in  some  cases  co-
operation)  with  regard  to  supplies  of  energy  and  raw 
materials,  and  in  the  relationships  and  actual  or  potential 
conflicts with other third countries  (countries with centrally 
planned  economies,  developing  countries,  OPEC  countries), 
especially Japan. 
The  attitude  of  the  USA  - like  that  of  the  Com-
munity  - to  Japan,  is conditioned  by  close  ties of interdepen-
dence  that  can  give  rise  to indirect reactions  by  one party as 
a  consequence  of  the  acts of  the  other party. 
As  a  final,  positive  remark,  it can  be  said that  the 
practice  of  regul~r consultations  between  the  Commission  and 
the  US  Administrition  on  more  general  problems  (economic 
situation,  energy,  application  of  GATT  rules,  etc.)  and of  ad 
hoc  consultations  on  the  more  acute  problems  that  may  arise 
from  time  to  time  (motor  industry,  steel,  textiles,  synthetic 
fibres,  petrochemicals,  etc,)  has  made  possible  a  deeper 
understanding  of  the  respective  problems  and positions and  has 
facilitated  the  search  for  the  most  appropriate  solutions 
furthering  common  interests. 
It  is  to  be  hoped  that  the  practice  of  periodic 
consultations  in  specific  problems  will  in  future  be  consoli-
dated  and  expanded  so  that  the  artificial  distortions,  ob-
stacles  to  competition  and  non-tariff barriers  still existing 
between  the  two  parties can  be  progressively abolished. - 22  -
3.3.  RELATIONS  WITH  CANADA 
The  Community  has  been  very  active  in  connection 
with  its  relations  with  Canada,  and  has  concluded  agreements 
with  that  country.  An  outline  agreement  on  trade  and  economic 
cooperation,  initialled  in  1976,  provides  for  the  establish-
ment  of  joint  consultation  committees  which  are  to  hold 
six-monthly  meetings  on  matters  of  major  interest  to  the  two 
parties.  Bilateral  agreements  have  set  up  bodies  to  ~egulate 
relations  concern1ng  fisheries  and  the  environment. 
The  outcome  has  not  been  satisfactory  i.r.  all  re.s-· 
pects.  Trade  between  the  Community  and  Canada  has  not  in-
creased  as  much  as  expected,  and  talks  on  stepping  up 
economic,  industrial  and  financial  cooperation  ace  JUd[:8C  i.::J 
some  quarters  to  have  been  somewhat  disappointing.  The  Cor::-
muni ty  has  remained  in  deficit  in  its  trade  'di th  Canada, 
indeed  the  deficit  has  increased  from  1.500  million  ECUs  J.n 
1970  to  2,700 million ECUs  in  1980. 
The  main  reason for  ~his is the  dirigist approach  of 
the  Canadian  authorities,  who  have  adopted  a  policy  o~·  he<."YY 
investment  in  the  public  sector,  various  controls  fer  the 
productive  sector  and  investment,  and  incentives  for  dis-
advantaged  regions. 
In  the  field of  foreign  trade,  this approach  has  led 
to  protectionism  for  domestic  Canadian  produce,  with  import 
quotas  and  restrictions  and  resort  - sometimes  for  ulterior 
motives  - to  GATT  safeguard clauses. 
These  matters  have  been raised  in the  joint coopera-
tion Committees;  the  Community  has put  forward  complaints,  but 
long-term  solutions  have  not  been  found. - 23  -
Canada,  for its part,  has  counter-attacked by  saying 
that  CAP  is  protectionist  (though  CAP  does  not  discriminate 
against it), 
Oil  double-pricing  is  one  disquieting  feature  of 
Canadian  protectionist  tendencies.  This  system  subsidizes oil 
imports  heavily  and  gives  local  consumer  industries access  to 
oil  at  half  international  prices.  The  resultant  competition 
distortion  is  of  particular concern  to  the  USA  (who  have  only 
recently  decided  to  scrap  their  double-pricing  arrangements 
for  hydrocarbons),  but  could  also  have  a  negative  impact  on 
the  Community  in the  future. 
Notwithstanding  these  difficulties,  there  is  scope 
for  cooperation  between  the  Community  and  Canada,  given  the 
marked  complementa~ity of  the  two  economies.  Political will  on 
both  sides,  however,  would  be  needed. 
Canada  is  very  rich  in  raw  materials,  energy  and 
agricultural  and  forestry  resources.  It  has  shown  that  it is 
willing  to  accept  investment  from  the  Community  (provided  such 
investment  is  subject  to  controls)  and  that it is open  to  ad-
vanced  forms  of  cooperation  in the  productive  sector. 
The  Community  will  have  to  determine  to what  extent 
the  present  system  of  economic  relations  can be  substantially 
improved  so  that  the  EEC  can  rely  on  Canada  for  future 
supplies  of  raw  materials  and  increased  economic  cooperation. 
Basically,  this  means  forsaking  the  short-term  view,  which  is 
confined  to  the protection of transient interests. - 24  -
A  longer-term  approach  on  the  part of  the  Community, 
and  greater  readiness  to  exploit  the  scope  for  cooperation, 
could,  moreover,  give  Canada  more  balanced  economic  relations 
with its traditional partners  (United States  and  Japan). 
3.4.  RELATIONS  WITH  AUSTRALIA 
The  Australian  continent  is  exceptionally  rich  in 
mining  and  agricultural  resources  and  there  is every prospect 
of  rapid  and  widespread  economic  growth.  These  factors, 
combined  with  historical  and  cultural  ties  and  social  and 
political  similarities,  should  have  resulted  in  particularly 
close  relations between Australia  and  the  European  Community. 
Yet  relations  between  the  two  areas  have  never been 
easy in the  past  and  there  have  been  instances of  open contro-
versy  in  international  forums,  as  well  as  cases  of  trade 
restriction and blatant protectionism  on  both  sides. 
From  the  inception  of  the  Common  Agricultural 
Policy,  there  has  been  friction  between  the  EEC  and Australia 
(and  New  Zealand)  over  trade.  This friction was  exacerbated by 
the  United  Kingdom's  accession to  the  Community.  Australia has 
suffered  substantial  economic  loss  despite  all  the  efforts of 
the  mother country- traditionally also  the  largest market  for 
its  farm  produce  - to  protect  Austral ian  interests  when  it 
joined the  EEC. 
Until  the  last  few  years  the  Community's  attitude  to 
Australia  (and vice versa)  has not  been very conciliatory.  The 
EEC  has  consistently  countered  Australian  accusations  of 
protectionism  in  the  agricultural  sector  with  charges  of 
industrial  protectionism  {very  high  Australian  import  duties 
on  Community  manufactures)  and  of  a  reluctance  to  accept 
traditional  Community  exports  (cars,  footwear, 
clothing,  etc.). 
textiles, - 25  -
Notwithstanding  this  rather  unfavourable  climate  of 
relations  between  the  two  areas,  the  Community  comes  second 
only to  the  United  States as exporter to Australia. 
EEC  exports  to  Australia  in  1980  totalled  about 
3,  000  million  ECU  and  were  focussed  on  machinery,  transport 
systems,  chemicals,  etc.)  EEC  imports  from  Australia consisted 
primarily  of  raw  materials  and  semi-finished  products  (wool, 
coal,  hides,  minerals,  etc.). 
In  addition,  Community  firms  have  invested  heavily 
and  placed  large  orders in Australia,  especially in the  mining 
and  high-technology  sectors.  This  shows  the  vast  scope  for 
industrial  and  commercial  cooperation with  that country. 
Australic  is  a  major  source  of  raw  materials.  Not 
only  does  it  pos:,ess  17%  of  the  uranium  reserves  of  the 
non-Communist  world  but  it  has  also  huge  coal  deposits 
(current  exports  f.')  mainly  to  Japan)  and  substantial  reserves 
of  iron  ore,  titanl.um,  and  bauxite  (by  the  end of  the 80's it 
will  be  the  largest  aluminium producer  in  the western world). 
In  view  of  the  difficulties  the  E'Ec  is experiencing 
in obtaining  raw  materials  and  energy,  the  Community's  policy 
to  date  could  perhaps  be  more  longsighted  as  it  has  hardly 
been  conducive  to  establishing  a  close-knit  relationship with 
Australia in the  various  economic  spheres. 
Recently,  however,  there  have  been  signs  of  an 
improvement  in  relations  between  the  Community  Institutions 
and  the  Australian  Government.  A  step  forward  was  taken  in 
1979  when  it was  decided  to hold  regular consultations  between 
the  Australian  authorities  and  the  EEC  Commission.  Infonnal 
contacts were  also established between  the European  Parliament 
and  the  Australian Parliament. - 26  -
In  April  1981.  the  Commission  finally  opened  an 
official  mission  to  Australia  in  Canberra,  so  that  contacts 
with  the  Australian  Government  could  be  put  on  a  permanent 
footing  and  a  constructive  dialogue  opened  up  between  the  two 
sides. 
In  discussing  this matter,  the  Section expressed  the 
view  that  the  whole  complex  of relations between  the  Community 
and  Australia  should  be  re-thought  and  re-modelled  in  new, 
more  positive  terms  than in the past. 
Points  of  discord  and· conflict  should,  in  par-
ticular,  be  eliminated  as  soon  as possible,  since  some  of  them 
appear to be  of relatively marginal  importance. 
It  is  significant  that  trade  in  agricultural  pro-
ducts  has  been  the  sole  source  of  conflict  between  the  two 
sides.  The  stream  of  remonstrances  and  vociferous  complaints 
from  Australia in 'fact  stems  from  the EEC's  alleged failure  to 
• 
honour  its  commitments  on  limited  beef  and veal  imports under 
the  GATT  agreements  and  above  all  from  the  indirect  damage 
caused  to  Australian  exports  by  cut-price  sales  of  EEC  farm 
surpluses  (particularly  beef,  veal  and  sugar)  to  Australia's 
natural  markets  in  South- East  Asia,  the  Middle  East  and  the 
Far East. 
The  latest seed  of discord  is the  EEC's  decision,  in 
May  1980,  to  incorporate  sheepmeat  into  the  CAP.  Since  then 
tension  has  been  eased  by  the  voluntary  restraint  agreement 
concluded  under  the  umbrella  of  GATT  in  October  1980,  and  a 
cut-back  in  the  levy  on Australian sheepmeat  from  20%  to  10%. 
The  changes  to  the  sugar  export  regime  made  in  the 
Spring  of  1981  should  also  help  to  improve  relations with Aus-
tralia. - 27  -
With  goodwill  on both sides,  it ol'ght  to  be  possible 
to  find  reasonable,  swift  solutions  to all  these  problems  and 
areas of conflict. 
While  the  Community's  policy  towards  Australia  has 
quite  plainly  lacked  consistency  in  the  past,  how  consistent 
it  is  in  the  future  will  obviously  be  judged  by  how  success-
fully  the  complementary  and  collaborative  aspects  of 
EEC/  Australian  links,  are  developed  not  only  in  trade  and 
industry but  also  in broader  terms. 
This  should  also  be  an  attractive  proposition  for 
Australia,  which  will  be  able  to  sustain a  fruitful  relation-
ship  with  Europe,  and  so  avoid  having  to  look  solely  to  the 
United  States and  Japan. 
3.5.  RELATIONS  WIT!- NEW  ZEALAND 
Like  Australia,  New  Zealand has certain social,  cul-
tural  and  politica:  affinities with  Europe,  partly due  to its 
links with  and  membership  of  the British Commonwealth. 
New  Zealand's  economy  is based  on  the  production of 
a  limited  range  of  goods  (wool,  sheepmeat  and  butter).  In  the 
past  the  bulk  of  these  were  exported  to  Europe,  and  so 
ag:dcul tural  pol icy is of  crucial  importance  to  New  Zealand. 
Given  this  situation,  the  European  Community  still 
has  certain  responsibilities  in  regard  to  New  Zealand's 
economic  future.  It will  be  very  difficult for New  Zealand to 
achieve  - within  a  reasonable  period  of  time  - the  objective 
of  diversifying  its  exports  into  alternative  markets.  Access 
to  the  EEC  market  will  still be  crucial  for  some  considerable 
time  to  come. - 28  -
This  fact  has  been  recognized  in  the  consultations 
and  contacts  between  the  European  Community  and  the  New 
Zealand  Government,  but  this  has  not  prevented  conflicts· of 
interest  arising  as  the  result  of  certain  decisions  taken  by 
the  Community  pursuant  to  the  Common  Agricultural  Policy. 
Each  year,  specific  quotas  have  been  laid  down  for 
Community  imports  of  sheepmeat  and  dairy  products  from  New 
·Zealand.  The  resultant  problems  have  only  been  overcome 
through  the  goodwill  shown  on both sides.  However,  despite  the 
difficult  economic  situation  over  the  last  few  years,  New 
Zealand exports  to  the  EEC  have  continually increased in value 
and  the  country  has  been  running  a  trade  surplus  with  the 
Community  (excluding  invisibles and  services). 
However,  New  Zealand's  worries  have  not  entirely 
disappeared  (partly  because  the  country  is  going  through  a 
rather  serious  economic  crisis)  and  in  some  cases  its expec-
tations  have  not  been  wholly  fulfilled.  This  is  a  typical 
example  of  how  the  Community's  aim  of  "consistency"  in  its 
dealings  is severely tested  in  trying to  reconcile conflicting 
objectives. 
It is quite  clear  (and  the  European  Parliament said 
as  much  in  no  uncertain  terms  in  a  1979  report)  that  the  two 
sides  will  have  to  make  every  effort  to  explore all real pos-
sible  opportunities  for  strengthening  and  deepening  the  links 
between  them. 
The  mining,  energy  (coal,  natural .gas,  hydroelec-
tricity),  industrial  and  se~vice sectors  in  New  Zealand still 
are  in  a  barely  embryonic  state  and  could  be  given  a 
significant  boost  through  appropriate  co-operation  links  with 
industry,  technology  and  management  in the  EC  Member States. - 29  -
New  Zealand•s  aim  is  to  diversify  its  economy  by 
stimulating  and  diversifying  those  branches  of  agriculture, 
mining  and  industry which  can  hold  their own  on world  markets. 
And  there  is  no  doubt  that  the  European  Community  is  in  a 
position  to  make  a  positive  and  major  contribution  to  the 
efforts  which  New  Zealand  will  have  to  make  in  this  area  in 
the near future. 
3.6.  RELATIONS  WITH  JAPAN  (*) 
Within  a  few  years  of  the  European  Community  being 
founded,  discussions  began  on  ways  of  finding  common  ground 
with  Japan  in order  to  regulate  mutual  trade  which  was  being 
distorted  by  wide  differences  in  the  respective  economic 
systems. 
In  the  1960 • s  the  Community  unsuccessfully  pressed 
for  the  negotiation  of  a  full-scale  trade  agreement  with 
Japan. 
Japan,  however,  was  busy  drawing  up  its  own  pro-
posals  for  orderly  marketing  and  orderly  exporting,  on  the 
basis  of  unilateral  voluntary  regulation  of  Japanese  exports 
and  international-level  agreements  between  industrial  pro-
ducers  from  various  branches of  the  economy.  Japan  was  worried 
by  the  tendency  of  importing  countries  to  impose  unilateral 
curbs.  The  United  States  took  this  step  in  1971,  and  the  EEC 
might  well  have  followed  suit. 
(*)  The  Economic  and  Social  Committee  adopted  an  own-in-
itiative  Opinion  in  July  1981  on  Economic  and  Commercial 
Relations  between  the  European  Community  and  Japan.  The 
Opinion  analyses  the  reasons  for  differences  in  com-
petitiveness  between  the  two  areas  and  lays  down  guide-
lines for a  coherent  Community  policy. - 30  -
None  of  the  proposed  solutions  yielded  concrete 
results  and  Japan  pushed  on  with  its policy  of  centrally-di-
rected exports.  The  results are ·known  to all  of us.  The  energy 
crisis  of  1973  and  the  subsequent  Tokyo  Round  of  GATT 
negotiations  then  absorbed  the  attention  and  initiating capa-
city of  the  two  parties  • 
.  The  Community's  trade  deficit  with  Japan  has  been 
growing  steadily worse  since  1973. 
in  thousand million ECU 
Year  EEC  Imports  EEC  Exports  Difference  in Value 
1970  1.65  1.38  - 0.27 
1972  2.65  1.49  - 1.16 
1974  4.38  2.77  - 1.60 
1976  6.40  2.72  - 3.70 
1977  7.67  3.09  - 4.58 
1978  8.73  3.73  - 5.00 
1979  9.79  4.63  - 5.16 
1980  12.46  4.57  - 7.89 
Source:  EUROSTAT 
In  the  first  quarter  of  1981  the  deficit recorded  a 
further  deterioration,  jumping  46%  compared  with  the  corres-
ponding  period of 1980. 
The  situation  is  rapidly  becoming  intolerable  for 
the  Community  economy,  and  especially for  a  number of key  sec-
tors. - 31  -
It  has  been  pointed 
peculiar  to  Japan  give  it  an 
industrialized  countries.  These 
out  that  certain 
advantage  over 
include  the  low 
features 
the  other 
level  of 
public  expenditure  on  social  security,  defence,  and  aid  for 
developing  countries  (though  there  has  been  an  increase  in 
recent years). 
But  the  real  strong  point  of  Japanese policy is its 
consistent  and  strict  adherence  to  a  number  of key principles 
high  level  of  competitiveness  and  productivity,  tight 
organization  of  the  domestic  market,  industrial  and  trade 
strategy geared  to clear-cut,  planned objectives. 
The  Community  presents  a  much  less  consistent  pic-
ture.  The  level  of  competitiveness  is  inadequate  and  varies 
sharply  between  t  1e  Member  States,  the  Community  market  is 
very  open  to  the  rest  of  the  world,  and  there  is  no  real 
industrial  and  trade  strategy  designed  to  further  common 
objectives. 
The  crucial  factor  in  trade  between  the  EEC  and 
Japan  is  the  way  Japanese  exporters  have  concentrated  on  a 
handful  of  sectors  where  they  are  helped  by  the  high  quality 
and  advanced  technology  of  their  products  and  their extremely 
effective  marketing  methods,  backed  by  an  advantageous  finan-
cing  system.  The  major  Japanese  penetration  of  a  number  of 
sectors  has  plunged  many  competing  Community  firms  into  a 
serious  crisis,  even  to  the  point  of  jeopardizing  their 
continued  existence. 
Concurrently,  EEC  exports  to  Japan  have  been  slug-
gish.  They  have  not  been  expanding  nearly  as  rapidly  as  the 
exports  of  other  industrialized  countries,  such  as the  United 
States. - 32  -
The  deterioration  in  the  EEC 's  export/import  ratio 
in its trade  with  Japan  has  occurred at  a  time  when  Japan  has 
a  substantial  current-account  deficit  and  when  its  trade 
account  with the  USA  is moving  closer to equilibrium. 
It  has  also  been  pointed  out  that  Japan  has  to 
import  large  quantities  of  many  items,  such  as  food  and 
clothing,  which  are  produced  in  the  Community.  There  is  an 
export  opportunity here for Community  producers. 
In  the  face  of the worsening  situation over the  last 
few  years,  the  EEC  Commission  has  shown  a  degree of hesitation 
as  to what  decision to  take  (*). 
It  was  not  until  October  1980  that  the  Commission 
drafted  a  proposal,  specifically  requested  Japan  to  exercise 
voluntary  restraints  to  keep  its  exports  to  the  EEC  within 
acceptable  limits and at  the  same  time  to  open  up  its domestic 
market  more  to  EEC  products. 
The  formal  discussions  which  began  in  early  1981 
were  a  complete  failure.  Japan  showed  little  interest  in 
serious  talks  with  the  Community  Institutions  which,  in  its 
view,  did  not  really  represent  the  varied  interests  of  the 
Community  countries. 
( *)  As  late  as  1980  the  Commission  urged  that  the  Member 
States  should  unilaterally,  and  without  negotiation~., 
abandon  residual  quotas  and  remove  all  barriers  to 
Japanese  imports.  The  Commission  stated  its  firm  belief 
that  this  display  of  goodwill  would  be  answered  by  the 
Japanese  with  spontaneous restraints  on  exports. - 33  -
The  weakness  of  the  Community  position  is  mainly 
attributable  to  the  lack  of  mutual  trl'st  among  the  Member 
States.  Appeals  by  the  latter  for  Community  solidarity_ have 
been  belied  by  their  insist~nce  on  pursuing  purely  national 
and  bilateral  approaches  to  their  relations  with  Japan;  in 
some  cases  they  have  persisted  in  the  unilateral  defence  of 
certain sectcrs of their domestic markets. 
Furthermore,  it is  inconsistent  to  attempt  to  deal 
with EEC/Japan  issues at Community  level  without  having  an  EEC 
industrial  policy  on  which  to  base  discussion,  with  the  Ja-
panese,  on  the  terms  of - and  scope  for - reciprocal  trade  and 
investment,  and  reciprocal  transfers of technology. 
From  another  angle,  the  discussions  with  Japan  are 
of  major  political  importance.  Japan  cannot  continue  to 
offload  onto  its  Western  partners  the  structural  deficits it 
is  running  on  its  trade  with  the  oil-prc•ducing  countries. 
However,  the  approach  adopted  by  the  USA  also  has. a  major 
impact  on  the  scoi:e  for ensuring equilibrium between Japan  and 
the  Community.  So  far,  the course adopted  by  the  United  States 
{aimed  at  obtaining  concessions  tt.rough  bilateral  ne-
gotiations)  has  not  made  it  any  €asier  to  secure  such  an 
equilibrium  ( *). 
The  issue  of  opening  up  the  Japanese market  more  to 
Community  products  is  a  familiar  topic  which  has  been  dis-
cussed at length. 
( *)  It  was. recently  announced  that  Japan,  the  Community  and 
the  United  States  would  probably  meet  to  discuss  trade 
problems  of  common  int~rest. - 34  -
The  Japanese  system  of  non-tariff barriers  involves 
such  complex  procedures  and  constraints;  and  is  so  time-con-
suming  that many  foreign businessmen are deterred  from  trading 
with  Japan.  The  Japanese  authorities  have  frequently promised 
to ease  these procedures but  without  concrete results. 
In  the  view  of  Community  businessmen,  one  of  the 
reasons why  the  Japanese  market  is  so  impenetrable is that  the 
distribution  network  is  highly  fragmentec,  seems  rather  in-
efficient,  and  is  controlled  by  a  handful  of  large  companies 
closely  lir·ked  to the production side. 
Recently,  the  Community  ha~; also  shown  an  increasing 
propensity  to  cons:!.(er  defensive  measures  based  on  existing 
GATT  rules  (including  monitoring  clauses  to  be  backed  up  by 
more  specific action on  the·  tariff,  quota  and other fronts,  in 
the  event  of  consul tat  ions  with  Japan  failing  to  achieve  the 
desired results. 
In this respect,  the  European  Community  is following 
the  example  of  other  countries  - particularly  the  United 
States  which  has  always  interpreted  GATT  rules  broadly,  i.e. 
used  them  not  only to promote  trade  :iberalization but  also  to 
protect  and  safeguard  internal  markets  against  the  disruptive 
trade practices of  third  countries. 
In  conclusion,  after  a  long  period  of  uncertaj nty 
and  indecision,  the  Community  has  still  not  succeeded  in 
implementing  a  realjstic policy vis-a-vis Japan. 
It  must  dispel  the  uncertainty  that  has  reigned  to 
date  and  win  recognition as the  legitimate,  official represen-
tative of Member  States. - 35  -
It  would,  however,  be  wrong  to  th:l.nk  that  trade 
relations between  the  EEC  and Japan  can  rapidly be  restorf:d  to 
equilibrium  simply  by  pursuading  the  Japanese  to  be  less 
agressi  ve  and  more  cooptu·ati  ve. 
The  problem is a  complex  one,  and  other external  and 
internal  aspects have  to be  taken  into cc•nsideration. 
We  must  therefo1·e  ask  what  Japanese  strateg:'f,S,  and 
consequently economic  relations between  the  EEC  and Japan,  are 
likely to  look  like in the  future. 
Some  indications  can  he  gleaned  from  the  publi-
cations  of  the  MITI(*)  which  speak  of  new  investment  strate-
gies  abroc;~d,  the  development  of  home-grown  Japanesf:  technolo-
gies,  the  rise  of  new  sectors  snd  new-generation  industri•~:::, 
and  the  decline  in other  ma,ture  industries which will  be  left 
to  the  newly  industrializing  co~ntries.  It is clear that  a  new 
situation  h.  taking  shape  and  a  close  watch  will  have  to  be 
kept  on it while  there is still time. 
remains  that of substan- The  basic problem,  however, 
tially  improving  the  competitiveness 
something  which  can  be  achievtcl 
of  European  in<lu~.tries -
by  efforts  to  innovate, 
acquire  more  advanced  technologies,  improve  managerial  skills 
and  embark  on  a  more  forceful  export drive. 
( *)  Cf.  the  MITI  dossier  :  "A  view  of  industrial  policy  for 
the  1980s",  Mondo  Economico,  26  July 1980,  pages  21-22. - 36  -
It  has  beer"  s':ated,  for  example,  that  some  of  the 
responsibility  for  the  sluggishness  of  European  exports  to 
Japan  is  attributable  to  the  fact  that  European  firms  have 
made  little  or  no  effort  to  make  their  presence  felt  on  the 
important  Japanese market. 
The  efforts of European  firms  in terms  of resources, 
manpower,  time,  and  attempts  to  understand  the  local  culture 
and  language  have  lagged  far  behind  the  efforts  of  their 
Japanese  counterparts  to  penetrate  European  and  American 
markets.  The  difference  in  results  is  therefore  not  sur-
prising. 
It  is therefore  important  that  a  climate  favourable 
to  innovation,  research,  plant  replacement  and  high  produc-
tivity  be  restored  as  soon  as  possible.  It  is  likewise 
important  to  create  a  framework  for  more  stable  social  and 
industrial  relations,  the  aim  being  to  secure  a  gradual  and 
constant  improvement. 
National  governments  and  the  Community  authorities 
will  have  to  commit  themselves  fully  to  bringing  about  such 
conditions  and  ensuring  a  far  greate~ degree of consistency in 
Community  action,  by  harmonizing  national policies and  setting 
common  goals  for  industry._ A  further sine qua  non  is a  dynamic 
trade policy,  with  the  Community  market  showing  a  united  front 
and  requiring  Japan  to  comply  fully  with  the  principles  of 
reciprocity of trade. 
When  this process is firmly  under way,  even Japanese 
dynamism,  which  is  a  cause  of  so  much  concern  today,  will 
provide  an  opportunity  for  the  Japanese  and  EEC  economies  to 
work  out  new  forms  of  cooperation  and  joint  expansion  at  the 
local  and world  level. 
* 
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CHAPTER  IV 
RELATIONS  WITH  THE  DEVELOPING  COUNTRIES 
4.0.  BACKGROUND 
The  Community  can  currently  draw  on  an  extensive 
battery  of  instruments  for  the  purpose  of  implementing  its 
development  co-operation and aid policy. 
The  Convention concluded with  the African,  Caribbean 
and  Pacific  (ACP)  States  and  the  Agreements  with  the  Medi-
terranean  countries  are  the  contractual  pillars  of  its oper-
ation  in  this  area.  The  Generalized  Preferences  Scheme  (GSP) 
is  another  specific  instrument  which  has  won  widespread 
appreciation. 
In  addition  to  these  three  areas,  the  Community 
plays  a  prominent  role  within  international  organizations.  It 
has  participated  i. n  commodity  negotiations,  was  one  of  the 
driving  forces  behind  the  North-South  and Euro-Arab  Dialogues, 
and  is a  party to numerous  bilateral  agreements with  the  LDCs. 
It  also  provides  financial,  food  and  emergency  aid,  loans  to 
non-governmental  organizations,  and  so  on. 
During  the  period  immediately  after  the  entry  into 
force  of  the  Treaty  of  Rome,  the  Community 
1 s  development  co-
operation  drive  was  channelled  mainly  through  the Association 
provided  for  in Part  IV  of  that  Treaty.  This  Association  was 
restricted  to  a  number  of  former  French  colonies  in  Africa, 
the  Italian  trust  terri  tory  of  Somalialand,  Netherlands,  New 
Guinea,  the  Belgian  Congo  and  Ruanda-Urundi. - 38  -
Despite  its circumscribed  geographical  area  and  the 
very  modest  funds  available  to it,  the  Association  fanned  an 
efficiently  structured  core  with  its  own  institutions,  which 
operated  smoothly. 
In  1964,  a  fresh  impetus  was  provided  in  the  shape 
of  the  First  Yaounde  Convention,  though  the  Association's 
territorial  scope  remained  limited. 
In  1967  the  Community  started  to  broaden  its  con-
tractual  ties  with  the  African  countries;  the  negotiations 
opened  with Nigeria,  Kenya,  Uganda  and  Tanzania  and  culminated 
the  following  year  in  the  Arusha  Association  Agreement  (em-
brae ing  only  Kenya,  Uganda  and  Tanzania).  In  1969  the  two 
Conventions  were  renewed  and  in  1973  Mauritius  acceded  to  the 
Yaounde  Convention. 
1973  saw  the  start  of  the  talks  that  led  to  the 
conclusion of  the first  Lome  Convention  in 1975. 
This  Convention,  encompassing  46  LDCs,  was  intended 
by  the  Contracting  Parties  to  establish  a  new  blueprint  for 
relations between  the  industrialized and  developing nations. 
As  the  years  went  by,  relations  with  the 
Mediterranean  countries  came  to  assume  considerable  impor-
tance.  Following  the  conclusion of association agreements with 
Greece  and  Turkey  in  the  early  Sixties,  the  first  agreements 
were  concluded  with  the  Maghreb  States  and  exploratory  talks 
got  under  way  with  Malta,  the  United  Arab  Republic  and  the 
Lebanon.  Immediately  afterwards,  in  1970,  agreements  were 
signed with  Israel  and  Spain,  and negotiations with Cyprus  and 
Portugal  got off the ground. - 39  -
As  these  contacts  rapidly  gathered  momentum,  the 
Community's  relations  with  the  Medi terrSLl'lean  cou.1tries  gra-
dually  took  shape,  in  mutual  recognition  of  the  de  facto 
interdependence of all States in that region. 
On  a  worldwide  scale,  the  Community  has  been  par-
ticularly  active  within  the  United  Nations  framework,  and 
especially in UNCTAD  (set  up  in 1961). 
In  1968  the  Community  took  the  lead  in  framing  a 
Generalized  Preferences  Scheme  (GSP)  designed  to  aid  the  LDCs 
and  played  a  decisive  role  in  the  establishment  of  this 
Scheme,  to  which  other  industrialized  countries  have  sub-
sequently acceded. 
With  the  accession  of  the  United  Kingdom,  Denmark 
and  Ireland,  the  Community's  external  relations with all parts 
of the  world,  and especially certain East Asian countries  (the 
ASEAN  group)  received  a  shot  in  the  arm.  Simultaneously,  the 
prospect  of  opening  negotiations  with  China  started to become 
a  reality. 
The  Paris  Summit  (1972)  concluded  that  the  various 
components  of  the  Community's  external  relations policy should 
form  part  and  parcel  of  a  consistent,  overall  approach  to  the 
Community's  specific  international  role.  Applying  this  prin-
ciple  first  to  the  Mediterranean  countries,  it was  advocated 
that  any  existing  or  future  agreements  with  them,  would  have 
to tie in with  a  balanced,  general  strategy. 
It  was  clear  from  the  Summit  that  the  Member States 
needed  to  harmonize  and  coordinate  their  standpoints  more 
effectively,  both  within  international  forums  (particularly 
the  United  Nations)  and  for  the  purpose  of  framing  a  genuine 
Community  development  cooperation policy. - 40  -
The  political  declaration  made  by  the  Nine  at  the 
Copenhagen  Summit,  in  No vern be r  197  3,  paved  the  way  for  the 
Euro-Arab  Dialogue.  Later,  in  December  1975,  the  foundations 
for  the  North-South  Dialogue  were  laid  at  the  Paris  Mini-
sterial Conference  on  International  Economic  Cooperation. 
Accordingly,  at  the  time  of  the  advent  of  the first 
oil  crisis  in  1973,  the  Community  was  able  to conduct  and  de-
velop  its  relations  with  developing  countries  all  over  the 
world  on  a  number of  fronts  : 
active  involvement  in  major  UN  and  GATT  negotia-
tions; 
- relations  with  the  South  and  East  Mediterranean 
countries; 
- relations with  the  ACP  States; 
- negotiations with China; 
- aid to non-associated  LDCs; 
- start of  the  Euro-Arab  Dialogue; 
the  launching  of  the  "North-South  Dialogue"  in 
conjunction with other industrial nations. 
Over  the  subsequent  period,  international  economic 
relations  have,  needless  to. say,  been  severely  strained  by 
such  pressures  as  the  energy  crisis,  upheavals  on  the  world 
money  market  and  the  deteriorating  economic  situation of many 
industrialized  countries  and,  to  an  even  worse  extent,  the 
LDCs. - 41  -
The  Community  continues  to  press  ahead  with its ex-
ternal  policies  though  the  resources  avP.ilable  ar·e  in  no  way 
commensurate  with  the  serious  problems  that  needed  to  be 
tackled.  ( *) 
Nonetheless,  the  LDCs  take  a  keen  economic  and poli-
tical  interest  in  such  action;  they  recognize  the  importance 
of  the  Community  keeping  up  its efforts in hard  times like  the 
present. 
The  signature of  the  Second  Lome  Convention  in 1979, 
the  conclusion  of  the  Tokyo  Round  Agreements,  measures  to 
assist  the  LDCs,  commodity  agreements,  the  Mul tifibre  Agree-
ment  and  food  aid  schemes,  combined  with  the  general  expres-
sion  of  a  firm  political  resolve  to foster closer trade  links 
be tween  the  Member·  States  and  the  LDCs,  are all milestones  on 
the  arduous  uphill  path  to  which  the  Community  remains 
resolutely committed. 
There  ar·e  also  some  signs  of  progress  as  regards 
closer political  cooperation  among  the  Member  States.  Regular 
consultations  (rooted  in  the  1973  Copenhagen  declaration)  h~ve 
prompted  the  Nine  to  coordinate  their  stands  more  frequently, 
especially on  their policies vis-a-vis  the  developing nations. 
* 
*  * 
( *)  Nevertheless,  between  1975  and  1980  Ccmmuni ty  aid  to  the 
LDCs  rose  from  886  million  EUA  to  1,  816  million  EUA  (an 
annual  increase of  some  30%). - 42  -
4.1.  GENERAL  DEVELOPMENT  POLICY  INSTRUMENTS 
4.1.1.  Generalized Tariff Preferences  Scheme  (GSP) 
The  Community  deploys  this  autonomous  instrument 
particularly in its relations with  the  non-associated  LDCs.  In 
theory,  however,  the  GSP  is  designed  for  all  LDCs  and  the 
Community  compiles  the list of beneficiaries. 
The  experience  acquired  both  by  the  Community  and 
the  developing  countries  in  implementing  the  GSP  have  proved 
positive  ( *) • 
The  Community's  offer  has  substantially  increased 
since  1971,  and  especially after the  United  Kingdom  joined  the 
EEC  in-1974.  In  the  space  of  five  years it went  up  from  3,700 
million  EUA  to 6,500 million EUA. 
On  the  other  hand  the  developing  countries'  use  of 
the  GSP  has  not  been  entirely satisfactory.  On  average  it was 
60%  for the  year  1978,  with very high  rates of utilization for 
the  most  sensitive  products  ( 103%)  and  very  low  rates  of 
utilization  for  non-sensitive  or  the  least  sensitive products 
(36.5%).  The  obvious  explanation for this latter phenomenon  is 
that  the  marginal  gains  from  GSP  are  less  than  the  adminis-
trative costs  involved. 
Another  conclusion  to  be  drawn  is  that  it  is  the 
most  advanced beneficiaries that gain most  from  the  GSP.  These 
are  South  Korea  and  Taiwan  (the  two  countries  accounting  for 
25%  of  imports  under  the  GSP  for 1977),  Hong-Kong,  Yugoslavia 
and Brazil. 
(*)  Cf  CES  1/80 fin  and Appendices - 43  -
The  wisdom  of  extending  the  GSP  to  China  and 
Bulgaria as well  as  Romania has also  been questioned. 
The  question  to  be  asked  therefore  is  whether  the 
GSP  actually  ful:fils  the  role  of  the  Community  has  always 
intended it to play,  i.e. first and  foremost  to help countries 
whose  needs  are  greatest,  secondly  to  take  into  account  the 
level  of  development  achieved  by  individual  beneficiary coun-
tries,  and  thirdly  to  show  sensitivity  to  the  economic  and 
social  problems  of the  Community itself. 
There  does  seem  to  be  some  discordance  between  the 
aims  of  the  GSP  and  actual  achievements.  This  gap  might  pe 
closed  if  the  Community  were  able  to  retur·n  to  normal  GATT 
rules for  imports  from  developing  countries which  have  reached 
a  sufficiently high  level  of  competitiveness,  and if the  Com-
munity  were  able  to  demand  reciprocity  in  trade  with  such 
countries.  Those  developing  countries  which  have  not  yet 
reached  this  level  of  competitiveness  should,  in  their  re-
lations  with  the  ;.:,ommunity,  behave  in  a  manner  that  is  in 
keeping  with  the  agreements  concluded  arid  should  ensure  that 
there  is  healthy  competition,  especially  with  regard  to 
prices,  regularity  of  deliveries,  terms  of  payment  and  access 
to markets. 
Finally  there  is  the  case  for  insisting  that  bene-
ficiaries  under  the  GSP  should  observe  minimum  labour  stan-
dards  under  ILO  conventio'ns  and  should  respect  basic  human 
rights. - 44  -
4.1.2.  Financial  aid 
Some  non-associated  LDCs  receive  financial  aid, 
which  is  non-reimbursable  and  intended  primarily  for develop-
ment  projects  in  rural  areas. ·Grants  totalled  20 million  EUA 
in  1976  but  climbed  to  138.5 million  EUA  in 1980,  when  73%  of 
aid  was  channelled  to  Asian  countries  and  20%  to  Latin 
American  countries.  40%  of  the  aid  was  used  for  co-financed 
projects. 
4.1.3.  Credit granted  to  non-governmental  organizations 
In  addition  to  aid  granted  via  the  two  above-men-
tioned  instruments,  non-associated  developing  countries  (to-
gether  with  others)  have  been  recipients  of  development 
co-bperation  aid  (45  million  EUA  since  1976)  granted  by 
non-governmental  organizations.  These  denominational  or 
non-denominational,  charitable,  youth,  voluntary  and  other 
bodies  offer  specific,  top  quality  services.  Aid  is normally 
deployed  through  co-financed  schemes. 
4.1.4.  Food  aid 
Under  the  food  aid  programme  for  1979  and  1980, 
about  700,000  tonnes  of  cereals,  45,000  tonnes  of  butteroil 
and  150,000  tonnes  of  skimmed  milk  powder  were  supplied each 
year.  In  1980,  moreover,  under  the  Third  Convention with  UNRWA 
(United  Nations  Relief. and  Works  Agency),  the  Community 
supplied  about  8,000  tonnes  of  sugar,  2,700  tonnes  of  colza 
oil,  about  7,000  tonnes  of  scarlet  runner beans  and  35  tonnes 
of baby  food. 
4.1.5.  Emergency  aid 
Lastly,  a  number  of  non-associated  LDCs  receive 
emergency  aid  in  the  wake  of  political  events  (Cambodians, 
Afghan  refugees)  or  natural  disasters  (the  Azores,  Nepal, 
Haiti). - 45  -
The  Community's  emergency  aid  varies  from  year  to 
year but  amounted  to approximately  40 million  EUA  in 1980. 
4.1.6.  International  conferences  on  commodities,  etc. 
Preface 
'  The  great  divide  in  all  commodity  negotiations  is 
that  between  producers  and  consumers.  The  general  issue,  how-
ever,  is further  complicated  by  the  fact  that,  although  a  few 
industrialized or developed  countries are  among  the  major pro-
ducers  of  some  commodities,  in almost  no  case  are  their econo-
mies  dependent  on  the  export  of  any  single  commodity;  whereas 
the  economies  of  many  developing  countries  are heavily depen-
dent  on  the  export  of  one  or  two  commodities  (though  ~hey are 
importers  of  others).  Commodity  issues  therefore  are  not 
simple  conflicts  o~ interest  between  producers  and  consumers, 
but  also  play  a  rr;.,.jor  part  in  the  North/South  dialogue.  This 
has  led  in  recent  years  to  efforts  in  UNCTAD  to  promote 
commodity  arranger. ents  which  deliberately  favour  developing 
producing  countries  at  the  expense  of  developed  consuming 
countries  ( *). 
The  economic  costs  of  such  policies,  if  they  were 
vigorously  pursued  over  a  wide  range  of  commodities,  would 
impose  considerable  burdens  on  consuming  countries  - at  least 
in the  short  term;  moreover  there has  been  considerable  debate 
over  whether  they  would  bring  any  real  economic  advantage  to 
either producers  or consumers  in the  longer term. 
(*)  Cf.  UNCTAD  Resolution  93(IV)  (TD/RES/93(IV),  10  June  1976. - 46  -
Ever  since  the  UNCTAD  IV  Conference  at  Nairobi  in 
1976'  however  (at  which  the  principles  of  a  proposed 
11Inte-
grated  Programme"  were  worked  out)  there  have  been  external 
pressures  on  the  Community  to  achieve  a  "common"  pol icy  on 
Commodities.  In  this  context  the  word  "common"  has  two 
different  meanings  - viz.  it  can  mean  "common  to  all  Member 
States or to the  Community  as  a  whole";  or it can  mean  "common 
to  a  whole  range  of  commodities".  In  both  senses  of  the  word 
the  Community  .enjoyed  only  limited  success  in  achieving  a 
"common"  policy.  Differences in approach  between  Member  States 
still  remain,  together  with  difficulties  in  achieving  a 
uniform  approach  to all  commodity  issues. 
The  difficulties in  the  way  of achieving  a  common  Community 
Commodity  Policy 
With  the  major exception of sugar  {of  which  the  Com-
munity  is  the  second  largest  exporter  in the world),  the  Com-
munity  is an  importer of most  of  the  commodities  which  f!!'E--!'";.em--
the  subject of international negotiation and consultation  (and 
in this respect differs  from  some  other Group  B  countries  such 
as  the  US  or  Australia).  For  example,  the  UNCTAD  integrated 
programme  originally  envisaged  "structural  changes"  in  the 
markets  of ten  "hardcore"  commodities,  only  one  of  which  (i.e. 
sugar)  is  produced  in  significant  quantities  within  the 
European  Community  (viz.  cocoa  1  coffee  1  copper,  cotton  and 
cotton  yarn,  hard  fibres  and  similar products,  jute,  rubber, 
sugar,  tea,  tin).  Of  the  further  eight  which  were  added  sub-
sequently  (viz.  bananas,  bauxite,  iron  ore,  manganese,  meat, 
phosphates,  tropical  timber,  vegetable  oil  (including  olive 
oil)  and  oil  seeds)  only  three  are  produced  in  the  European 
Community  in  significant  quanti ties.  Most  Community  Govern-
ments  do  not  consider  that  on  economic  grounds it is to their 
advantage  to  enter  into  agreements  on  these  commodities which 
would  accord  with  the  demands  of  the  producers.  The  main 
exceptions  to  this  generalisation  relate  to  minerals,  where - 47  -
for  reasons  of  stable  prices  and  assured  supplies,  Community 
Governments  are  more  ready  to  contemplate  certain  kinds  of 
commodity  agreements. 
Some  scepticism  is  present  also  about  the  economic 
advantages  even  to  producers  in  the  long  tenn  of  Commodity 
agreements  based  on  UNCTAD  principles. 
On  general  commodity  issues,  ·Member  States  have 
tended until  recently to negotiate  individually rather than  as 
members  of  the  Community,  and  as  far  as  their  policies  are 
concerned,  these  have  been  primarily  dictated  by  their  inte-
rests  as  consumers  (sugar  being  the  major  exception).  Re-
cently,  however,  Member  States  and  the  Commission have  agreed 
that  there  shall  be  a  common  approach  to all commodity  issues 
covered  by  the  Integrated  Programme  with  a  single delegation, 
(except  for products  covered  by  the  CAP). 
Commodity  issues  are  not  only  very  complex  (since 
they  frequently  '.i volve  attempting  to  interfere  with  market 
mechanisms  on  a  world  scale  ~nd over a  long period ahead),  but 
they  also  differ  considerably  from  one  commodity  to  another. 
Negotiations,  however,  are generally concerned  with  three  main 
issues,  viz.  (i)  prices,  (ii)  quantities,  and  (iii)  mechanisms 
(such  as buffer stocks,  quotas,  etc.).  Producing  countries  see 
commodity  schemes  principally  as  a  means  of  guaranteeing 
export  earnings  and  certain  levels  of  income  for  their  pro-
ducers,  while  importers  regard  them  principally  as  a  means  of 
guaranteeing  certain  quantities  of  a  product  at predetermined 
prices.  Pricing  policies  can  themselves  be  the  cause  of  a 
great  deal  of  difficulty,  e. g.  whether  the  aim  ought  to  be 
price  stabilisation  or  price  maintenance  in  real  tenns  (the 
Community  for  obvious  reasons  strongly  favouring  the  fonner 
rather  than  the  latter).  As  regards  mechanisms,  buffer stock 
arrangements  are  obviously  much  more  difficult  to  apply  to 
perishable  commodities  such  as  bananas  than  to non-perishable - 48  -
products  such  as  minerals.  All  these  factors  mean  that 
arrangements  have  to  be  negotiated  commodity  by  commodity  and 
uniformity  as between  commodities is scarcely attainable. 
The  UN  Common  Fund  for  Commodities 
The  decision  to  set  up  such  a  Fund  was  taken at  the 
Nairobi  Conference  of  1976.  It  was  intended  that  the  Fund 
should  reinforce  arrangements  for  ~.ndi vidual  commodities which 
would  be  regulated  by  particular  community  organizations.  The 
Fund  would  have  two  Accounts  - the  First  would  contribute  to 
the  financing  of  buffer  stocks  and  of  internationally 
co-ordinated  national  stocks  operated  by  particular  Inter-
national  Commodity  Organizations;  the  Second  Account  would 
support  commodity  measures other than  stocking  (e.g.  research 
and  other measures  to  improve  productivity  and marketing).  It 
was  intended  that  the  Fund  should  come  into  operation  on 
31  March  1982,  but  it  is  now  most  unlikely  that  sufficient 
countries  will  have  ratified  by  that  date  to  bring  the 
arrangements  into  force.  Even  developing  countries  seem  in  no 
hurry  to ratify. 
The  extent  of  Community  competence  in  relation  to 
the  Common  Fund  has  created  some  difficulties.  It  is  under-
stood  that  the  Community  will  participate  as  an  "intergovern-
mental  organization  of  regional  economic  integration".  It may 
not  vote  nor  contribute  to  the  First  Account  beyond  the 
contributions  of  Member  States.  It  may  contribute  to  the 
Second  Account,  though  most  Member  States  would  appear  to 
prefer  national  financing.  Moreover  the  recent  agreement 
between  the  Member  States  and  the  Commission,  providing  for 
Community  participation  in  Commodity  negotiations  and  agree-
ments,  with  a  common  delegation  speaking  with one voice,  does 
not  apply  to the  Fund. - 49  -
The  Section,  anyhow,  has  favourably  commented  on  the 
recent  views  manifested  by  industrial  countries  meant  to 
channel  scarce  financial  resources  now  available rather to  the 
Second  Account  of  the  Common  Fund  (research  and  development, 
marketing,  etc.)  than  to  the  financing  of buffer stocks. 
As  far  as  particular  commodities  are  concerned,  the 
Rubber,  Tin  and  Cocoa  agreements  would  appear  to  be  possible 
candidates  for association with  the  First Account  of  the  Fund. 
But  negotiations  on  commodities  which  might  benefit  from  the 
Second  Account,  i.e.  cotton,  jute,  hard  fibres,  and  tropical 
timber,  are all either inactive,  deadlocked or in disarray. 
Sugar  is for  the  Community  a  special  case.  The  Com-
munity  is a  major producer and  exporter  (second  only  to  Cuba), 
but  is  not  a  member  of  the  International  Sugar  Agreement.  It 
is  widely  accused  by  other  producers  of  pursuing  policies 
which  disrupt  world  markets  for sugar(*). 
The  Community's  po8ition  a  critical assessment 
The  Section  has  repeatedly  outlined  the  objective 
reasons  why it is in the  Community's  interests to encourage  an 
effective  development  co-operation  policy,  for  solidarity  and 
other reasons. 
{*)  The  question  of  coherence  in  sugar  policy  is examined  in 
document  COM(78)  623  final  of June  1978;  and  the  situation 
has  not  changed  substantially since  that  date. - 50  -
However,  in  this general  context  it is not entirely 
clear whether the  Community's  accession  to  the  Integrated Pro-
gramme  was  determined  by  an  objective  belief  that  this 
Programme  is  conducive  to  the  LDCs'  long  term  interests  or 
whether  the  Community's  move  was  dictated  solely  by  its 
general  policy  on·  relations  with  the  LDCs  (who  are  already 
complaining  that  its  approach  to  development  co-operation  is 
inordinately  "regionalist").  Here  it has  to  be  remembered  that 
public  opinion  in  the  Community  i.s  by  no  means  wholeheartedly 
in favour  of  the  UNCTAD  programme. 
More  specifically,  it is debatable  whether accession 
to  the  Integrated Programme  will  allow  the  Community  to secure 
supplies  of  raw  materials,  especially  mining  resources,  on  a 
long-term basis. 
Lastly,  how  does  the  Community  intend  to  reconcile 
its  essentially  liberal  and  free  trade  approach  with  the 
Integrated  Programme's  authoritarian  principles,  as  described 
above  (*)? 
It  is  worth  mentioning  that  not  all  Member  States 
expressed  approval  either at  the  sixth  UN  Special  Session held 
in 1974  or at  the  1976  Nairobi  Conference. 
( *)  A  number  of  t>tember  States  strongly  opposed  the  New  Inter-
national  Economic  Order  on  the  grounds  that it was  autho-
ritarian and,  by  extension,  the  Integrated Programme. - 51  -
In contrast,  the  Luxembourg  declaration of June  1981 
and  the  London  declaration  of  December  1981  reflected  con-
sensus  on  the  need  to  anchor  the  Community 
1 s  commodities 
policy  in  a  cohesive  set  of  objectives and  measures:  (a)  sta-
bilization  of  commodity  prices,  (b)  stabilization  of  export 
earnings,  (c)  increased  emphasis  on  local  processing,  (d)  di-
versification of  LDC  output  and  (e)  development  of  LDC  natural 
resources. 
Other commodity  arrangements 
The  criticism  levelled  at  the  Stabex  and  Minex 
schemes  in  the  section  of  this  Study  dealing  with  the  Lome 
Convention,  should  be  borne  in mind.  Briefly,  it was  pointed 
out  that  such  schemes  may  discourage  beneficiary  ACP  States 
from  diversifying  production  and  expanding  their  industry  and 
are  therefore  a  purely  stopgap  solution  to  these  countries 
1 
balance  of  payments  and  other  problems.  Moreover,  the  problem 
of  securing  Community  supplies  of  mining  resources  and  step-
ping  up  investment  in this sector  remains  unsolved. 
Similar arguments  apply  to  the  IMF  compensatory  fun-
ding  scheme,  which  can  deploy  larger  resources  than  the  two 
EEC  schemes  but  operates along  much  the  same  lines. 
Nonetheless,  "compensatory  funding"  arrangements 
(including  Stabex  and  Minex)  seem  preferable  to  the  UNCTAD 
Integrated  Programme  since  the  former's  aim,  is  to  stabilize 
export  earnings  from  raw  materials  as  opposed  to  price 
stabilization  (thereby  assisting  the  external  spending  of 
beneficiary  LDCs  in broad  terms). - 52  -
The  Section  wondered  whether  the  Community  had 
considered,  by  way  of  alternatives  to  the  UNCTAD  Integrated 
Programme,  extending  the  Stabex  and  Minex  schemes  to all  LDCs 
(subject  to  certain  conditions)  or  joining  with  other  indus-
trialized  countries  such  as  the  United  States  and  Japan  in  a 
world  scale  Stabex.  It  would  also  be  interesting  to ascertain 
the private  views  of  ACP  countries  that  have  been eligible for 
all  these  schemes  :  which  would  they  prefer  if  they  had  to 
choose,  and  on  what  grounds?  Would  they  prefer  the  Community 
arrangement  to  be  expanded  rather  than  relying  on  so  many 
different  sources  of aid? 
Agreements  on  manufactures 
In  connection  with  commodity  agreements  with  the 
LDCs,  the  Study  Group  turned  its  attention  to  agreements  on 
some  manufactures,  aimed  at  achieving  voluntary  restraint  on 
exports  (a  typical  example  being  the  Multifibre Agreement). 
Certain  similarities  with  the  Integrated  Programme 
were  observed  since,  here  again,  the  intention  is  to  replace 
free  interplay  of  market  forces  by  trade  agreement8  be tween 
producer and  consumer countries. 
The  diffe renee  is  that  the  initiative  in  this  case 
stems  from  the  industrialized  countries  of  the  West,  in  an 
effort  to  bolster  ailing  production  sectors  and  shelter  them 
from  (sometimes unfair)  outside  competition. 
In both cases  the  cost of  operating  these authorita-
rian  schemes  has  been  passed  on  to  the  consumer  in  the  shape 
of  higher  prices  and  it  is  debatable  whether  sufficient 
attention  has  been  paid  to  their  impact  on  the  location  of 
industry both  in and outside  the  Community. - 53  -
The  general  policies  behind,  for  instance,  the  Ge-
neralized  Tariff  Preferences  Scheme,  which  seeks  to  step  up 
LDC  trade  in  manufactures,  are  clearly  at  variance  with  the 
principles  underlying  the  Mul tifibre  Agreement  and  similar 
arrangements,  whose  aim  is  to  limit  the  side-effects on  trade 
which  are  inherent  in  greater  LDC  participation  in  this 
sector. 
To  what  extent,  if at  all,  has  the  Community  given 
thought  to  reconciling  these conflicting approaches? 
The  Section  concluded  that,  following  the  recent 
arrangement  between  Member  States  and  the  Commission,  a 
greater  effort  should  be  made  in  the  future  to  produce  a 
single  Community  policy  on  all  Commodity  questions  so  that  the 
Community  can  speak  with  one  voice  both  in  the  UN  forums  and 
in negotiations  01.  particular commodities. 
In  view  of  the  likely  delays  in the  ratification of 
the  Common  Fund  proposals,  the  Study  Group  concluded  that  in 
the  period  ahead  Community  attention  would  be  concentrated 
mainly  on  negotiations  on  particular  commodities.  In  these 
although  some  attention has  to be  paid  to political  considera-
tions,  particularly  in  the  light  of  the  North/South  Dialogue, 
the  Community's  main  concerns  ought  to  be  economic,  especially 
that  of  safeguarding  the  Community's  supplies of  scarce  commo-
dities  at  stable  prices.  Where,  as  in  the  Stabex,  special ar-
rangements  are  entered  into  for  developmental  reasons,  the 
economic  costs  of  such  schemes  should  be  clearly  identified 
and  compared  with other  forms  of  development  assistance. 
Finally,  the  Section  suggests  that  specific  atten-
tion be  devoted  by  the  Economic  and  Social  Committee  to  commo-
dity issues  and negotiations,  since  the  discussion  carried out 
deserves  further  deepening  in  order  to  better see  the  impli-
cations  of such  a  complex  matter. - 54  -
4.2.  AGREEMENTS  CONCLUDED  WITH  CERTAIN  DEVELOPING  COUNTRIES 
OR  GROUPS  OF  DEVELOPING  COUNTRIES 
4.2.1.  Preferential  agreements  with Mediterranean Countries 
- Background 
During. the  transitional  period,  the  Community's  ex-
ternal  relations  in  the  Mediterranean  developed  primarily  in 
accordance  with  the  demands  and  pressures  of  the  third 
countries concerned. 
The  Community  responded  to  the  initiatives  and  re-
quests  of  these  countries  by  embarking  on  negotiations  for  a 
large  number  of  agreements,  each  case  being  judged  on  its own 
merits. 
The  proliferation,  in  this  phase,  of  various  kinds 
of  agreements  with  almost  all  the  Mediterranean  countries, 
with  arbitrary  unrelated  procedures  and  differing  content and 
models  (perhaps  for  no  specific  reasons),  soon  presented  the 
Community  with  the  problem  of  adopting  a  more  consistent, 
rational  approach  as part of  an  overall  harmonized  concept. 
The  pol icy  was  thus  formulated  of  an  "overall,  ba-
lanced  approach"  to  the  Mediterranean  area,  which,  together 
with  the  ACP  agreements,  was  to  serve  as  a  bridge  between  a 
tactical,  emperical  concept  and  a  long-term  strategy  for  the 
Community's  external  relations. - 55  -
- Overall  policy on Mediterranean countries 
The  Paris Summit  of the  Heads  of State or of Govern-
ment  of  the  Member  States  in  October  1972  established  the  new 
Community  guidelines  for  the  systematic,  hannonized  develop-
ment  of  its  relations  with  the  Mediterranean  countries,  a 
policy  which  is  prompted  by  the  historical  key  1 inks  between 
the  two  areas  and by  the  need  for balanced,  stable development 
in this region. 
This  new  policy  was  to  include  the  following 
points 
- transition  from  the  earlier  stopgap  agreements  to  a  system 
of  agreements  to  be  expanded  and  made  more  comprehensive 
thereafter; 
- identification of  the general  and  specific problems  of  those 
northern  Mediterranean  countries  1 ikely  to  become  future 
members  of  the  Cc·mmuni ty; 
the  expansion of purely commercial  agreements  (tariffs,  quo-
tas,  etc.)  to  include  a  broader  commercial  policy  and  even-
tually an  economic  policy in the  wider sense; 
the  introduction  of  new  guidelines  for  economic,  technical, 
scientific  and  financial  cooperation,  stating  the  Com-
munity's  readiness  to  assist  the  Mediterranean  countries' 
structural  diversification  by  means  of  aid  for  industrial 
expansion  and  investment,  etc.; 
- in  the  social  sphere,  affirmation  of  the  principle of  safe-
guarding  the  social  security  and  wage  rights of workers  who 
migrate  to  the  Member States. - 56  -
On  the  basis  of  the  above  guidelines,  the  Community 
negotiated  and  entered  into  agreements  with  Israel  in  1975, 
the  Maghreb  States  (Algeria,  Tunisia  and  Morocco)  in  1976  and 
some  of  the  Mashrek  States  (Egypt,  Jordan,  Syria  and  Lebanon) 
in  1977.  Existing  agreements  with  Malta  and  Cyprus  were 
amplified  and  brought  into  line  with  the  new  Mediterranean 
policy of the  Community. 
During  these  same  years,  accession negotiations  con-
tinued with Greece,  Spain  and  Portugal. 
More  recently,  special  priority  has  been  given  to 
renegotiating  the  economic  cooperation  agreement  between  the 
EEC  and  Yugoslavia,  a  complex  well-defined  instr·ument  designed 
to  strengthen  cooperation  between  Yugoslavia  and  the  Commu-
nity  ( *). 
The  agreements  with  the  Mediterranean  countries 
occasionally  embrace  political,  as  well  as  strictly economic 
matters. 
At  present  all  the  Mediterranean  countries with  the 
exception  of  Albania  and  Lib~ are  linked  with  the  Community 
by various  agreements. 
The  Community  1 s  active  policy  with  respect  to  the 
Mediterranean  countries  has  caused  some  concern  to  other 
countries outside  the  area. 
( *)  See  the  Economic  and  Social  Committee 
1 s  Study  of 
12  December  1979  on  Relations  between  the  Community  and 
Yugoslavia  (CES  1473/79). - 57  -
Some  industrialized  countries  (e.g.  · the  United 
States)  accused  the  EEC  of  infringing  one  of  the  fundamental 
rules  of  GATT,  namely  non-discrimination  in  international 
trade,  and  establishing preferential  treatment  for  some  coun-
tries  to  the  detriment  of  others  outside  the  Mediterranean 
region(*). 
Some  of  the  developing  countries also criticized the 
EEC,  accusing  it  of  not  pursuing  with ·respect  to  the  other 
developing  countries  the  same  policy  of  agreements  and  co-
operation  implemented  in the  Mediterranean  region. 
- The  achievements  of  the overall  policy 
It is not  easy  to draw  conclusions  about  the  results 
obtained  by  the  Community  in  the  Mediterranean  area  and 
perhaps  this  wouli  be  premature  given  that  the  agreements  of 
the  "overall"  pha:.e  are  still  only  a  few  years old.  Moreover, 
the  international  economic  and  political  situation  has  been 
severely  di sruptec..  since  1973  both  in  the  Mediterranean  area 
itself and  in  the  neighbouring  Middle  East. 
This  further  strengthens  the  case  for  giving  sepa-
rate  consideration  to  the  impact  of  Community  policy  on 
Greece,  Portugal  and  Spain  - as  opposed  to  the  impact  on  the 
countries of  the  Southern  and  Eastern Mediterranean. 
The  Community  has  pursued  a  consistent  policy  of 
openness  and  support  with  respect  to  Northern  Mediterranean 
countries  (Greece,  Spain  and  Portugal  -.with  the  exceptior. of 
Turkey).  This  policy  has  done  much  to  strengthen  the  new 
democratic  regimes  in these countries. 
(*)  The  dispute  between  the  EEC  and  the  USA  on  this point  has 
now  been settled. - 58  -
This  political  success  is  of'  major  importance  for 
the  future  of'  these  countries  and  for  the  equilibrium  of'  the 
Mediterranean  region  and  the  entire European  continent. 
Economically,  the  implementation  of'  agreemeents  has 
facilitated  the  gradual  creation  of  the  conditions  needed  to 
secure  recent  accession  of'  Greece  and  the  future  accession of 
Spain  and  Portugal  (even  though  there  are still many  problems 
to be  overcome)  {*). 
Critical  appraisal  of  the  aims  and  achieverr.ents  of 
Community  policy  on  Southern  and  Ea-stern  Medi ter-
ranean  countries 
Here,  past  achievements  and  the  current  outlook are 
less  satisfactory.  Despite  the  efforts  it  has  made,  the 
Community  seems  to  have  contributed  very  little  to  the 
stabilization of'  this region. 
The  EEC 's  "economic  diplomcccy"  approach  has  been 
inadequate  and  has  been  inhibited  by  external  conditions 
beyond  the  Community's  control,  e.g.  the  political  and  mili-
tary  tensions  that  have  jeopardized  the  equilibrium  of'  the 
entire region. 
For  these  and  other  reasons,  the  Community's  ac-
tivity  on  the  economic  front  has  had  little  impact  in  this 
region. 
(*)  See  Committee  Opinion of  28  June  1979  on  the  Greek,  Portu-
guese  and  Spanish  applications  to  join  the  Community  (OJ 
No.  C  247,  1  October 1979). - 59  -
Many  of  the  objectives  specified  in  the  agreements 
signed  in the  Sixties with  the  individual  Southern  and  Eastern 
Mediterranean  countries appear not  to have  been  attained  - let 
alone  the  more  ambitious,  complex  objectives of  the  agreements 
signed  under  the overall  policy. 
a)  Strengthening  the  economies  of  th!'!  Southern  and  Eastern 
Mediterranean  countries  (*) 
In  recent  years  the  per  capita  GDP  of  most  of  these 
countries  has  risen  only  very  slightly  (about  2%,  with  .the 
exception  of  Israel,  Tunisia  and  Turkey).  Per  capita  GDP  in 
Egypt  and  Morocco  is still well  below  that  in  other  Southern 
and  Eastern Meditteranean countries. 
The  Southern  and  Eastern Mediterranean countries had 
balance  of  payments  deficits  in  1970,  and  have  since  moved 
considerably  further  into  the  red.  The  sole  exception  to this 
trend is Israel. 
Per  capita  food  production  in  this  area  has  fluc-
tuated  in  recent  years  but  the  trend  has  generally  been 
downwards. 
Manufacturing  growth  rates  also  vary.  Many  of these 
countries  have  managed  to  expand  this  sector,  but  output  has 
dropped  substantially in others  (e.g.  Algeria). 
On  balance,  it  cannot  be  claimed  that  economic 
growth  and  consolidation  in  the  Southern  and  Eastern  Medi-
terranean  countries  is  keeping  pace  with  their  requirements 
and aspirations. 
(*)  Figures  from  the  World  Bank's  Report  on  World  Development 
1979. - 60  -
b)  Developments  in trade with  the  European  Community 
In  the  five  years from  1973  to  1978,  the  total value 
of  trade  between  the  Community  and  the  Southern  and  Eastern 
Mediterranean  countries  more  than  doubled  (as  measured  in 
current  prices).  A  number  of  countries,  such  as  Egypt,  have 
put  up  a  very good  performance. 
The  weakness  is  the  fact  that  the  exports  of  these 
countries  to  the  Community  have  declined  ( -111%)  while  their 
imports have  increased  {+140%). 
The  underlying  trend  has  thus  moved  against  the 
Southern  and  Eastern  Mediterranean  cour1tries,  whose  trade 
balance  vis-a-vis  the  EEC  has  accordingly  declined  sub-
stantially. 
The  accession  of  Greece  to  the  Community,  and  the 
future  accession  of  Spain  and  Portugal,  are  likely  to  have  a 
disquieting  impact  on  traditional  agricultural  exports  to  the 
Community  from  the  Southern  and  Eastern  Mediterranean  coun-
tries. 
To  see  things  in  their  proper  perspective,  it must 
however  be  remembered  that  the  energy  crisis and  the  economic 
depression which  has affected  the  entire world  economy  has had 
a  significant impact  on these figures. 
overall 
opening 
Southern 
The  implication,  if  one  may  be  allowed  to  draw  an 
and  possibly  simplistic  conclusion,  is  that  the 
up  of  the  Community  market  to  imports  from  the 
and  Eastern  Mediterranean  has  not  of  itself  been 
sufficient  to  bring  about  a  substantial  expansion  of  the 
economies  of  these countries. - 61  -
c)  Progress Report  on  cooperation policy 
Cooperation  in the  industrial,  technological,  scien-
tific,  financial  and  other fields  was  intended  to be  the  key-
word  in  the  EEC  overall  policy  for  a  new  process  of  har-
monious,  balanced  growth  in  the  Mediterranean  area.  It  has 
already  been  said  that  it may  be  premature  to  attempt  to  make 
a  accurate  assessment  of  achievements  to  date.  However,  i.t 
must  be  pointed out  that  the  provisional  figures  are  extremely 
disappointing. 
The  policy guidelines  set  out  in  the  agreements  have 
largely  been  unimplemented,  and  even  when  any  action has  been 
taken  the  resources  deployed  (especially  the  funds  allotted) 
have  been  patently  inadequate.  Above  all,  there  has  been  no 
political will  t0  pursue  the  proposed  aims  effectively. 
To  be  effective  ( *),  industrial,  technological  and 
scientific  cooperation  should  have  taken  a  new  form  based  on 
medium  and  long-term  development  programmes,  in  the  event 
there  have  been  no  practical  results,  only  statements  of 
intent. 
One  or  two  isolated  initiatives  have  been  taken but 
there  has  been  no  systematic  framework  to  back  them  up.  One 
question  still  unresolved  is  how  to  ensure  rapid,  harmonious 
and  partly  export-oriented  industrialization  of  these  coun-
tries without  bringing  them  into conflict with  the  Community's 
own  industries,  many  of  which  are  in  the  throes  of  modern-
ization and  overproduction crises. 
( *)  See  ESC 
towards 
Study  of  26  October  1977  on  Community  policy 
the  countries  of  the  Southern  and  Eastern  Medi-
terrane  an. - 62  -
When  express  provision  has  been  made  for  finaP.cial 
cooperation  schemes  in  the  financial  protocols  to  the  agree-
ments,  these  have  been  duly  implemented. 
To  date,  a  blind  eye  has  been  turned 
Committee's  recommendation  (*)  that  the  funds  of 
participating  countries  should  be  channelled,  via 
to 
all 
a 
the 
the 
new 
financial  instrument,  to  development  programmes  - including 
joint programmes  of  the  EEC  and  Mediterranean countries. 
Nothing  has  been  done  in  the  field  of  commercial 
cooperation,  e.g.  to  ensure  a  better distribution of Mediter-
ranean  agricultural  and  industrial  products  intended  for  the 
Community  market. 
Energy  cooperation  has  been  almost  totally  neglec-
t.ed,  even  in  the  agreements  concluded  after  the  1973  oil 
crisis.  The  oil-producing  Mediterranean  countries  have  proved 
anyth.ing  but  willing  to  cooperate  with  the  Community  and  to 
further  mutual  interests;  to  the  contr·ary,  there  has  been  a 
sharp  clash between  diverging  interests. 
There  have  been  no  significant  initiatives  in  the 
fisheries  sector although cooperation is specifically provided 
for  in  the  various  association  agreements.  On  the  contrary, 
there are  sharp  differences  and  divergences  between  the  Commu-
nity,  individual  Member  States  and  a  number  of  Mediterranean 
countries  (e.g.  the  fisheries  dispute  between  Tunisia  and 
Italy). 
(*)  See  Study  of  the  ESC  (26  October 1977)  on Community  Policy 
Towards  the  Countries  of  the  Southern  and Eastern Mediter-
ranean. - 63  -
On  the  question  of  cooperation  between  the  Medi ter-
ranean  area  and  non-member  countrjes,  the  Community  has  been 
unable  to  act  as  a  catalyst  for  either  proposals,  inter-re-
gional  projects  (possibly  with  the  allocation  of  specific 
funds)  or  the  coordination of  int.e rnational  aid. 
In  this  respect  the  achievements  of,  and  future 
prospects  for,  the  Community's  "overall"  policy  towards  the 
Mediterranean  area  seem  much  less  significant  than  the 
achievements  and.  future  prospects  of  the  Community's  policy 
vis-a-vis  the  ACP  countries. 
The  reason  for  this  is  a  patent  1 ac k  of  funds  and, 
above  all,  the  lack  of  political  will  on  the  part  of  the 
Member  States  who  still  favour  bilateraJ  relations  with 
countries  in  the  .rea. 
In  conclusion,  the  "overall"  pol icy  on  cooperation 
between  the  Comnunity  and  the  countries  of  the  Southern 
Mediterranean  has  yielded  very  disappointing  results;  future 
prospects  are  also  gloomy.  It  is not  so  much  that  the  policy 
itself  has  been  incoherent,  as  that  there  have  been  obvious 
difficulties  in  giving  cooperation  and  development  aid objec-
tives  real  substance  - and  this  in spite of  the  fact  that  the 
objectives  themselves are intrinsically correct  from  the point 
of  view  of  the  priorities  the  Community  wishes  to  set  in this 
area. 
The  second  enlargement  of  the  EEC  casts dark  shadows 
over  the  continuation  of  traditional  exports  of Mediterranean 
farm  products  to  the  EEC  since  there  may  well  be  surpluses  of 
such  products within  a  very short period of  time. - 64  -
The  time  has  . now  come  perhaps  to  re-examine  the 
medium  and  long-te~  rll"OSpects  of  relations  between  the 
Community  and  the  icountries  of  the  Mediterranean  in  an 
entirely  new  light.  :The  new  aim  should  be  to  ensure  that  the 
Community's  strategy  is  more  coherent  and  effective  and  is 
' 
geared  to  furthering  the  overall  development  of  the  Medi-
terranean basin  as  such . 
... 
In  the  lor;ger-term,  however,  it  will  probably  be 
necessary  to  go  even  ft.lrther,  moving  away  from  a  bilateral 
view  of relations between  the  Community  and  individual  regions 
(such  as  the  Medi te·rranean  region)  to  a  more  comprehensive 
view  of  overall  EEC  relations  with  all other areas  and  groups 
of countries  (e.g.  w.ith  /'.frica  and  Asia,  where  there  are still 
food  shortages,  and  w~th 'Latin America). 
4.2.2.  Conventions  with 1£P  countries 
- Principles and  objectives of  the  EEC's  Lome  policy 
A  new  convention  between  the  EEC  and  the  ACP  coun-
tries wa1:.  signed  in  r~ome  (capital  of  Togo)  on  31  October 1979. 
The  specific  features  of  the  Lome  Convention  are  as 
follows: 
- contractual  relati.or.ships  creating  rights  and  obligatior.s 
between  two  regional  groups,  which  involve  a  series  of  co-
operation  instruments ·adaptable  to  the  priori ties  of  the 
individual  countries  (trade,  Stabex,  aid,  etc.) 
- and  which  are  based  on  a  permanent. dialogue  through  insti-
tutions  provided  for  i:1  the  Convention  (EEC-ACP  Council  of 
Ministers,  Commit~ee of  Ambassadors,  Consultative  Assembly, 
consultations  of econcmic  and  social circles). - 65  -
The  objectives of  the  Convention are  to: 
- promote  trade  between  the  ACP  States  and  the  Community  and 
between  the  ACP  States themselves; 
ensure  greater  stability  in  export  earnings,  economic via-
bility  and  sustained  growth  of  the  economies  of  the  ACP 
States; 
support  the  economies  of  ACP  States  dependent  on  the  mining 
industry; 
- encourage  EEC  investments  in the  ACP  States; 
- promote  industrial  development  in the  ACP  States; 
- assist  in  resolving  problems  relating  to  rural  development, 
including  problems  connected  with  agricultural  production 
for  domestic  cons11mption; 
- accord  special  treatment  for least developed,  landlocked  and 
island ACP  States; 
- promote  the  economic  and  social  development  of  the  ACP 
States. 
- Contents 
Under  the  trade  cooperation  arrangements,  manu-
factured  goods  and  agricultural  products  that  do not  directly 
compete  with  products  governed  by  the  CAP  enter the  Community 
free  of  duty  and  quantitative  restrictions.  The  ACP  States 
thus  enjoy  preferential  treatment  compared  with  other  third 
countries. - 66  -
These  concessions are not reciprocal.  The  ACP  States 
have  merely  undertaken  to  give  Member  States  the  same  advan-
tages as  the  most  favoured  industrial nation. 
The  Convention also provides for an  import  quota  for 
beef and veal,  arrangements  for  improving  the  conditions under 
which  bananas  originating  in  the  ACP  States  are  produced  and 
marketed,  increasing  duty-free  quotas  for  Caribbean  rum  and  a 
Community  obligation to  purchase  1,400,000  tonnes  of sugar per 
year at  a  guaranteed price. 
- Financial  resources 
A  total  of  5,227 million  EUA  ($6,952  million(*)) 
for  the  duration  of  the  Convention  is  allocated  in  Lome  II. 
4,542 million  EUA  is  for  the  EDF,  covering  grants  (2,928  mil-
lion),  special  loans  ( 504  million),  risk  capital  ( 280  mil-
lion),  Stabex  {550 million),  minerals  (280 million).  The  Euro-
pean  Investment  Bank  is  to  provide  soft  loans  to  a  maximum  of 
685  million  EUA  (and  200 million  for  the  mining  projects 
referred  to  above). 
A  joint  declaration  contains  provisions  on  migrant 
workers  from  ACP  countries  similar  to  those  contained  in  the 
co-operation  agreements  with  the  Maghreb  countries with  regard 
to  working  conditions,  pay  and  social  security  benefits.  The 
ACP  countries have  given  reciprocal  undertakings. 
Another  joint  declaration  on  sea  fishing  outlines 
the  general  framework  for  future  bilateral  fishery  agreeme·nts 
between  the  Community  and  the  ACP  States concerned. 
( *)  The  total  net  flow  of  official  resources  from  Community 
Member  States  to  developing  countries  and  multinational 
agencies  in 1980  was  approximately  US$  12,500 million. - 67  -
In  addition to  the  areas  referred to  above,  Lome  II 
deals  with  other  fields  of  co-operation  such  as  investment 
protection  and  promotion,  sea  transport,  agricultural 
co-operation and  trade  promotion. 
Critical  appraisal  of  aims  and  achievements  - outstanding 
problems 
a)  Trade  cooperation  and  the  stepping-up  of  ( i)  EEC-ACP  trade 
and  (ii)  trade  between  the  ACP  States 
The  impact  of  the  trade  provisions  of  the  Lome  Con-
ventions  on  EEC  trade  with  the  ACP  countries  is  often  exag-
gerated.  Although  almost  100%  of  ACP  exports  to  the  EEC  are 
duty-free,  75%  of  them  would  have  been  exempt  even  without 
Lome  (raw materiaJ3  or products  covered  by  the  GSP). 
Similar.: y,  the  growth 
countries  is  not  primarily  due 
in  Community  exports  to  ACP 
to  the  trade  liberalization 
arrangements  but  .·ather  to  Community  and  national  aids,  which 
stimulate  demand  in those  countries. 
Nevertheless,  trade  has  developed  favourably  :  im-
ports  from  the  ACP  countries  have  risen  faster  than  imports 
from  the  developing  countries  as  a  whole,  and  the  increase  in 
imports  from  the  ACP  countries  has  exceeded  the  increase  in 
Community  exports  to  those  countries.  ·This  means  that  the 
balance  of  payments  has  in  general  remained  positive  for  th~ 
ACP  countries  (except  for  1978:  - 800  million  UA),  the  surplus 
being  about  3,  000 million  UA  for  1979,  This  growth  in  Com-
munity  imports  from  the  ACP  countries  looks  like  continuing  in 
1980  an(  1981. 
Although  there  are  no  figures  on  trade  between  ACP 
countries,  there  is  unlikely  to  have  been  a  spectacular 
development,  particularly  because  of  the  lack  of  diversi-
fication  in production. - 68  -
Likewise,  the  effects  of  the  Convention  as  regards 
integration  at  sub-regional  level  still  seem  to  be  very 
modest. 
It is in  the  Community's  interest  to  encourage  this 
development  by  means  of specific aids. 
b)  Stabilization of earnings  from  exports of agricultural pro-
ducts and  iron ore  (Stabex  and  Minex) 
The  STABEX  system  has  been  operating  since  1976. 
During  these  5  years,  transfers totalling about  375  million UA 
have  been  made  to  26  countries.  The  number of products  covered 
by  the  system  has  been  gradually  increased  to  arm..:ncJ  20.  In 
1978  STABEX  had  to  compensate  for  the  largest  dr(Jps  in export 
earnings  recorded  by  the  ACP  countries  sirce  the  introduction 
of the  system.  In  1978  transfers  amounted  to  about  164  million 
U.A. 
In  general  there  has  been  a  certain  measure  of 
satisfaction  with  the  operation  of  STABEX.  Critic  isms  have, 
however,  been voiced  on  the  ACP  side.  These  have  concerned,  in 
particular,  the  total  sum  available  and  the  rigid way  in which 
the  system  operates;  MINEX  covers  minerals  (except  for  the 
iron  ore  already  covered  by  STABEX)  and  aims  partly to ensure 
that  the  Community  receives  regular  supplies:  of  minerals. 
Other  LornA  provisions  aim  to  develop  the  mining  output  of the 
ACP  countries. 
The  minerals  problem  in  Africa  seems  to  stem  mainly 
from  inadequate  inve'stment,  something  which  cer·tainly  cannot 
be  remedied  simply by  the  sums  made  available  under  MINEX,  (it 
will  accordingly be  necessary  to work  out  a  long-term  so:!.ution 
capable  of  meeting  the  requirements  of  both  the  EEC  and  the 
ACP  countries). - 69  -
These  two  systems  probably  represent  the  Community's 
most  original  contribution  to  the  solution  of the  problems  of 
unde rdevel opn!ent. 
These  systems  must  not,  however,  be  presented  as  a 
remedy  for  anything  other than  short-term problems  \balance of 
payments)  ancl  they  must  be  swiftly  backed  up  by  medium  and 
long-term  instruments  capable  of  a)  reducing  the  ACP  coun-
tries'  dependence  on  raw  materials,  particularly agricultural, 
b)  really solving  the  problem of the  security of minerals  sup-
plies  and  c)  stimulating  the  industrialization  of  the  ACP 
countries'  productive  apparatus, 
export outlets. 
c)  Funding  investments 
inter  alia  by  providing 
During  the  five  years  of  operaticn  of  the  first  Lome 
Convention,  a  total  of  3,054 million  UA  was  allocated  for 
trade,  industrial  financial  and  technical  co-operation.  The 
sectoral  breakdowJ.  of  the  finance  was  practically  the  same 
each  year,  the  productive  sector  both  industrial  and 
agricultural  - heading  the  list  by  a  wide  margin,  followed  by 
economic  infrastructure  and,  in  the  bottom  position,  the 
social sector. 
Particular  attention  is  paid  to  rural  development, 
which  concerns  a  large  proportion of  the  population of  the  ACP 
countries.  So  far,  rural  projects  have  been  aimed  mainly  at 
satisfying  local  food  needs.  A  total  of  57  micro-projects 
(18.2  million  UA)  of  this  kind  have  been  carried out  in close 
association  with  the  local  authorities  concerned.  Despite 
these  efforts,  the  fear  has  been  expj·essed  that  the  present 
machinery  ( Stabex,  the  sugar  agreement  and  to  some  extent  the 
beef agreement)  may  steer investments  in the  wrong  direction. - 70  -
Many  decisions  concerning  finan<.:e  for  industry  have 
also  been  taken  involving  both  aids  administered  by  the  EIB 
and  aids  administered  by  the  Commission. 
Community  investment  in the  industz·ial  sector can be 
directec  towards  meeting  domestic  needs,  particularly  in  the 
agro-food  sphere,  or  can  be  concerned  with products  for export 
to  the  Community  or  third  countries.  In  the  first  case 
especially,  the  Community  can  make  a  concr·E-:te  contribution to 
the  economic  development  of  the  ACP  countries  without 
creating major  problems  for  itself. 
One  of  the  problems  is  the  need  to  protect  forE-ign 
investment  (from  expropriation,  nationalizat.icn,  etc.)  and  to 
create  a  legal  framework  to  ensure  stability and certainty in 
legal relations,  perhaps  monitored  by  new  supranational  insti-
tutions  (courts  of  justice,  arbitration  tribunals,  codes  of 
conduct,  etc.),  set  up  by  the  ACP  countries  independently  or 
in  agreement  with  the  EEC. 
As  regards  investment  in  export  products,  the  main 
problem  here  is  how  to  obtain  an  adequate  r~~turn despite  the 
many  difficul  tie:::•  (lack of external  economles,  infrastructure, 
skilled labour,  etc.). 
Still,  free  access  for  these  products  to  the  market 
of  the  Ten  represents  an  importan1.  guaranteed  outlet.  It  is 
noted,  however,  that  the  Convention  will  be  valid for  5  years 
only.  This  should  prompt  the  Community  to  examine  the  possi-
bility  of  longer-term  commitments  within  the  framework  of 
general  programmes  for  the  internal  adaptation  of the  sectors 
concerned. 
At  all  events,  in order to stimulate entrepreneurial 
activity  at  local  level,  preference  should  be  given  to  joint 
ventures  and  mixed  companies  (especially  with  private-sector 
firms,  though  the  participation  of  state  corporations  should 
not  be  ruled out). - 71  -
d)  Promotion of industrial  development  in  the  ACP  countries 
It is  a  difficult  and  lengthy  process  to  build  up 
local  entrepreneurial,  business  &nd  technical  management 
skills.  But  efforts  must  not  be  spared,  for  the  ACP  countries 
can  only  overcome  underdevelopment  by  consolidating  and  di-
versifying their productive base. 
It  is  particularly  important  to  concentrate  on 
helping  small  and  medium-sized  enterprises  and  on  providing 
them  with  facilities  for  technical  and  business  co-operation, 
etc. 
The  Centre  for  Industrial  Development  and  the  Com-
mittee  on  Industrial  Co-operation  have  an  important  role  to 
play  in  this  area.  The  figures  available  indicate  moreover 
that  in  certain  A~P countries  industrial  production,  particu-
larly  in  manufacturing,  is  growing  at  a  fairly  satisfactory 
rate  { 1970/77:  Niger  +  9. 4%,  Kenya  +  11%,  Uganda  +  8%,  Nigeria 
+  10.3%,  Congo  +  6.9%,  Ivory  Coast  +  7.9%).  The  growth  of 
industrial  production  in  most  of  the  other  ACP  cot.;ntri es 
unfortunately still leaves  much  to be  desired. 
The  idea  of  co-operation  in  the  energy  sphere  has 
been  entertained  since  1974,  most  of  the  ACP  countril-~~;  being 
importers  of  energy.  Since  Lorn~  I  came  into  force,  more  than 
140  million  UA  have  been  assumed  to  57  pz·ojects  and  studies in 
this  field,  special  emphasis  being  placed  on  the  development 
of renewable  energy  sources,  particularly hydroelectric power. 
·e)  Rural  development  and  development  of  agricultural  pro-
duction  for  domestic  consumption  and export.  With  regard  to 
agricultural  production  for  exports  {frequently  the  result 
of  external  initiatives)  the  ACP  States  complain  about  the 
restrictions  imposed  on  their  exports  of  temperate  agri-
cultural  products  to  the  EEC,  but  progress  here  would  be 
difficult without  radical  changes  in the  CAP. - 72  -
The  stimulation  of  production  !'or  domestic  con-
sumption  is another matter however. 
It  is  imperative  to  promote  higher  agricultural 
production  to  meet  this  demand.  The  major  effort  should  be 
made  here,  since  such  an  increase  in  agricultural  production 
could  resolve  a  number  of  pr·oblems  (domestic  standards  of 
living,  balance  of  payments,  rural  development,  thus  curbing 
the  drift  to  the  towns,  increased  incomes,  etc.). 
f)  Financial  and  technical  cocperation 
The  policy  devE::loped  in  this  area  in  recent  years 
has  sought  to  pr·omote  co-financing;  the  projects  financed  in 
this way  since  the  entry  into  force  of  Lome  I  total  518.5  mil-
lion  VA.  Over  23%  of  the  portion  of  the  fourth  EDF  (2,256 
million  VA)  devoted  to projects has  been  used  to co-finance  48 
proJects at  a  total  cost  of 3,600 million  VA. 
The  principles  of  financial  and  technical 
co-operation  have  been  retained  ir'  Lome  II  and  the  funds  for 
this purpose  have  been considerably  increased  (+  62%  in VA)  to 
a  figure  of  5,227 million  VA,  including  2,928 million  VA  as 
grants,  550 million  VA  for  STABEX  and  280  million  VA  for 
MINEX.  The  EIB  will  provide  one  financing  facility of  685  mil-
lion  VA  and  another,  outside  the  Convention,  of  200  million 
VA.  The  sum  of 180 million  VA  will  be  made  available  under  the 
Community  budget  to  cover  in  particular  the  costs  of  dele-
gations. 
Experience  has  shown  that it is important  to  improve 
the  Community's  aid-granting procedures. 
Serious  thought  should  also  be  given  to  investi-
gating  the  bureaucrat_i l:  and  other  obstacles  whicr.  hamper  the 
flow  of  Community  aid  to  ACP  countries  and  to  taking  a  closer 
look  at  who  actually  receives  the  aid  in each beneficiary ACP 
country. - 73  -
g)  Special  measures with  respect  to  the  least-developed,  land-
locked  and  island ACP  countries 
The  impact  of  such  measures  should  be  compared  with 
the  figures  actually  supplied  by  the  EEC  and  its  inclividual 
Member  States.  OECD/DAC  statistics  suggest  that  aid  goes 
mainly  to  the  more  developed  ACP  countries. 
The  general  conclusion to be  reached  is that,  in its 
dealing  with  the  ACP  countries,  the  Community  has concentrated 
on  fundamental  probler::E,  has  been  systematic  and  has  made 
substantial  efforts,  even if some  ACF  countries still consider 
such efforts to be  insufficient. 
4.2.3.  Relations  with  the  Arab  oil-producing countries  of  the 
Middle  East  (*) 
Economi:::  relations  between  the  Community  and  the 
Arab  oil-producirg  countries  of  the  fl1iddle  East  have  become  a 
thorny  issue  sin :e  tl·.e  energy  crisis  in  1973.  These  oil-ex-
porting  countries'  large  trade  surplus,  with  the  corresponding 
deficit~ of  the  Member  States and  the  other Western countries, 
have  given  rise  to  complex  economic  and  fina.ncial  problems 
fraught  with  consequences,  both  direct  and  indirect,  for 
international  economic  equilibrium. 
{ *)  This Sectic'n covers  the  following  countries:  Saudi  Arabia, 
Kuwait,  Iraq,  Bahrain,  Quatar,  United  Arab  Emirates,  Oman. - 74  -
In  recent  years,  the  Community  has  tried  a  regional 
appJ·oach  by  initiating  the  Euro-Arab  dialogue.  Since  its 
inception,  this  dialogue  has  been  confined  to  a  limited  range 
of subjects  (oil matters  were  excluded),  but it has  got b?gged 
down  owing  to  the  difficulties  the  Arab  countries  have  in 
agreeing  a  joint position. 
Thus  the  Community  as  such  has  not  in fact  been  able 
to  pursue  a  coordinated  pol icy  vis-a-vis  this  area,  which  is 
now  (and  will  be  even  more  in  the  future)  facing  problems  of 
great  importance  for its development. 
There  have  been  isolated,  bilateral  contacts  between 
individual  Member  States  and  Arab  oil-producin£  countries, 
when  the  latter  have  been  prepared  to  conclude  cooperation 
agreements  with European  countries. 
Overall,  however,  relations  between  the  two  areas 
remain  confused,  uncoordinated  and  difficult  to  grasp.  The 
problems  are serious  and  complex  on both sides. 
but  ion 
The  Arab  countries  are  asking  for  a  larger contri-
by  Europe  towards  rapid  industrialization  and 
strengthE,ning  of  their  economies  before  their  oil  resources. 
dwindle  in  the  not  so  distant  future.  They  are  asking  for 
technical  cooperation,  the  tran~fe·r  of  technology  ahd 
know-hc·w,  and  cooperation  in  the  sphere  of  management, 
training,  etc. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  Arab  countries  take  for 
granted  that  their  new  industrial  products  should  have  free 
access  to  the  Community  market. 
It  is precisely  this latter point  that is most  wor-
rying  for  the  Member  States - along  with  their need  for conti-
nuous  oil  supplies at  ttpredictable"  prices. - 75  -
It  is  not  easy  to  forecast  the  impact  on  Community 
markets  of  large  influxes  of  industrial  goods  with  a  high 
energy  content,  given  the  abnormal  competitive  situation (the 
use  of  "two-tier"  prices  for  energy  raw  materials  which  wi 11 
probably be  very widespread  in this area). 
There  is  no  doubt  that  the  signs  bode  ill for  the 
economic  and  social equilibrium of the  Member  States affected. 
The  only  imponderable  is  when  this  phenomenon  will  manifest 
itself and  how  serious it will  be. 
The  Community,  affected  - as  has already  been said -
by  the  lack of political solidarity between  the  Member States, 
does  not  seem  to  be  aware  of  what  the  future  holds  and  is 
persisting  in  its  "non-political"  inactive  course,  for  which 
the  term  "incoherent"  would  seem  inadequate. 
4.3.  BILATERAL  RELATIONS  WITH  THE  NON-ASSOCIATED  DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES 
4.3.1.  In Africa 
On  4  November  1980  an  agreement  was  signed  (and  is 
now  in  the  process  of  being  ratified)  admitting  Zimbabwe  to 
the  Lome  Convention.  Angola  anc1  Mozambique  are  therefore  the 
only  developing  countries  in  Africa  not  to  be  formally 
associated  to  the  Community.  The  latter is a  special  case  and 
in  its policy  on  Namjbia,  the  EEC  is firmly convinced  that it 
is  necessary  to  go  on  supporting  efforts  to  ensure  that  the 
United Nations plan is enforced  in that country. - 76  -
4.3.2.  In Asia 
On  8  March  1980  the  Community  signed  a  co-operation 
agreement  with  the  ASEAN  countries  ( *}.  The  concordance  of 
views  of  the  two  groups  of  countries  on  the  Afghanistan  and 
Cambodian  crises  gave  much  political  impetus  to  the  agreement 
in question. 
The  EEC-ASEAN  agreement  can  be  seen  as  an  attempt  to 
broaden  the  regional  component  (hitherto  largely  confin~d to 
Mediterranean  LDCs  and  the  ACP)  of  Communj ty  development-co-
operation Policy. 
EEC-ASEAN  trade  is  on  a  smc:.ll  scale  (2.3%  of  EEC 
external  trade  in  1978),  though  it  forged  ahead  ir·  the  Seven-
ties.  All  five  ASEAN  States  are  attractive  trade  partnen., 
either  because  of  the  level  of  development  they  have  attained 
or because  they  are  rich  in natural  resources. 
It  is  clearly  in  the  Community's  interests to boost 
exports  to  ASEAN  and  to endeavour,  through  imJ:·Orts,  to  achieve 
greater security of supply as  regards  raw  materials.  Increased 
trade,  however,  might  require greater Community willingness  to 
buy  manufactures  from  ASEAN.  Singapore  is already  a  vigore-us 
exporter  of  manufactures  but  the  other  four·  ASEAN  countries 
will  soon  also  be  able  to  flood  the  world  market  with  cheap 
goods  (textiles,  electronics,  etc.).  This  trend  is also  being 
fostered  by  Japanese  firms  in  particular,  which  for  several 
years  now  have  been  decentralizinf.  and  locating producticn  in 
ASEAN  countries.  The  price  of  greater  access  to  ASEAN  raw 
materials  and  closer  EEC-ASEAN  trade  relations  may  be  greater 
accessibility  to  the  Community  market  for  ASEAN  manufactures 
in competition with  EEC  "lame-duck"  manufactures. 
( *)  Indonesia, 
Thailand. 
Malaysia,  the  Philippines,  Singapore  and - 77  -
The  ASEAN  countries  also  have  everything  to  gain 
from  attracting  investment  from  the  Corr.rrtuni ty,  especially 
investment 
and  from 
in  industrialization  schemes  for  the  entire bloc, 
stepping  up  industrial  and  technologic~l 
co-operation,  etc. 
There  are,  however,  snags.  Firstly  there  is  the 
problem  of  competitior.  from  other  investors  (principally 
Japan).  We  therefore  have  to  examine  the  extent  to  which  the 
EEC-ASEAN  Agreement  can  actually promote  European  invE:.stn.ent. 
Secondly,  there  is  the  problem  of  markets  for  the 
resultant  ASE:J1N  products.  If the  latter are primarily intended 
for internal  ASEAN  consumption or for other Asian  LDC's,  there 
are  no  problems  for  th~  EEC.  But  if they are  intended chiefly 
for  the  Community  market  (Singapore  exports  give  cavse  for 
concern),  the  result  might  be  increased  competition  from  the 
new  industrial  nations  wl•j ch  even  now  is  posing  a  number  of 
problems  for  the  Community. 
However,  the  integration experiment  set  i~ motion  by 
the  five  ASEAN  count.d es is extremely  promj sing  and  the  EEC  is 
certain  to  back  it  under  the  Cc-operation  Agree:ment,  not 
merely  because  of  the  various  measures  involved  but  also 
because  it  realizes  the  value  of  the  ASEAN  bloc  as  a 
supranational  trade  partner.  The  area  forms  a  sizeable paten-· 
tial  market  and  is  of  considerable  strategic  and  economic 
importance.  This  is why  every  effort  should  be  made  to  secure 
its  poli  t i ca  J.  ~:tab  i 1 i ty  and  progress  or.  both  the  social  and 
economic  fronts. 
The  Agreement  in  question  may  also  have  reper-
cussions  on: - 78  -
- Relations  between  the  EEC  and  those  LDCs  which  have  already 
concluded  co-operation  agreements  1Medi terranean  ancl  ACP 
countries  in  partiC"t•lar).  Some  of  these  LDC s  consider  that 
their  "margin  of  preferer::ce"  has  been  eroded  and  are  asking 
the  EEC  for appz·opriate  compensati (ln. 
- Relations  between  the  EEC  and  other  countries  of  the  sub-
continE:.nt,  particularly  India,  Pakistan,  BangladeEh  and 
Burma,  insofar as  the  Agreement  - rather than  discriminating 
against  them  is  likely  to  pave  the  way  for  closer 
co-operatic•r•  with  the  EEC. 
Hong  Ko~ is  a  special  case  since  the  EEC  still re-
gards  it  as  a  dependent  territory  (thus  allowing  the  EEC  to 
apply  a  number  of  specific  trade  rules  to  it)  and  since  re-
lations  between  the  Community  and  Hong  Kong  will  be  in-
creasingly  influenced  by  the  development  of  relations between 
thE'  Community  and China. 
The  Community  has  concluded  broadly  similar  bi-
lateral  tract~  agreements  with  Pakistan,  Bangladesh  and  Sri 
Lanka.  Recer.tly  ( 1  December  1981)  it  signed  an  economic 
cooperation  agreement  with  India,  which 
trade  agreement.  These  agreements  stem 
enlargement  of  the  EEC  and  the  loss 
ferences. 
supersedes  a  bilateral 
largely  from  the first 
of  Commonwealth  pre-
British  entry  into  the  EEC  was  a  major  blow  for 
these  countrif.·[;  since  only  the  African,  Caribbean  and Pacific 
members  of the  Commonwealth  ( na  turalJ  y  excluding Australia  and 
New  Zealand)  have  had  the  chance  to  be  associc•.ted  with  the 
Community  through  the  Lome  Convention.  The  trade  agreements 
concluded  first  with  India  and  then  with other countries have 
not  counterbalanced  the  advantages  of  Community  Association. 
Perhaps  only  the  agreement  with  ASEAN  can  be  construe<."  as  a 
first  step  in  thiE  direction,  but  this  is  something  that  can 
only be  assessed  in  a  few  years'  time. munity 
On  the  one  hand, 
does  r.ot  wish  to 
- '19  -
it  is  understandable  that  the  Com-
dilute  rel~ticns  with  the  ACP 
countries  by  incorporating  in  the  bloc  such  countries  as 
India.  On  theother,  it  is  clear  that  the  reality  of  the 
sub-continent  cannc•t.  be  ignored  either  frc·m  the point of view 
of  its economic  backwardness  or  from  the point  of  view  of  the 
Community's  own  interests.  The  four  countries  in  ~uestion in 
fact  consi tute  a  potential  market  of  more  than  eight  hundred 
mill ion  people,  with  vast  potential  for  trade  and  inve~.;t.ment, 
despite  the  enc·rmous  economic  problems  facing  them. 
Even  though  a  strengthening  of  co-operation  with 
these countries entails economic  (and  political)  difficu:ties, 
it  is  questionable  whether  the  EEC's  present  policy  is  suf-
ficiently  far-.sighted.  This  is  all  the  more  so  since  the 
Agreement  concluded  with  the  ASEAN  bloc  is bound  to encourage 
the  other  countries  of  South-East  Asia  to  seek  at  least equal 
treatment with the  five  countries considered. 
Another  1oot  point  is  to  what  extent  these problems 
were  taker,  into  consideration  when  the  ASEAN  Agreement  was 
drawn  up. 
Agreements  such  as  those  concluded  with  India  do  not 
exist as  far as  Burma,  Afghanistan or Iran are  concerned. 
The  specific  problems  of South Korea  and  Taiwan must 
also  be  taken  into  consideration.  Relations  between  the  Com-
munity  and  these  two  countries will  be  ir.r:reasingly  influenced 
by  their special  linki~ with  China  on  the  one  hand  and  Japan  on 
the  other. - 80  -
4.3.3.  In Latin America 
Trade  with  Latin American  countries,  which  had  been 
very  limited  for  a  long  tinE,  has  developed  relatively  well 
over  the  last few  years. 
Total  Community  exports  to  Latin  American  countries 
as  a  whole  (Central  and  South America)  rose  from  3,800 million 
ECU  in  1970  to  almost  12,500 million  ECU  in  1979.  The 
Community • s  trade  t<:!J ance  with  the  Latin  American  countries 
has  always  been  in the  red,  although  the  deficit is not  caused 
by  oil  imports  from  Mexico  and  Venezuela.  As  trEding partners 
the  39  Latin  American  countries  are  more  important  than  the 
60  ACP  states  and  comE  straight  after  the  state-trading 
nations. 
Since  the  late  1960s  the  Community  haE  made  efforts 
to  stE:·p  up  relations  wi tr.  the  Latin American  countries. 
A  co-operation  agreement  has  been  in  existence 
between. the  EEC  and  Mexico  since  1975  and  in  September  198C  a 
similar  agreement  was  concluded  with  Brazil,  the  latter 
succeeding  the  trade  agre€ment  of  1974.  Since  1974  relations 
between  the  Communj ty  and  Uruguay  have  been  regulated  by  a 
trade  agreement.  By  contrclSt,  the  EEC/  Arg5'ntirta  trade  agree-
ment  was  not  renewed  when  it expired  on  31  December  1980.  The 
Argentine  Government  had  for  a  long  time  been  complaining 
about  the  Community's  attitude  to  their  country  and  were 
particularly  bitter  about  the  effects  of  the  Common  Agri-
cul  tu.l.'c\l  Policy.  As  a  consequence  they  considerEd  any  trade 
agreements  to  be  superfluous  after  the  conclusion  of  GATT 
agreements  on  beef  and  veal.  The  Communi.ty  has  thus  lost  a 
very  important  trading partner. - 81  -
A  co-operation  agreement 
CO(;ntries  of  the  Andean  Pact  (*) 
between  the  EEC  and  the 
is  currently  being  ne-
gotiated.  This  agreement  will  be  similar  to  the  one  signed  in 
March  1980  with  the  ASEAN  countries.  Negotiations  have  un-
fortunately  had  to  be  suspended  following  the  coup  d'etat  in 
Bali  vic- in  July  1980.  Technical  relations  are  nevertheless 
being maintained  between  the  Commission  end  the governing body 
(Junta)  of the  Andean  Pact. 
ThesE>  five  countries  of  the  Andean  Pact  are  of  no 
great  importance  to  the  EEC  at  the  present  time  as  they 
provide  about  1.1% of  total  EEC  imports.  Nevertheless  they  are 
major  suppliers  of  raw  materials  such  as  tin,  copper,  zinc, 
lead  and  tun!!;sten,  not  to  mention  coffee  and  bananas.  Vene- · 
zuela is also  important  as  a  current  and  potential supplier of 
oil.  The  five  countries  in  question  import  all  sor·t s  of 
manufactures  from  the  EEC  and  the  Community  is,  after  the 
United  States,  their most  importar.~  trading partner. 
Apart  L·om  strengthening  trade  relations  and  se-
curing  larger oil  and  raw  material  supplie~,  the  EEC  might  do 
well  to  explore  the  scope  for  implementing  joint research and 
development  projects.  This would  create  a  useful  precedent  in 
the  Latin  Arne rican  sub-continent,  especially  in  view  of  the 
poor  results  of the  Mexico  agreemFnt. 
The  EEC  may  also  find  it advantageous  (and  this  is 
equally  true  of  the  EEC-ASEAN  Agreement)  to  deal  with  a  bloc 
rather  than  with  individual  governme:r.ts,  and  the  case  for 
economic  integration  in  that  region  could  then  be  supported 
and  strengthened. 
(*)  Venezuela,  Cclumbia,  Peru,  Ecuador and  Bolivia - 82  -
Agreements  on  specific  products  have  also  been con-
cluded  with  most  Latin  American  countries,  all  of  whom  are 
covered  by  the  GSP. 
Despite  these  various  agreements  and  other efforts, 
relations  between  the  EEC  and  Latin America  have  not  developed 
as well  as  might  have  been hoped  in  recent  years. 
The  Cooperation  Agreement  with  Mexico  has  not 
achieved  a  great  deal,  especial] y  in  the  field  of  technical 
and  commercial  cooperation,  alth(Jugh  EEC  exports  to  Mexico 
almost  doubled  between  1977  and  1979.  Mexico,  anc'  the  other 
above-mentioned  countries,  seem  to  have  benEfitted  more  from 
the  GSP  than  from  specific  agreements  with  the  Community. 
All  in  all,  Latin  America  1 s  share  in  EEC  imports 
felJ  back  from  11%  in  1958  to  5%  in  1978.  This  can  be 
attributed  to  a  sluggish  flow  of  raw  materials  (which  still 
account  for  about  80%  of  Latin  Arne rican exports)  but  the  main 
rec::son  is undoubtedly  weak  trading  in manufactures  be tween  the 
Community  and  the  sub-continent. 
Brazi  1  and  Mexico  in  particular  have  become  ex-
poMers  of  manufactures  and  the  Communjty  cannot  ignore  their 
need  or 
consoljdate 
that  of  countries  in  a  similar  position  to 
their  role  of  exporters.  If  the  Community  does 
give  them  the  cold  shoulder,  it  will  los1:  the  golden  oppor-
tunities  offerE:d  to  European  firms  by  thE:  internal  markets  of 
Brazil  and  Mexico. 
Moreover,  in  view  of  the  level  of  competitiveness 
attained  by  these  cour.1.ries,  the  question  of  reciprocity  in 
trade  relations  and  full  respect  for  GATT  rules  on  trade 
liberalization,  is bound  to be  raised. - 83  -
We  must  also  find  out  what  awareness  exists  of  the 
long-term  commercial  implications  of  these  agreements  and 
hence  what  adjustment  policie::;  need  to  be  adopted  by  Community 
sectors  which  are  already,  or will  soon be  in  difficulti~~ ir 
the  future  and  are  1 ikely  to  have  to  face  increased  com-
petition. 
European  finns  are  clearly· interested  in  the possi-
bility  of  increasing  their  investments  (in various  forms)  in 
the  principal  Latin-American countries.  The  latter also  recog-
nize  the  vi tal  role  of  foreign  capital  in  their  own  develop-
mE~nt.  Nevertheless,  progress  with  regard  to  guarantees  and 
security  fo1·  European  investor~.  has  so  far  been  unsatis-
factory,  as  has  become  clear  from  recent  negotiations  with 
Brazil. 
Another  problem  with  Latin  Ame·rican  countries  is 
that  of  access  to  raw  materials  (anc~ Mexican  oil),  in orc'er to 
provide  the  Community  with  greater  diversification  and  se-
curity  of  supplif l.  No  real  progress  seems  to  have  been  made 
on  t h i s  p o in  t  e i t h  ~~ r . 
The  other  Latin-American  count.rj es  which  have  not 
special  agreement t•  with  the  EEC  cor.te  under  the  GSP  or  are 
party to  agreements  on  specific  pr·cducts.  These  countries are: 
- the  five  members  of  the  Central  American  Corr:mon  Market 
(Costa  Rica,  El  Sah·<:•c:or,  Honduras,  Guaternala,  Nicaragua) 
where  the  local  political  situation  seems  to  militate· 
against  any  comprehensive  agreement  although  an  intenE.i-
fication  of  relations  with  one  or  two  individual  countries 
(e.g.  Costa  Rica)  is not  beyond  the  realms  of possibility; 
Panama,  Belize,  Haiti  and  the  Dominican  Republic,  all  in 
Central  Amerj1a; - 84  -
- Chile  (wbE~re  the  political  situation  prevents  an  official 
agreement with  the  EEC)  and  Paraguay  in South  Am~rica. 
Finally,  the  ACP  countries  of  Central  America  ar·f; 
dealt  with  in  the  chapter  covering  ACP  countries  in  general. 
Cuba  (a  member  of  the  CMEA  or  Comecon)  is  technically  one  of 
those  countries with  a  centralized economy. 
The  EEC's  policy  towco.rds  the  Latin  American  coun-
tries  is  primarily  influer:ced  by  the  fact  that  it  shares 
responsibility  with  the  United  States  for  the  developrr.ent  of 
this  sub-continent  where  some  of  the  poorest  people  in  the 
world  live.  The  Uni tec1  States  itself  has  traditionally  con-
siderfd  aid  to  South  American  countries  as falling within its 
own  particular province. 
Secondly,  the  wealth  of  raw  materials  in  this 
sub-continf~nt,  the potential  size  of its market,  and  the  rapid 
economic  expansion  in  some  of  the  countries  in  this  area, 
partic:ular} y  Brazil  and  Mexico,  unquestionably  make  Latin 
American  countries  attractive  traclir·e  partners  for  the  Com-
munity,  although  the  problems  they  pose  are  no~  incon~ 
siderable. 
Finally,  Latin  America  has  a  wide  variety of pc·li ti-
cal  regimes  which  frequently  stray  from  the path of democracy. 
This  makes  it  difficult  to  establish  relations  \'.lith  the 
Community.  Nevertheless,  we  need  to  ask  v.·hether  the  Community 
is  not  making  a  mistake  by  concentn.ting  on  relations  with 
former  colonies  rather  than  attempting  to  stimulate  more  eco-
nomic  development  in  this  arE-·a  - an  area  which  could  be  of 
decisive  importance  in  the  search  for  economic  and  political 
solutions  to under-development  at world  level. 
* 
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CHAPTER  V 
RELATIONS  WITH  STATE-TRADING  COUNTRIES 
The  last  decade  saw  a  sharp  increase  in  trade 
between  the  Community  and  Eastern  Europe,  matching  that  in 
trade between  the  Community  and  the rest of  the  world. 
The  same  period  saw  an  increase  in  co-ope1·ation  in 
the  productive  sector,  with  transfer~  of  technology,  sales of 
plant  anc  scientific  exchanges.  Closer  financial  links  were 
establ  ishE,d.  New  grounds  for  co-operation  developed,  but  also 
sources  of conflict and  str·f:Ss. 
In  short,  the  two  areas  have  become  markedly  more 
interdependent  and  interlinked. 
This  tr-:_nd  is  in  sharp  contrast  to  the  absence  - or 
at  least  the  f.·agili ty  of  agreements  between  the  in-
stitutions of  the  two  areas.  It is the  Community  Member States 
and  the  individue~l  countries  of  thE  Communist  bloc  that  have 
taken  the  initiative,  and  signed  bilateral  agreements.  And  in 
some  cases  companies  have  acted  directly,  without  any  formal 
agreements. 
Basically,  the  Community  insti  tutiom;  have  remained 
on  the  sidelines.  The  Community  haE.  failed  to  provide  an  of-
ficial,  stable  and  coordinated  legal  basis  for  the  in-
creasingly  important  and  politically  charged  - economic 
relations with  the  countries of Eastern Europe. ·  ...... 
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_  There  are  many  reasons  for  this.  As  far back as  the 
-~~'::  -.  ..  '• 
Sh:ties,  the  Community  started to consider  the  case for estab--
1 ishing  a  Lmiform  basis  for  the  Member  States'  trade policies 
towards  the  coun~~ries  of  Easterr  Europe.  First  of  all, 
arrangements  were 
munity  level  on 
made  for  preliminary  consul tat  ion  at  Com-
bilateral  negotations  with  state-trading 
countries.  Later,  a  common  regime  for  impc·rts  of  products 
subject  to  quotas  was established.  Subsequently,  at  the  end  of 
the  transition  per·iod  in  1969,  thE!  Community  took  over  the 
power  to  draw  up  trade  agreements  with  individual 
state-trading cot.:n lJ·ies. 
However  there  were  doubts  and  resistance  in  Member 
States and  the  Community  encounterf;cl  practical difficulties in 
its  attempts  to  estat,~ ish  its  own  trace  policy.  As  a  result, 
the  Member  States  contiroued  to  act  independently,  with  the 
tacit  asser.t  of  the  Community.  They  gradually  moved  from 
straightforward  "bilateral  trade  agreements"  with  Eastern 
European  countr:i es  to  "bi latera}  co-operation  agreements" 
i~volving  technological,  scientific,  industrial  and  financial 
collabor·ation  i.e.  to  agreements  which  could  have  sub-
stantial economic,  financial  and  trade  impll <:e•tions. 
In  the  final  analysis,  by  signing  these  &greements, 
the  Member  States  a.re  contravening  the  princip:.e  laid  down  in 
1969  whereby  the  Community  is  soleJ y  responsible  for external 
economic  relations. 
The  Member  States have  ofter.  failed  to consult  their 
partner~;  beforehand  at  Community  level.  And  the  confus1 cr•  has 
been  further  increased  by  the  agreement~- reached  by  comp;:onies. - 87  -
In  the  Seventies  the  Community  did  r.ot  make  a  really 
determined  attempt  to  impose  a  minimum  of  discipline  on  the 
Member  States.  It  did,  however,  explicitly  ask  the 
state-trading countries of Eastern Europe  to  open  negotiations 
on  global  bilateral  agreements  covering  the  whole  range  of 
trade  and  technological  and  financial  co-operation.  Moreover, 
a  draft  agreement  was  drawn  up  and  circulated. 
of  day 
So  far,  only  one  tr<tde  agreement  hctf;  seen  the  light 
the  one  between  the  Community  and  Romania.  This 
agreement  is,  however,  of  special  importance  because  it  was 
designed  to  mark  the  start  of  a  new  phase  in  which  the 
Corr.rr;uni ty,  representing  the  interests  of  the  Member  States, 
would  be  at  the  centre  of  negotiatic.·n~  on  agreements  with 
individual  state-trading countries. 
Progress  here  has  been  hampered  by  the  di~pute with 
COMECON  about  the  so::-1  of  agreement  the  two  parties  should 
sign.  The  Community  has  turned  down  the  COMECON  proposal  to 
negotiate  an  "out Line  global  agreement"  covering  all  aspects 
of  trade  and  technological,  industrial  and  scientific  co-oper-
ation.  The  Community  argues  that  the  two  instiiutions are not 
comparable,  in  that  only  the  Con,muni ty  has  solf·  negotiating 
powers  on  trade  isst;es,  COMECON  being  a  body  which  laeks  legal 
personality or powers  to  represent  its members. 
The  Community  :feels  that  it is necessary  to be  able 
to  establj~h direct bilateral  relations with  any  state-trading 
country. 
Outside  the  COMECON  area,  the  Community  recently 
(1978)  signed  a  bilateral  trade  and  econ<,mic  co-operatic•n 
agreement  with  the  People's  Republic  of  China.  This  agrf  .. c·ment 
will  run for five  years,  and  may  be  expandE·d  considerably. - 88  -
The  Community's  approach  to  relations  with 
state-trading  countries  is  thus  co-rrect  and  consistent  with 
its general  objectives  in the matter. 
The  failure  to  implement  this  approach  properly  is 
attributable  to  the  delays  which  have  occurred  in practice,  to 
uncertainties  in  the  unification  and  monitoring  of  the  prac-
tices  and  commitments  of  individual  Member  States,  and  the 
fact  that  certain  specific  problems  have  been  allowed  to 
deteriorate to  the point where  they  can  no  longer be  ignored. 
Many  of  the  hindrances  to  trade . relations  between 
the  Community  and  state-trading  countries  are  attributable  to 
the  crucial  differences  between  the  way  in which  the  free-mar-
ket  economies  function  and  the  rigid  rules  of  planned  eco-
nomies. 
The  special  features  of price  formation  in Communist 
countries  are  among  the  main  reasons  for sales at "political-
ly-dictated"  prices,  which  to  some  extent  are  tantamount  to 
dumping. 
The  Community  has  long  had  its  own  anti-dumping  and 
safeguard  rules.  But  the  procedures  are  slow  and  cumbersome, 
and  in  any  case  dumping  has  continued  to  occur,  though it has 
varied  in . its  intensity  (one  factor  is  the  fact  that  the 
seller  countries  may  need  to  obtain  hard  currency  at  any 
cost). 
As  a  safeguard  against  abnormal  competition  from 
Eastern  bloc  countries,  a  number  of  Member  States  have 
retained quantitative  quotas.  These  are far from  being aligned 
at Community  level. - 89  -
The  Community  has  had  to  step  in  to  deal  with 
imports  of  sensitive  products  of  the  steel,  textile and other 
sectors  facing  structural  difficulties.  It  has  concluded 
voluntary  restraint  agreements  with  a  number  of  Eastern  bloc 
countries.  This  constructive  development  could  be  taken  fur-
ther  and  become  a  feature  of  relations  with  state-trading 
countries. 
In  the  absence  of  a  genuine  common  policy on credit, 
the  individual  Member  States  and  other  industrialized Western 
countries have  engaged  in cut-throat competition on  the credit 
front,  offering  increasingly  generous  credit  terms  to  the 
Eastern bloc  countries. 
One  pointer  to  this  trend  is  the  sharp  upsurge  in 
debts,  which  rose  from  a  total  of  some  6000 million dollars in 
1970  to  65000  million  or  so  in  1979.  The  debts  of  some  coun-
tries  (such  as  Poland)  have  reached  the  danger  point  and 
special  arrangemer:ts  are  needed;  we  consider  that  these 
arrangements  should  be  co-ordinated at Community  level. 
This  indebtedness  has  been  accompanied  by  the 
spread,  in  Eastern  bloc  countries,  of plant  generating  large 
eY.ports  of  finished  and  semi-finished  goods  to  the  Community 
market.  Product  payback,  compensatory  and  barter  deals  have 
become  increasingly  common  in  recent  years  and  have  sometimes 
led to disquieting penetration of Western markets. 
These  types  of  trade  are  not  necessarily  to  be  de-
plored,  but  if  they  are  allowed  to  multiply  unchecked  they 
could  have  marked  adverse  repercussions.  Here  again  the  Com-
munity  has  remained  on  the  sidelines  - it has  not  even  kept 
statistics. - 90  -
Nor  does  the  substantial  and  rapidly expanding trade 
between  the  two  Germanies  ( *)  show  up  in  EEC  customs  sta-
tistics  even  though  such  trade  also  involves  sensitive  pro-
ducts  regulated  by  the  EEC. 
The  European  Parliament  recently  took  a  critical 
look  at  the  disadvantages  and  repercuss:i.ons  of these  forms  of 
trade  (Committee  for  External  Relations  draft  report  on 
relations  between  the  Community  and  the  state-trading  coun-
tries of Eastern Europe  and  COMECON  - report by  Mr  DE  CLERCQ  -
16  December  1980). 
The  lor.g-established  commercial  practices of Eastern 
European  countries  on  the  maritime,  inland  waterway  and  road 
transport markets  have  repeatedly been described  as  dumping. 
Here  again,  the  Community  authorities  have  yet  to 
lay  down  a  clear-cut  Comrruni ty  strategy .. 
Finally,  there  is  the  increasing  inter-linkage  in the 
energy  sector  with  the  countries  of  the  Eastern  bloc,  par-
ticularly  the  USSR.  The  energy  crisis  has  greatly  increased 
the  dependence  of  the  smaller  Eastern  Europe  countries  on  the 
USSR.  The  major  schemes  for  piping  natural  gas  to  the 
Community  - financed  by  \t/estern  capital,  and  using  Western 
plant  and·  technology  - are  of  major  importance,  if only  for 
their obvious  political  implications. 
(*)  Trade  between  the  two  Germanies  is regarded  by  the  Federal 
Republic  and  the  GDR  as  internal  trade,  i.e.  basically  a 
form  of  bilateral  integration  which  trar.scends  EEC  trade 
rules,  even  where  it  involves  products  covered  by  EEC 
regulations  on  the origin of goods.  To  consider such  trade 
as  intra-Community  trade  may  be  prejudicial  to  the  MembE·r 
States. - 91  -
A  problem  of  this  kind  should  be  dealt  with  in 
accordance  with  the  energy  policy  which  the  Community  intends 
to implement  in the near future. 
In  conclusion,  it is  certainly  desirable  that  eco-
nomic  relations  between  the  Community  and  the  state-trading 
countries  of  Eastern  Europe  should  develop  steadily,  in  an 
atmosphe~e of co-operation and  detente. 
However,  there  is a  strong  case  for providing these 
relations  with  a  precise  and  stable  legal  basis,  so  that  the 
Community  can  establish  a  clear,  coherent  economic  and  trade 
policy  towards  this area. 
It  is  in  the  mutual  interests  of  the  Community 
Member  States  and  the  Eastern  European  countries  that  this 
basis  should  be  set  up  in  an  orderly  manner,  that  factors 
making  for  economic  tension  should  be  eliminted,  and  that  the 
concessions  made  by  the  two  parties  should  be  genuinely 
reciprocal. 
The  Community  has  clear-cut political  and other res-
ponsibilities here. 
* 
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CHAPTER  VI 
CONSISTENCY  BETWEEN  THE  COMMUNITY'S 
EXTERNAL  AND  INTERNAL  POLICIES 
6.0.  INTRODUCTION 
If  the  European  Community  is  to  build  up  trade  and 
expand  its  external  relations  activities,  it is essential  to 
strengthen  the  economic  structures  of  the  EEC's  internal 
market. 
The  converse,  however,  is also  true  :  in other words 
the  Community's  action vis-a-vis non-member countries can  also 
influence- and  determine  the  development  of  the  Community's 
internal policies. 
We  shall  be  adopting  a  new  approach  in this chapter 
by  examining  the  interrelations between  the  Community's exter-
nal-relations  activities,  on  the  one  hand,  and  a  number  of 
formally  established  internal  policies  (the  Common  Agri-
cultural Policy,  Social  Policy  and  Regional  Policy)  as  well  as 
one  or  two  "embryonic"  internal  policies  (Industrial  Policy 
and  Energy  Policy),  on  the  other. 
Such  an  examination will yield abundant  criteria for 
assessing  the  "coherence"  of  the  Community's  policy  as  a 
whole.  The  balance-sheet  will  be  partly  positive  and  partly 
infavourable  :  inconsistencies,  lack  of  uniformity  and  un-
certainties  which  are  closely  related  to  the  difficulties the 
European  Community  has  come  up  against  in the  last  few  years. 
As  already  stated,  the  aim  of  this  Study  is not  to 
make  suggestions  or  proposals  on  ways  and  means  of  improving 
the  present  situation,  but  merely  to  highlight major problems 
and  sources of malaise. - 93  -
We  are  nevertheless  convinced  that  pinpointing  the 
problems  will  in  itself  help  to  pave  the  way  for  possible 
solutions  in the  future. 
* 
*  * 
6.1.  INTERACTIONS  AND  CONSISTENCY  BETWEEN  RELEVANT  ASPECTS  OF 
THE  COMMUNITY'S  EXTERNAL  RELATIONS  AND  INDUSTRIAL 
POLICIES 
Although  Europe  has  long  ceased  to  be  the  workshop 
of  the  world,  it is  still  a  force  to  be  reckoned  with.  The 
pattern of  its  traae  (imports:  60%  primary  and  semi-processed 
products;  exports:  87%  manufactures)  is ample  proof. 
However,  if  the  Community  is  to  remain  a  leading 
exporter of manufactures,  its products  have  to  be  able  to hold 
their own  against  those  of its competitors.  Europe's  continued 
economic  growth  and  future  economic  and  social  stability are 
therefore  heavily dependent  on  an  industrial policy calculated 
to boost  its international  competitiveness  in both traditional 
and  advanced  technology  industries,  combined  with  a  coherent 
and  dynamic  trade policy actively protecting free  world  trade. 
To  boost  Europe's  competitiveness,  both  offensive  and  de-
fensive  action is needed. 
However,  Community  industry  is flailing  in  the  wake 
of  the  reverberations  caused  by  the  oil  crises.  Economic 
growth  has  ground  to  a  halt  and  recession  is  a  real  threat. 
There  are  sharp  divergences  from  State  to  State,  accompanied - 94  -
by  substantial  trade  gaps  and  mounting  public  debts.  Whole 
industries are in the  throes  of  far-reaching structural crises 
while  investment  in  plant  and  equipment  has  dried  up.  Other 
sectors are ailing because  of unfair competition from  non-Com-
munity  countries.  On  top  of  all  this,  inflation continues  to 
rage,  apparently uncontrollable.  In  social  and  human  terms  the 
most  disturbing  trend  is  soaring  unemployment  - in  itself an 
accurate  yardstick  of  the  depths  of  the  crisis  into  which 
Member States have  been plunged. 
This  distressing  situation  is  not  due  just  to 
internal  factors  (which  are  outside  the  scope  of  this  study). 
External  factors,  linked  with  the  deteriorating  terms  of 
international  competition,  also play  a  significant part. 
Persistent  confusion  on  the  currency  market  (dating 
back  over  ten  years  to  the  collapse  of  the  Bretton  Woods 
agreements  in  1971)  has  led  a  number  of  States  to  resort  to 
tactics  such  as undervaluing  their  currencies  and  bolstering 
their  exports  artificially.  The  sudden  hardening  of  the  US 
dollar,  coupled  with  higher  American  interest  rates,  has  made 
matters  worse  by  stimulating  a  massive  exodus  of  capital, 
pushing  up  currency  deficit  and  sparking  off  a  fresh  upsurge 
in  inflation(*). 
(*)  The  Introduction  pointed  out  that  an  exhaustive  treatment 
of  international  monetary  and  financial  relations  was 
impossible  here  because  of  the  technical  and  complex 
nature  of  the  subject-matter.  {The  Economic  and  Social 
Committee  did,  however,  discuss  this  problem  in  its 
Opinion  of  21  June  1978,  O.J.  No.  C  283  of  27  November 
1978)' 
We  would  reiterate  this  statement  but  at  the  same  time 
point  out  that  international  monetary  relations  (with  the 
distortions  of  competition  which  may  result  from  ex-
change-rate  manipulations)  are  a  crucial  factor  in  as-
sessing  current  and  future  international  difficulties  and 
should  stimulate  debate  about  the  line  to  be  taken by  the 
Community. - 95  -
Some  countries  are  pushing  their  exports  hard,  ex-
ploiting  to  the  hilt  any  national  advantages  that  may  accrue 
from  low  labour  costs;  alternatively,  they  may  apply  11two 
tier"  prices  for  energy  and  other  raw  materials,  undercutting 
world  prices to encourage  domestic  export-oriented production. 
An  increased  tendency  to  resort  to  dumping  and  unfair  com-
petition,  sometimes  in  its  crudest  forms,  can  be  observed  in 
other  cases.  All  these  trends  reflect  the  sharpened  com-
petition  for  foreign  markets,  even  at  a  cost  of  substantial 
losses. 
The  deterioration  of  international  trade  is  also 
evident  in  the  relentless  drive  to  protect  domestic  markets, 
enlisting  every  conceivable  type  of  non-tariff  barrier  and 
some times  going  so  far  as  to  re-introduce  import  quotas.  The 
general 
of  the 
aim  is  to mitigate  trade  deficits  by  offloading  some 
strain  of  high  oil  import  costs  and  currency  losses 
onto  some  other country(*). 
Confronted  by  this  outbreak  of  worldwide  economic 
confusion,  which  has  a  decidedly  protectionist  bias,  exhor-
tations  to  observe  the  GATT  Agreements  - whose  aim  was  to 
L1t roduce  rules  ensuring  balanced  international  trade  and 
check  the  spread  of  unfair State  practices  such as  subsidies, 
aids,  public  purchase  and  discriminatory  procedures  - seem  to 
be  falling  on  deaf  ears.  More  and  more,  the  GATT  Agreements 
are  being  regarded  as  codes  of  good  intent  rather  than 
effective  instruments  for  restoring order on  the  international 
market. 
---------------------------------------
( -•)  This  point  which  is  related  to  the  monetary  problem 
touched  upon  in  the  footnote  of  the  previous  page  - is  a 
reference  to  the  fact  that  the  financial  deficits  caused 
by  the  oil  bill  disrupt  the  trade  balances  of  all 
countries  and  raise  the  complex  problem  of  recycling 
petrodollars  into productive  investment~ - 96  -
In  recent  years  there  has  been  considerable  un-
certainty within  the  Community  as  to  what  industrial  and  trade 
policy  to  pursue.  Traditionally  opposed  to  intervention,  the 
Community  has  consistently  operated  on  the  basis  that  it is 
for  firms,  and  firms  alone,  to restructure  industry and  tailor 
it to changing market  conditions.  It was  felt  that  the  role of 
the  Member  States  and  the  Community  should  be  confined  to 
creating  a  general  climate  conducive  to  the  required  ad-
justments and  innovation,  .as  opposed  to direcx  intervention in 
the  decision-making  prDcess.  The  free  interplay  of  market 
forces.  combined  with  the  total  dismantlement  of  trade  bar-
riers,  was  thought  to  be  sufficient  to  give  individuai  firms 
the  impetus  to  take  spontaneous  steps  to . boost  the  com-
petitiveness of their products. 
The  above  national  and  Community  industrial  and 
trade  strategy  coinci-ded  with  (and  may  well. have  helped  to 
bring  about)  a  period  of  worldwide  prosperity  which,  for 
almost  twenty  years,  went  hand-in-hand  with  economic  ex-
pansion,  rising  incomes  and  employment  and  a  steady  increase 
in  standards  of  living  throughout  the  Community.  Under  such 
rosy  conditions  there  was  no  cause  to challenge  the  reasoning 
behind  these policies. 
However,  this  non-interventionist strategy  ran  into 
increasingly deep  waters  when  the general  situation started to 
deteriorate  after  the  1973  oil  crisis  and  competition  from 
non-member  countries  sharpened,  sometimes  under  distorted· 
terms,  as described above. 
With market  forces  left to Operate  unchecked  in this 
critical  situation,  new  checks  and  balances  proved  hard  to 
find.  Serious  distortion  of  competition  resulted,  aggravated 
by  a  price  war  (with manufactures  sometimes  sold at below  cost 
price)  and  a  proliferation  of  problems  affecting  entire 
sectors.  This  sad  state  of  affairs  highlighted  the  inflexible 
structures  of  many  European  industries,  hampered  as  they  are - 97  -
by  resistance  to  change  and  compartmentalization on  a  national 
scale.  One  side-effect  of  inadequate  adjustment  and  mobility 
has  been  that  inefficient manufacturers  remain  in business. 
As  mentioned  above,  these  troubles  were  compounded 
by  the  arrival  of  imports  competing  for  the  Community  market 
on  unfair  terms.  Left  on  their  own  to  cope  with  this 
onslaught,  firms  found  themselves  unable  to  fight  _back.  A 
general  counter-offensive,  rallying all economic  groups  in the 
Community,  became  necessary.  Effective  opposition  inside  GATT 
called  for  the backing of  a  forceful  policy enjoining non-Com-
munity countries  to  abide  by  the  rules of  fair  compet1tion. 
Responsibility for mobilizing  this counter-offensive 
was,  of course,  assigned  to  the  Community  Institutions respon-
sible  for  the  EEC'3  external  trade  policy.  Despite  delays  and 
stumbling  blocks  caused  by  inadequate  organization  {some 
Commission  depart1:.ents  are  grossly  understaffed)  and  hesi-
tation over what  e~:actly had  to  be  done,  the  Community  invoked 
the  GATT  provi sior. ,  (e.g.  anti-dumping  measures,  the  re-intro-
duction  of  customs  duties  and  customs  surveillance  and  safe-
guards)  in  a  drive  to protect its manufacturing  industries and 
put  a  stop  to  the  most  flagrant  examples  of unfair competition 
by  non-member  countries. 
However,  the  core  of  the  problem,  viz  the  dwindling 
competitiveness  of  an  increasing  number  of  industries,  called 
for  the  concurrent  adoption  of  a  proper  industrial policy 
framed  to  remedy  the  causes  of  the  ailment  and  suggest 
guidelines  and  solutions  viable  in  the  long  as  well  as  short 
term. 
Only  in  certain  industries  labouring  under  obvious 
~tructural problems  (steel,  shipbuilding,  textiles,  synthetic 
fibres)  did  the  Communi by  intervene  to  eliminate  surplus 
capacity  rooted  in  investment  decisions  dating  back  many 
years,  before  the  energy  crisis.  Leaving  aside  the  specific - 98  -
case  of  the  steel  industry  (which  is  governed  by  regulations 
allowing  the  Commission  full  scope),  the  Community  strategy 
has  been  to  encourage  firms  in  other  ailing  sectors  to  trim 
their  fat  voluntarily,  halt  further  expansion  and  switch  to 
other lines of production to boost  productivity.  An  attempt  to 
introduce  a  "crisis  cartel"  in  the  synthetic  fibres  industry 
(a  particularly  hard-hit  sector)  proved  abortive  because  of 
conflicting  opinions  as  to  the  interpretation of  the  rules  on 
competition  and  their  role  in times  of  economic  recession(*). 
There  have  been  spasmodic  Community  drives  - alas,  on  such  a 
limited  scale  that  their  promise  has  not  been  fulfilled  - to 
promote  R  &  D,  innovation  and  retraining  programmes  and  pro-
vide  aid  to  alleviate  the  social  repercussions  of  plant 
closures.  Though  full  of  good  intentions,  such  schemes  lacked 
the  practical backing  required  to carry  them  through. 
On  the  external  relations  front,  the  Community  has 
opted  for  negotiations  (outside  GATT)  with  a  view  to  per-
suading  non-member  countries  to  agree  to  voluntary  restraint 
on  their  exports  of  "sensitive"  manufactures.  Results  have 
been  satisfactory  in  the  textiles  industry  (the  Mul tifibre 
Arrangement,  currently being  renegotiated,  is a  case  in point) 
but  disappointing  in  other  sectors,  including  shipbuilding 
(due  mainly  to  failure  to  enlist  the  co-operation  of  several 
major  non-Community  producers).  It  is  not  clear  how  much  has 
been  achieved  by  the  recent  talks with  Japan  on car imports. 
(*)The  Economic  and  Social  Cor:1mittee's  Opinion  of  30  April 
1981  on Competition Policy  illustrates the  inconsistencies 
created  in  the past  by  an  over-rigid  interpretation of the 
Treaty's  provisions.  The  Opinion  recognizes  the  need  to 
interpret  the  rules  more  flexibly  so  that  EEC  industries 
can  compete  with  their US  and  Japanese  counterparts. - 99  -
However,  with  the  exception  of  this  handful  of 
industries  where  surplus  capacity  is  a  particularly  serious 
problem,  the  EEC  has  displayed  a  conspicuous  lack  of  force-
fulness.  So  far  it has  largely  failed  to  take  positive  steps 
to  boost  the  competitiveness  of  all  sectors  of  European 
industry,  whether  traditional  or  advanced  technology,  mainly 
because  its  own  and  the  Member  States  •  respective  areas  of 
responsibility  in  the  sphere  of  industrial  policy  have  still 
not  been clarified. 
In  the  absence  of  a  Community  industrial  policy, 
ailing businesses and  sectors are bringing  increasing pressure 
to  bear  on  their  Governments.  The  latter,  confronted with  the 
urgent  need  to  protect  jobs,  have  been  quick  to  intervene 
directly  with  subsidies,  aids  and  other national  measures.  As 
a  result,  discrepa·~cies between  conditions  of  production from 
State  to  State  h1ve  become  even  more  pronounced,  thereby 
distorting  competi' ion within  the  Community. 
In  addition,  the  individual  Member  States  have 
stepped  up  bilateral  negotiations  with  non-member  countries, 
outside  the  Community  context,  in  the  hope  of  securing 
specific  outlets  for  their  manufactures  and,  where  possible, 
guaranteeing  energy  supplies.  At  the  present  juncture,  the 
latter  trend  is  perhaps  the  most  disturbing  feature  of  the 
lack  of  consistency  between  Community  and  national  external 
and  industrial  policies.  It  is  disturbing  for  many  reasons. 
First  and  foremost, 
make  it  harder  for 
such  disjointed  and  uncoordinated  moves 
the  Community  to  take  an  effective  and 
consistent  stand against  the  threats its industry faces  on all 
fronts  from  outside  competition.  Secondly,  it  exacerbates 
distortion  of  competition,  undermining  the  very  fabric of the 
Common  Market. - 100  -
Last,  and  perhaps  most  important,  such  bilateral 
negotiations  (in  many  cases  piecemeal  efforts  to  find  a 
short-term  cure  for  the  economic  problems  of  the  moment)  make 
it  even  harder  to  tackle  the  basic  issue,  i.e.  to  create  a 
climate  stimulating  the  competitiveness  of  Community  industry 
across  the  board.  On  this  last  point,  lack  of  co-ordination 
between  the  Governments  of  the  Member  States  is  the  major 
factor  in  undermining  the  drive  and  prospects  of  the  Com-
munity's external  trade policy.  It also  prevents  the  Community 
from  assuming  its  true  role  and  influence  on  the  internal 
scene.  What  is  needed  first  and  foremost  is  a  common  in-
dustrial  policy  designed  to harmonize  national  policies effec-
tively  and  give  backbone  to  joint  efforts  to  bring  down  the 
cost  of  Community  manufactures  to  make  them  competitive. 
If  Community  manufactures  are  once  again  to  hold 
their  own,  especially  against  the  products  of  other  Western 
competitors  and  the  newly  industrialized countries,  firms  must 
step  up  productivity.  A pre-requisite here  is a  clear European 
strategy  capable  of  channelling  investment  into  the  modern-
ization  and  restructuring  of  plant  and  equipment  and  the 
strengthening  of  business  and  sectoral  structures.  Strenuous 
efforts  are  also  needed  in  the  areas  of  research  and  in-
novation.  Co-ordination of national  schemes  and  the  pooling of 
both  Community  and  national  efforts  in  certain  key  sectors 
spanning national  frontiers,  are  a  prerequisite  to  give  a  shot 
in  the  arm  to  advanced  technology  industries,  in  which  the 
future  of European  industry lies. 
Provided  the  Community's  uniform  action  vis-a-vis 
the  outside world  is based  on  a  de  facto  convergence  of Member 
States'  internal policies,  the  Community  could  once  again  rank 
among  the  world's  leading  negotiating  powers  and  be  able  to 
discuss  on  an  equal  footing  ways  and  means  of  overcoming  the 
most  serious  obstacles  to  economic  recovery. - 101  -
We  must  avoid  the  pitfall  of  isolating  aspects  of 
the  Community's  domestic  industrial  policy from  aspects of its 
foreign  trade  policy,  as  if  they  were  distinct  and  separate 
issues.  The  two  are  very  closely  interlinked and it would  not 
only  be  inconsistent but also very  dangerous  to  pursue  uncoor-
dinated policies in these  areas. 
Consolidating  industrial  structures in the  Community 
is  therefore  a  pre-requisite  for  preserving  free  trade  in  the 
world  - free  trade  being  recognized  as  a  means  to  ensure  the 
development  of all countries. 
Lastly,  there  is  the  matter  of  relations  with  the 
industrializing  LDCs  ( *).  The  various  difficulties  and  in-
consistencies  now  apparent  in  this  sphere  can  be  traced  back 
to  the  Community  s  failure  to  adopt  a  comprehensive  and 
consistent  approac!  in  the  past.  Just  to  take  the  case of  the 
textile  industry:  1he  Community  started by  encouraging  invest-
ment  in  a  number  of  LDCs  only  to  appeal  to  these  same 
countries  shortly  afterwards  to  exercise  voluntary  restraint 
on  their  exports  to  the  Community  under  the  Multifibre 
Arrangement.  Our  basic  aim  must  be  to  work  out  a  rational  new 
strategy  taking  a  medium-to-long  term  view  of  (a)  the  poten-
tial  role  of  Community  industry  in  a  world  perspective, 
(b)  inter-relationships and  potential  advantages  and  disadvan-
tages  of  current  industrial  trends  in  the  LDCs  and  (c)  ways  of 
withstanding  sharpened  competition  from  the  industrialized 
States  and  countries  with  centrally  planned  economies.  The 
LDCs  look  to  the  EEC  not  just for  specific aid and  assistance 
(*)  This matter was  also  referred  to  in para.  4.3.  above. but,  first  and  foremost, 
proffered  in  that  spirit 
seems  equipped  to provide 
- 10?  -
for  clearcut  ideas  and  guidelines, 
of  co-operation  that  Europe  alone 
{ *) . 
* 
*  * 
6.2.  COHERENCE  OF  THE  COMMUNITY'S  EXTERNAL  POLICY  IN  RELATION 
TO  ITS  ENERGY  POLICY  GUIDELINES 
Since it first  erupted  in 1973,  the  world oil crisis 
has  gone  through  a  number  of  stages,  becoming  more  and  more 
acute.  The  Member  States  and  Community  Institutions have  been 
forced  to  come  to  grips  with  a  threat,  unparallelled  in 
history,  to  future  economic  growth. 
The  ESC  has  studied  the  energy guidelines adopted  by 
the  Community  Institutions  and  given  its  own  Opinion  urging 
prompt  implementation  of  a  truly  effective  Community  energy 
policy  reconciling  and  forcefully protecting  the  interests and 
requirements  of all Member  States. 
Up  to  now  a  number  of  complex  factors  have  impeded 
the  framing  of  such  a  policy,  with  the  result  that  the 
Community  has  had  to  content  itself  with  "guiding"  - rather 
than  co-ordinating  - national  energy policies,  which  are often 
lacking in uniformity  and  consistency. 
However,  there  is  general  consensus  on  a  number  of 
basic  principles,  namely  the  need  to  reduce  the  Community's 
dependence  on  external  sources  for  its  energy  supplies;  sever 
the  link  between  growth  in  prosperity  and  energy  consumption 
(*)  On  ways  in which  the  Community  could  be  of major assistance 
to  the  LDCs,  see  also  the  ESC  working  document  of 8 May  1980, 
drawn  up  by  Mr  MARGOT,  on  the  small  and  medium-sized enter-
prise in  ACP/EEC  industrial cooperation. 10~ 
(through  large-scale  energy  savings  and  rational  use  of  re-
sources);  develop  the  Community's  conventional  and  alternative 
sources  of energy  (including nuclear power)  wherever possible; 
step  up  R  &  D  in  the  energy  sector.  The  need  for  a  dynamic 
external  policy  with  a  twofold  aim  of ensuring greater relia-
bility  and  continuity  of  supply  and  diversifying  sources  has 
also  been  recognized. 
In  recent  years  the  Community  Institutions  have 
mainly  focussed  their  efforts  on  schemes  connected  with  the 
Community's  internal  energy  policy.  As  indicated  above,  the 
emphasis  has  been  on  steering  national  policies  in  pursuance 
of  common  medium  and  long-term  aims  and  on  implementing 
constructive  Community-scale  projects  in  specific  spheres.  In 
contrast,  the  international  relations facet  of  the  Community's 
energy  pol icy  has  been  somewhat  low  profile  and  has  stopped 
short at  exhortation. 
For  instance,  it  has  repeatedly  been  said  that  the 
Community  must  tackle  world  energy  issues  or  do  something 
about  the  serious  repercussions  of  the  energy  crisis  on  the 
LDCs  (especially  the  LLDCs). 
Only  a  short  time  ago  a  fresh  appeal  was  made  to  the 
oil-producing  countries  to  cooperate  more  closely  with  the 
consumer  countries. 
None  of these  statements  has got  beyond  the  stage  of 
general  policy  declarations  which,  though  not  to  be  decried, 
are  devoid  for  the  time  being  (and possibly for  many  years  to 
come)  of  any  practical  impact.  When  seeking  to  determine 
consistency  or  inconsistency  between  the  energy  policy of  the 
Community  (and  the  Member  States)  and  the  external-relations 
policies  being  pursued  concurrently,  there  is  no  problem  in 
pinpointing numerous  "sins of omission",  i.e.  things  that  have 
been  left  undone  though  nothing  stood  in  their  way,  in other 
words  things  that  were  perfectly  feasible  or  could  at  least - 104  -
have  been  discussed  with  the  other  parties  involved.  The 
inconsistency between  the  two  policies is undoubtedly attribu-
table  to  the  diffirences  of  opinion  between  the  Member  States 
on  this  matter.  Another  important  factor  however  is  the  lack 
of  coordination  between  the  Community  authorities  who  have 
been  conducting  talks  and  concluding  agreements  with non-mem-
ber countries with little or no  reference  to energy  issues. 
Let  us  briefly sum  up  the  energy  implications  of  the 
agreements  reached  in  recent  years  with  third  countries, 
breaking  down  the  extensive  data  available  on  the  Community's 
external  relations  under  rather  different  headings  from  the 
usual  ones  to make  it easier to draw  significant conclusions. 
a)  Relations with  the non-oil  LDCs  from  the  energy  angle  (*) 
- A  close  look  at  the  agreements  concluded  by  the  Community 
with  LDCs  in  recent  years  show  that  little or  no  attention 
has  been  given  to energy matters  (**) 
- Specific  collaboration with  LDCs  on energy has only  recently 
been  the  subject  of  studies  and  Commission  proposals.  The 
lack  of  interest  in  this  matter  in  the·  past,  even  in  the 
years  immediately  followil'!g  the  energy  crisis,  is  somewhat 
surprising.  Yet  it  is  well-known  that  adequate  energy 
resources  are  a  pre-requisite  for  those  countries'  economic 
development.  This  issue  has  assumed  major  importance  and 
urgency  following  the  worsening  of  the  balance  of  payments 
in  these  countries  as  a  consequence  of  increases  in  the 
price of  imported  energy products. 
(*)  This  group  comprises virtually all ACP  countries,  many  of 
the  "global Mediterranean policy"  countries  and  a  large part 
of Asia  and  Latin America. 
(**)  The  First,  and  subsequently  the  Second,  Lome  Convention  pro-
vides  for aid  linked  to  specific  energy projects,  including 
electricity production,  but  only on  a  limited scale.  The 
matter of energy was  summarily  considered  in  the  agreements 
between  the  EEC  and  some  Mediterranean countries,andbetween 
the  EEC  and  ASEAN. - 105-
-Past Community  agreements  make  only  a  vague  reference  to  the 
vital  question  of  the  development  of  local  energy  resources 
which  in  a  number  of  these  countries  (though  unfortunately 
not  all)  could  be  exploited,  if not  on  an  export-oriented 
basis,  at  any  rate for  domestic  use. 
In  the  above  agreements 
systematic  Community 
no  offer  whatsoever 
assistance  in 
is  made  of 
implementing 
target-oriented  development  projects  in  the  energy  sector, 
based  on  co-ordination  and  encouraging  participation  by 
Community  industry. 
All  the  Community  has  done  is  (a)  to  proffer bilateral  aid 
and  funds  (EIB)  to  a  number  of  countries  for  the  construc-
tion  of  specific  plant  and  (b)  to  act  in  conjunction  with 
major  international  organizations  such  as  the  United 
Nations,  the  World  Bank  and  OECD-IEA. 
At  the  end  of  1978  the  Commission  was  still  considering 
whether  other  Community  ventures  could  have  proved  useful. 
In  1979  it  acknowledged  that  the  serious  shortage  of 
reliable  data  and  statistics  made  it impossible  to pinpoint 
the  LDCs'  true  energy  requirements. 
For  its  part,  the  ESC  has  expressed  concern  over  the 
haphazard  uncoordinated  attitude  of  the  Commission  and  the 
other  Community  Institutions  to  energy  cooperation with  the 
LDCs.  In  Opinions  on  the  matter  (*),  delivered  on  its  own 
initiative,  the  ESC  recommended  that  immediate  steps  be 
taken  to  draw  up  a  comprehensive  programme  reflecting  a 
balanced  approach  to  the  different  regions  of the  world  and 
sources  of  energy,  the  first  step  being  the  elementary  one 
of  compiling  an  inventory of  the  LDCs'  energy  resources. 
(*)  OJ  C  227  of  10  September  1979. 
OJ  C  53  of  3  March  1980. - 106  -
One  initial  conclusion  is  self-evident.  Framed  as  a  re-
commendation,  it  is  as. follows:  prompt  steps  must  be  taken 
to  review  the  energy  component  of all  agreements  which  the 
Community  has  concluded  with  the  LDCs  (and  likewise  all 
other agreements  with non-member  countries)  so  that  they  can 
be  updated  and  possibly  supplemented  by  "energy protocols" 
founded  on  an  overall  approach  to  energy  resources  both  :i.n 
and  outside  the  Community.  A  welcome  development  in  this 
context  was  the  agreement  reached  by  some  140  countries  at 
the  recent  UN  Conference  in  Nairobi  as  to  the  nature  of the 
energy  problems  threatening  both  the  industrialized  coun-
tries  and  the  international  Community  at  large.  Concrete 
recommendations  were  also  made  as  regards  the  requisite 
policies  for  speeding  up  the  development  and utilization of 
new  and  renewable  energy  sources. 
b) ~-~~~~~~~~-~~t~-t~~-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-~~~~!E~~~-!~~~-!~~-~~~!~¥ 
-~~l_e__(_~) 
As  mentioned  above,  regular  consultations  are  organized  on 
an  institutional basis  to allow  the  Community  and  the  major 
industrialized countries  to discuss  their mutual  problems. 
Recently  energy  issues  have  obviously  been  the  focus  of 
attention.  The  major  consumer  countries  must  seek co-oper-
ation  and  co-ordination  wherever  possible,  and  avoid  beg-
gar-my-neighbour  competition for scarce  resources. 
( *)  In  addition  to  the  United  States  and  Japan,  this  group 
includes  countries  such  as  Australia  and  Canada which  are 
both industrialized and  produce  energy. - 107  -
Apart  from  being  a  member  of  the  IEA,  the  Community  takes 
part  in  the  summit  meetings  between  the  representatives of 
the  major  industrialized  countries  - most  recently  in July 
1980,  in  Ottawa.  In  this  respect  the  Community  and  the 
Member  States  seem  to  be  acting  suitably and  in accordance 
with  the  general  aims  they  have  set  themselves,  even  if 
co-operation  between  the  Western  countries  still  leaves 
something  to  be  desired.  However,  the  Community  has  been 
somewhat  slow  to  take  the  initiative  and  co-operate  with 
industrialized,  energy  supplying  countries  such  as  Canada 
and Australia,  in carrying  through  joint schemes  backing up 
the piecemeal  projects under  way  to  put  supply and demand  for 
energy  (especially coal  and  nuclear power)  on  a  more  stable 
and  predictable footing. 
Special  attention  should  be  given  to  a  practice indirectly 
linked with  the ojl crisis,  which  could  seriously aggravate 
distortion  of  ccnpetition,  thereby  making  international 
economic  relation~.  even  more  troubled and  disordered. 
The  practice  concerned  is  the  "two-tier"  energy  price 
system  still  applied,  especially  for  oil  and  natural  gas, 
by  a  number  of  countries  whose  industries  are  able  to  buy 
energy  at  domestic  prices  in  some  cases  far  below  the 
international  market  rates. 
The  Community  has  intervened  in  the  United  States,  where 
the  new  Administration  provided  at  the  beginning  of  1981 
for  the  "deregulation"  of unrefined  domestic oil prices and 
pledged  to  speed  up  the  "deregulation"  of  the  cost  of 
natural  gas. 
The  question  of  "two-tier  pricing''  of  energy  products  and 
raw  materials  in  general  is  followed  very closely to  avoid 
this  practice  spreading,  for  instance,  to  oil  rich  coun-
tries  aiming  at  rapid  export-oriented  industrialization. 
This would  have  a  wide  variety of adverse  repercussions. - 108  -
c)  Relations  with  oil  producing  countries· from  the  eneray  ----------------------------------------------------------S-
angle  ------
As  mentioned  in  connection  with  the  Community's  policy  of 
association  with  the  Mediterranean  countries,  there  is  a 
total  absence  of co-operation  in  the  energy sector with oil 
producers  such  as  Algeria,  Tunisia  and  Libya  (though  the 
latter is a  special  case). 
The  absence  of co-operation is also  apparent  in the  case of 
another  major  oil  producer  which  is  party  to  the  Lome 
Convention,  namely  Nigeria.  The  EEC-ASEAN  co-operation 
agreement  barely  touches  on  energy  matters,  despite 
Indonesia's  being  the  largest  oil  producer  in  South  East 
Asia.  The  same  holds  true  of  the  EEC-Andean  Pact  Agreement 
as  regards  Venezuela.  This  situation  would  seem  incon-
sistent  with  the  often  reiterated  desire  to  establish 
active  co-operation  in  all  spheres  with  the  oil  producing 
countries. 
The  Community's  bid  (Euro-Arab  dialogue)  to  establish 
direct  links  with  the  oil-producing  Arab  countries  has 
ended  in  stalemate,  probably  partly  because  of  the  in-
decisiveness  of  the  r-tember  States  (and  the  oil-producing 
Arab  countries).  Such  attempts  have  ranged  from  action  by 
individual  Governments  or  firms  to  the  reactivation  of 
world  scale  negotiations  (North-South  Dialogue)  embracing 
all  industrialized  and  developing  countries,  including  the 
OPEC  group. 
The  aims  towards  which  the  Community  (and  indeed all indus-
trialized  countries)  must  strive  are  in  any  event 
reasonably  clearcut  :  an  increase  in  the  world  supply  of 
all  energy  resources,  (not  just oil);  reliable and predic-
table  energy  supplies;  the  recycling  of  the oil producers' 
energy  revenue,  and  action  to  help  the  worst-off  Third - 109  -
World  countries.  Creating  a  climate  of  renewed  goodwill 
within  the  Community  and  in  international  relations  is 
obviously  a  pre-requisite for success. 
The  Community  can  make  a  crucial  contribution  here,  es-
pecially  if  it  speaks  with  one  voice ·and  takes  a  clear 
line. 
6.3.  INTERACTIONS  AND  CONSISTENCY  BETWEEN  THE  COMMUNITY
1S 
EXTERNAL-RELATIONS  POLICY  AND  THE  COMMON  AGRICULTURAL 
POLICY  (CAP} 
The  aim  of  this  chapter  is  not  to  survey  the 
achievements  of  the  Common  Agricultural  Policy  but  merely  to 
pinpoint  some  of  the  consistencies  and  inconsistencies of the 
relationship  between  the  CAP  and  the  Community 1 s  external 
relations. 
The  Common  Agricultural  Policy  is  the  most  highly 
developed of the  Community•s  common  policies and  the  way  it is 
managed  has  major  repercussions  on  the  internal stability and 
external  relations  of  the  Community,  and  on  international 
trade  relations  in general. 
One  fundamental  feature  of  the  Common  Agricultural 
Policy  is  the  creation  of  a  single  internal  market  for 
agricultural  products  - implying  free  trade  between  partner 
countries,  common  prices  in  all  Member  States,  common  organi-
zation  of  markets, 
11Communi ty  preference"  vis-a-vis  third 
countries,  and,  last  but  not  least,  common  financial  soli-
darity in supporting  the  resulting costs. 
The  existence  of  a  single  internal  market  for 
agricultural  products  makes  it  essential  to  have  common 
mechanisms  at  external  borders  in  order  to  prevent  trade 
deflection.  Furthermore,  since  agricultural  prices  fluctuate 
widely,  there are disruptive  influences which  could  jeopardize - 110  -
the  stability and  security of supplies aimed at  under  the  CAP. 
These  are,  however,  prevented,  through  common  protection 
measures,  from  automatically  spreading  to  the  EEC  via  inter-
national  markets. 
The  internal  agricultural  market  operates  not 
through  quantitative  restrictions  but  through  the  common 
customs  tariff  (in  certain  cases)  and  through  adjustable 
mechanisms  at  external  borders.  The  most  important  of  these 
mechanisms  is  the  system  of  import/export  levies and  refunds, 
in  respect  of  agricultural  products  regulated  by  a  common 
market  organization. 
Import  levies  are  designed  to  bring  the  prices  of 
imported agricultural producta into  line with  those  prevailing 
in  the  Community,  whilst  refunds  are  designed  to  bring 
Community  prices  into  line  with  those  prevailing  on  non-Com-
munity  markets.  Where  world  prices  are  higher than  common  EEC 
prices,  export  levies can  also  be  imposed. 
The  Commoh  Agricultural  Policy  has  greatly  in-
fluenced  the  Community's  external  economic  relations,  (a)  when 
the  Community  has  drawn  up  bilateral,  commercial  and  economic 
cooperation  agreements  with  countries  or  groups  of  countries 
outside  the  Community,  the  agreements  with  ACP,  Mediterranean 
and  individual  countries,  detailed  in  the  preceding chapter), 
and  (b)  when  the  Community  has  participated,  as  a  distinct 
economic  and  political  entity,  in  multilateral  negotiations 
and  in  initiatives  at  world  level  (likewise  previously  men-
tioned). 
It is also  fair  to  say that agriculture has  been  the 
principal  focus  of  attention  in  the  Community's  negotiations 
with non-member  countries  (some  critics feel  that  this has  not 
been  fully  justified).  This  situation can  partly be  put  down, 
however,  to  the  fact  that  most  of  the  non-member  countries 
with  which  the  Community  has  contractual  relations  are  agri-
culturally oriented. - 111  -
The  Community's  negotiators  have  frequently  found 
themselves  in  the  difficult  position  of  having  to  reconcile 
conflicting  considerations,  e.g.  the  Community's  trade  or de-
velopment  policy  objectives  on  the  one  hand  and  the  require-
ment  of  the  CAP  on  the  other.  Compromise  solutions  have  been 
hammered  out  in  several  instances  but  these  have  inevitably 
given rise  to  accusations  of  inconsistency. 
Another  problem  is  that. of  so-called  "tradi  tiona!" 
trade  relations,  which  the  Community  has  inherited  from  the 
previous  bilateral  preferential  which  some  Member  States have 
concluded with countries outside  the  Community. 
Specific  examples will best illustrate this problem. 
The  most  striking  example  is  perhaps  that  of  beef 
and  veal. 
Under  the  Lome  Convention  and  GATT  (agreements  on 
beef  and  veal  quotas),  and  in various  specific  agreements  with 
non-member  countries,  such  as  Yugoslavia,  the  Community  has 
undertaken  to  import  large  quantities  of  beef  and  veal 
(439 ,000  tonnes  in  1980)  at  preferential  rates  in  spite  of 
over-production  in the  Community. 
The  Community  is  obliged  to  re-export  these  extra 
surpluses  to  the  international  market,  and  to bear the cost of 
propping  up  the  export  price  (470  million units  of account  in 
1980). 
The  situation is similar in the  case of sugar.  Under 
the  Lome  Convention,  the  Community  has  undertaken  to  buy  1.3 
million  tonnes  of  unrefined  or  white  cane  sugar  from  ACP  and 
other  developing  countries  for  an  indefinite  period  and  at 
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If  the  agreed  quantities  cannot  be  marketed  in  the 
Community  at  a  price  equivalent  to  or  higher  than  the 
guaranteed  price,  then  the  Community  meets  its  commitment, 
within  the  framework  of  the  common  sugar market,  by  resorting 
to  intervention  or  other  types  of  agencies  operating  on  the 
world  market. 
The  upshot  of  all  this  is  that  the  EAGGF  is  saddled 
with expenditure  stemming  solely from  EEC  development  aid  com-
mitments.  This  is  important  because  with  the  introduction  of 
co-responsibility on  1  August  1981  EAGGF  expenditure on  Commu-
nity sugar is negligible. 
The  Community's  commitment  to  import  about  90,000 
tonnes  of  New  Zealand  butter  each  year  (despite  a  substantial 
butter  surplus  in  the  Community)  poses  similar  problems, 
except  that  New  Zealand  is  a  relatively  highly  developed 
country.  In  1980  350,000  tonnes  of  butter  were  re-exported 
from  the  Community  to  the  world  market  at  world  prices,  in 
addition to  the  60,000  tonnes  sent  to  the  poorest countries as 
food  aid.  The  extra  expenditure  involved  in  importing  New 
Zealand butter is  some  100 million units  of account. 
Customs  duty  concessions  under  the  EEC-Medi-
terranean  agreements  and  EEC-ACP  agreements  - on  imports  of 
other  agricultural  products  such  as  wine,  fruit,  vegetables, 
olive oil  and  tobacco  have  also created considerable financial 
problems  because  such  products  are  in direct competition with 
products  from  the Mediterranean  regions of the  Community  which 
qualify  for  special  aid  and  modernization  or  redevelopment 
programmes.  The  problem  of  growing  Community  surpluses  in 
these products  has  not yet  arisen,  but it is bound  to rear its 
head  wnen  Spain  and Portugal  join the  EEC. - 113  -
Customs  concessions  in  respect  of  fats  and  oils 
(which  abound  in  the  Community)  are  even  more  difficult  to 
justify  because  these  products  are  being  imported  from  the 
United States and other developed countries and  not  from  needy 
developing  countries.  A  recent  EEC  Commission  publication  (*) 
states categorically that  "competition which butter faces  from 
margarine  manufactured  from  low-priced  imported  products  is 
related  to  the  absence  of  a  global  supply  pol icy  for  fats". 
The  Committee  has  often  expressed  its  disappointment  that  no 
such  policy  exists.  Indeed  it  is  currently  compiling  an 
information  Report  on  the  entire  oils  and  fats  issue  and  the 
feasibility of an  overall  policy. 
Finally,  in  the  case  of  most  cereal substitutes, 
import  duties  are  non-existent  or extremely  low  (e.g.  manioc 
and  molasses).  This  has  led  to  a  net  loss  of  'own  resources' 
(from  levies)  as  well  as  to  increased  expenditure  (refunds). 
At  1979  prices  and  quantities,  imports  of  about  15  million 
tonnes  of  cereal  substitutes  have  netted  some  50  million  EUA 
whereas  the  Community  budget  would  have  benefitted to  the  tune 
of  about  1,300  million  EUA  if the  same  tonnage  of  cereals had 
been  imported. 
Other  examples  could  be  cited  also.  Basically,  the 
criticisms  raised  highlight  the  risks  of  swelling  Community 
surpluses  which  are  reducing  job  opportunities  and  incomes  in 
the  agricultural  sector.  They  do  however  stress  the  incon-
sistency  of  saddling  the  CAP  budget  (EAGGF)  with  costs  and 
expenditure  which  in  general  relate  to  the  Community's  ex-
ternal  pol icy.  Concessions  in  fact  have  had  the  following 
financial  results  : 
- significant  loss  of  revenue  from  customs  duties 
and  levies; 
- increased  expenditure  to  cover  refunds  on  re-ex-
ported surpluses; 
(*)  European  File  - February  1981  - Europe's  Common  Agricul-
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- increased  supplementary payments  to Community  far-
mers  for  products  threatened  by  subsidized  im-
ports. 
It  is essential  to  have  an  accurate  account  of  such 
costs and  list them  separate  from  the  CAP  budget  - or at least 
treat  them  as  a  separate  item within  the  CAP  budget. 
A  choice  has  to  be  made.  Certain  imports  may  be 
indispensable  to  preserve solidarity with  the  LDCs  or secure  a 
two-way  flow  of  trade  but  the  Community  machinery  cannot  be 
left  to  cope  alone  with  the  economic  and  employment  side-ef-
fects. 
However,  "inconsistency"  between  the  Community's 
external  relations  pol icy  and  the  Common  Agricultural  Pol icy 
is a  wider  issue  than  a  mere  catalogue  of the  costs and diffi-
culties  the  CAP  has  to  bear  as  a  result  of  concessions  to 
developing  countries  (and  sometimes  not  only  developing  coun~ 
tries)  outside  the  Community. 
Links  between  these  two  policies  are  very  deeply 
rooted  and  relate  directly  and  indirectly  to  the  entire  range 
of Community  external relations and  also  to internal policies. 
Some  non-member  countries  undoubtedly  view  the  Com-
munity's preoccupation with  the  smooth  running of the  CAP  as  a 
symptom  of  EEC  protectionism.  This  has  had  an  impact  on  the 
Community's  direct  and  indirect interests. 
Some  of  these  criticisms  have  been  referred  to  in 
preceding  paragraphs  on  EEC  trade  agreements  with  non-as-
sociated  countries  outside  the  Community  (particularly  the 
paragraphs  on  relations  with  Australia,  New  Zealand,  Canada, 
Argentina  and others). - 115  -
In  certain  cases  these  countries  continually  bemoan 
the .fact  that  they have  no  opportunity  to sell their farm pro-
ducts  on  the  European  market  at  prices  which  are  more  compe-
titive  than Community  prices. 
The  reply  to  these  criticisms  is  relatively 
straightforward  :  the  Common  Agricultural  Policy  is  a  funda-
mental  political  Community  choice,  and  does  not  aim  to 
discriminate in its dealings with any  country  from outside  the 
Community. 
The  CAP  is  consequently  a  permanent  (immutable?) 
component  of  the  European  edifice  and  has  to  be  taken  into 
account by  the rest of the  world. 
In other cases,  the  main  complaint is that Community 
surpluses  are  sold  on  world  markets  haphazardly,  at irregular 
intervals,  thus upselling the  (already precarious)  balance. 
Some  countries  (e. g.  Australia);  have  categorically 
accused  the  Community  at  GATT  of  using  refunds  to  subsidize 
the  sale of non-competitive  Community  products  on their tradi-
tional  markets. 
There  has also been  sporadic  commercial  retaliation, 
with  import  restrictions  being  imposed  on  Community  manu-
factures. 
To  put  it  another  way,  the  differences  on  agri-
cultural  matters  be tween  the  EEC  and  many  countries  outside 
the  Community  have  always  been  surrounded by  tension. 
This is even more  regrettable when,  as  stated above, 
some  of  the  countries with  whom  major  misunderstandings  occur, 
are  inportant  potential  partners  of  the  Community.  Such  coun-
tries either offer large-scale  development possibilities based - 116  -
on  the  ready  availability of mineral  wealth,  energy  and  even 
agricultural  resources,  or  have  cultural  affinities  which 
should  facilitate  genuine  two-way  cooperation  with  the  Com-
munity. 
We  would  not  claim  here  that  the  difi'icul ties  en-
gendered  by  the  CAP  are  solely  responsible  for  the  difficul-
ties  in  cooperation  with  such  countries  but  they  have  cer-
tainly  had  an  adverse  effect  on  the  implementation  of  an 
effective  Community  external  economic  policy. 
In this respect,  some  of the  criticisms of  the  CAP's 
shortcomings  and  of  the  way  the  Community  intervenes and  ope-
rates  on  world markets  (especially with  regard  to  the  disposal 
of surpluses)  is not  without  foundation. 
The  CAP  has  devoted  considerable  attention  to  the 
common  organization of the  internal  market.  It has  however  not 
been  completely  successful  and  has  been  unable  to  achieve  the 
stature  of  a  global  policy,  capable  of  expressing  a  foreign 
trade policy commensurate  with its importance. 
Some  circles  are  currently  expressing  the  view  that 
the  role  of  Community  agriculture  is  to  help  secure  the  food 
requirements  of  a  large  proportion  of  the  population outside 
the  Community,  and  to  stabilize  agricultural  markets.  The  CAP 
does  not,  however,  have  the  means  to  pursue  a  constructive 
long-term  export policy. 
This  clearly  stems  from  the  fact  that  in  the  past 
the  Community  role  was  confined  to contributing to world anti-
hunger  campaigns  and  to  stabilizing  world  markets  through  the 
use  of  buffer  stocks  and  observance  of  minimum  and  maximum 
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This  limitation  of  the  Community's  role  has  ap-
parently  been  recognized  by  the  Commission  which  has  just 
submitted  an  initial  document  to  the  Council  on  the  imple-
mentation  of  an  export  policy  for  food.  This policy is rooted 
in  the  Community's  desire  to  see  European  agriculture  play  a 
part  in  helping  to  meet  the  world  demand  for  food, · irrespec-
tive of whether the countries concerned  can  afford  to pay. 
In  its  "Reflections  on  the  Common  Agricultural 
Policy"  of  December  1980,  (COM(80)  800  final),  the  Commission 
notes  that  the  CAP  must  be  given  instruments  similar to  those 
enjoyed  by  the  major agricultural  exporting  countries  (United 
States,  Canada,  Australia,  New  Zealand),  in  particular  the 
opportunity to conclude  long-term agreements. 
This  prospect  raises  the  problem  of  consistency be-
tween  the  way  the  CAP  operates  and  efforts  to  organize  agri-
cultural  markets  a':  a  world  level. 
The  Community  approach  should  be  flexible  and  care-
fully-tuned  and  should  respect  the  specific  economic  and 
political  structures  of  countries  whose  basic  economic  and 
political  thinking differs  from  that ~f the  Community. 
Decisions  have  at  any  rate  to  be  reached  on  the 
direction  which  production  should  take  and  on  actual  pro-
duction  targets;  mechanisms  for  building  up  and  controlling 
stocks  may  also have  to  be  introduced. 
In  this  context  there  is  the  problem  of  what 
attitude  the  EEC  should  adopt  towards  the  "comparative  advan-
tage  theory"  which  comes  under  fire  from  certain  quarters 
because  of  the  risks  entailed  in  concentrating  the  world's 
supply of foodstuffs  in too  few  hands. - 118  -
In  the  area  of  food  aid  for  the  most  needy  coun-
tries,  the  Community's  strategy  of  examining  each  case  sepa-
rately and  on  a  short-term basis has  proved  inadequate. 
A  more  systematic  and  long-term  view  appears  to  be 
desirable  so  that  this  type  of  Community  aid  can  be  put  on  a 
permanent  footing. 
The  Community  could  make  a  much  more  useful  contri-
bution  alleviating  the  world's  food  shortage  by  firmly  and 
deliberately  focussing  on  its  own  development  and  cooperation 
policy  on  the  most  needy  non-member  countries.  The  aim  would 
be  to  create  conditions  for  local  food production in order to 
help  meet  the  national  and  regional  needs  in  the  country 
concerned. 
To  this end  the  Community  should  concentrate  on car-
rying  out  specific  research,  setting up  experimental  stations, 
etc.  rather  than  on  continuing  to  fund  projects  devoted  to  a 
single crop for export  to  already saturated Western markets. 
Care  should  also  be  taken  to  ensure  that  the  STABEX 
system  does  not  ul timatHly  curb  the  necessary  agricultural 
diversification  of  certain  countries  by  encouraging  them  to 
persist  with  a  one...,.crop  system  that  is  highly  vulnerable  to 
climatic  conditions  and  changes  in world  markets. 
* 
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6.4.  THE  RELATIONSHIP  BETWEEN  EXTERNAL  RELATIONS  AND  THE 
SOCIAL  AND  EMPLOYMENT  POLICIES  OF  THE  EUROPEAN  COMMUNITY 
Anyone  wishing  to  examine  the  interactions  between 
the  Community's  external  relations  and  its  social  and  employ-
ment  policies  must  not  lose  sight  of  the  fact  that  he  is 
dealing  with  the  relationship  between  two  policy  areas  with 
completely different histories. 
The  initial  paragraphs  of  this  Study  refer  to  the 
legal  principles  upon  which  the  Community's  external  activi-
ties are based,  and outline  the  events which  have  marked  their 
development. 
During  the  very  first  years  of  the  Community's 
existence,  the  Community's  social  policy  had  only  occasional 
links  with  its  external  policy.  It  was  concentrated  in  the 
60's  on  the  implementation  of  the  social  provisions  of  the 
Treaty  and,  in  the  early  70's,  on  the  reform  of  the  Social 
Fund  and  the  implementation of  the  Social  Action Programme. 
As  regards  external  relations,  social  policy  con-
fined  itself,  during  this  period,  to  certain  aspects  of 
co-operation  policy  with  some  third  countries,  and  in  par-
ticular  to  the  rights  to  be  granted  to  migrant  workers  from 
these  countries  under  trade  and  co-operation  agreements 
(Maghreb,  Yugoslavia  and  Portugal)  and  association  agreements 
(Greece  and  Turkey). 
In  the  context  of  external  relations  one  must  not 
forget  the  presence  in  the  Community  of  10  million  workers 
from  third  countries  who  have  contributed  to  the  development 
of  the  Community  economy.  The  transfers  they  make  each  year 
are  a  very  important  source  of  finance  for their countries of 
origin  (see attached  table). - 120  -
It  is  particularly  since  the  early  70's,  when  the 
crisis  hit  the  European  and  world  economies  with  consequent 
general  unemployment,  that  social  policy  has  had  to  take  into 
account,  amongst  other  things,  the  impact  of  the  Community's 
external  policy  on  employment,  and  on  the  situation  of  the· 
Community's  labour force  in general. 
In  some  specific  sectors  (e.g.  textiles)  the  effects 
on  employment  were  particularly  worrying and  made  necessary 
certain  measures.  (The  Mul tifibre  Agreement  comes  to  mind, 
which  seeks  to  stabilize  the  development  of  trade  relations 
with third countries). 
The  fact  that  there  is· a  direct  link  between  ex-
ternal  policy  and  the  objectives  of  social  policy  has  been 
increasingly  recognized,  as  witness  the  Community's  attitude 
on  inward  processing traffic. 
The  Commission  itself,  for  example,  has  submitted  to 
the  Council  proposals  aimed  at  making  the  granting  of  trade 
preferences  to  third countries conditional  on  their observance 
of international standards  on child labour,  the  maximum  number 
of  working  hours  per  day,  etc.  The  Council,  however,  has 
failed  to  follow  the  Commission's  lead  in this matter. 
As  the  crisis  in  whole  sectors  of  production  has 
worsened,  and  as  the  commercial  pressure  from  third countries 
(such  as  Japan)  has  increased,  the  two  sides of industry,  the 
workers'  and  employers'  organizations,  the  Community  bodies· 
and  the  Governments  of  the  Member  countries  have  gradually 
realized  the  need  for  greater consistency  between  the  Commu-
nity's  external  measures  and  the  objectives  of its social  and 
employment policies. 
However,  achieving  greater consistency between  these 
components  of  Community  policy  has,  up  till  now,  proved - 121  -
difficult.  This  is  probably  because  there  has  been  no  ex-
haustive  or  realistic  political  debate  on  fundamental  objec-
tives from  which  long-term guidelines could  emerge. 
The  fact  that  the  Community's  ideas  and  intentions 
are  not  sufficiently  clear  is  probably  at  the  root  of  this 
lack  of  political  will  which  has  repeatedly  shown  itself  in 
the  Council's  decisions  and  in  the  attitude  of  the  Member 
States. 
The  Economic  and  Soci.al  Committee,  even  quite  re-
cently,  (see  the  Committee's  Opinion on Social  Developments  in 
the  Community  in 1980  (*))  has expressed its anxiety about  the 
fact  that  the  Communi ty• s  decision-making  bodies  have  too 
often proved  lacking by not  paying sufficient attention to the 
social  aspect of Community  policies. 
When  all  is  said  and  done,  the  future  of  the  Com-
munity  depends  on  the willingness of its Member States  to  show 
their political  cc;hesion  and  their solidarity and  to translate 
d1is  cohesion  and  solidarity  into  co-ordinated  policies  and 
measures. 
There  is no  doubt  that careful  thought  must  be  given 
to  the  links  which  exist  between  the  Community's  external 
relations policy  and  its social  and  employment  policies. 
In  tackling  this  problem,  the  Section  examined  some 
aspects  of  these  relations,  and  these  are  set  out  here  as  a 
contribution  to  the  debate  which  has  just begun  and  which,  it 
is hoped,  will  be  both open  and  thorough. 
(*)  OJ  No.  C  230  of 10  September  1981. - 122  -
Firstly,  it must  be  recognized  that  the  adoption by 
the  Community  of  concrete  external  relations  initiatives 
cannot  be  considered  as  an  "independent  variable",  i.e.  as  a 
neutral  fact  having  no  impact  on  the  other  internal  policies 
of  the  Community,  such  as  industrial  policy,  agricultural 
policy,  social policy,  etc. 
It  is absolutely  necessary  that  all  aspects  and all 
possible  short  and  long-term  consequences  of  certain external 
measures  be  examined  together beforehand. 
It  will  be  the  task  of  the political authorities  to 
decide  which  factors  should  have  priority  over  others  with 
special  reference  in  each  case  to  the  "employment"  factor.  It 
will  also  be  up  to  the  decision-making  bodies  to  provide  for 
the  measures,  instruments  and  adaptations  that will  have  to be 
implemented  in  order  to  achieve  the  proposed  objectives  both 
internally and  externally. 
The  internal  problems  of  the  labour  market  s.i tuation 
are  a  matter  of  special  concern.  The  urgent  need  to  reduce 
unemployment  means  that all the  consequences  of·external acti-
vities must  be  viewed  in relation to  that objective. 
Measures  to  improve  the  employment  situation  {for 
instance,  following  some  suggestions,  reduction  of  working 
time)  must  be  seen  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  competitive 
position of the  Community  in the  world. 
This  sort  of  approach  is  particularly  appropriate 
when  dealing  with very  complex  pr~blems  such as,  for  example, 
the  stand  which  the  Community  must  take  as  regards  the 
nee-protectionist  tendencies  which  have  recently appeared as  a 
result of the  difficulties caused  by  the pressures of external 
competition. - 123  -
The  principle of the  opening  up  of markets  (which  is 
fundamental  if  European  industry  is  to  remain  competitive) 
must  be  seen  in relation to  the  need  to defend  the  jobs of the 
Community's  workers against  the  effects of external policy and 
in  relation  to  the  need  to  maintain  and  develop  co-operation 
with developing  countries. 
The  Community's  policy  regarding  the  developing 
countries  should  be  directed more  than  in the  past  towards  aid 
for  the  poorest  countries.  It  should  allow  not  only  for 
economic  but  also  for  social  factors,  such  as  the  need  for 
better  living  conditions  for  the  less  fortunate  sections  of 
the  population,  reinforcement  of  social  structures,  improve-
ment  of working  conditions,  etc. 
However,  a  careful  study  is needed  to determine  the 
instruments  for  introducing  criteria  for  selectivity  in  Com-
munity measures. 
The  Section  debated  whether  it  is  possible  and 
appropriate,  when  establishing  external  relations,  to  take 
account  of moral  criteria,  such  as  respect for  human  rights  or 
specific  political  factors  (the  defence  of  democracy)  or 
working  conditions  (child labour,  recognition of trade  unions, 
minimum  wages,  etc.). 
Some  guidance  could  be  provided  by  the  minimum 
standards  established  by  internationally  recognized  organi-
zations  (e.g.  the  ILO),  but  many  uncertainties  still  remain 
regarding  this  problem  as  a  whole  and,  as  has  already  been 
said,  a  lot  of  thinking  will  have  to  be  done  and  careful 
studies  made  before  a  clear  Community  stand  can  be  adopted. 
The  two  sides  of  industry  could  be  called  upon  to  help  the 
Community bodies  in this task. - 124  -
The  Section  also  discussed  the  possibility  of  the 
Community  calling  upon  European  multinationals  to  ensure  that 
the  codes  of  conduct  drawn  up  by certain international bodies 
are  observed  by  their  subsidiaries  operating  in  developing 
countries.  It  was  observed  that  these  are  problems  which 
should  be  tackled  not  just  at  Community  level,  and  that 
solutions  should  be  found  at  international  level,  in  the 
broadest  sense,  and  that  the  approach  should  be  based  on  the 
principle of voluntary participation by  the  firms  involved.  In 
this  area,  better  information  for  workers  in  companies  with 
transnational  and  complex  structures  should  be  an  adequate  way 
of  taking  account  of  the  importance  of  an  active  European 
employment  policy. 
Finally,  there  was  approval  for  the  proposal  that 
the  Social  Fund  be  given  additional  resources  commensurate 
with  the  tasks it has  to carry out,  and  that its objectives  be 
modified,  since  it is  an  extremely  important  instrument  for 
implementing  measures  connected  with  social  policy  and  the 
other internal  and  external policies of  the  Community. 
* 
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6.5.  COMPATIBILITY  OF  THE  COMMON  REGIONAL  POLICY  AND  SPECIFIC 
COMPONENTS  OF  THE  COMMON  EXTERNAL  POLICY 
The  Community's  regional  policy  has  two  aims: 
firstly,  to  promote  economic  development  in  the  regions  which 
have  traditionally  lagged  behind  the  rest  of  the  Community; 
secondly,  to  further  the  regional  restructuring and  adjustment 
needed  to  accommodate  changes  in the  international  division of 
labour. 
The  disparities  between  the  various  regions  of  the 
Community  are  becoming  more  and  more  pronounced  :  apart  from 
the  increase  in  the  number  of  traditionally  backward  regions - 125  -
which  will  result  from  the  accession  of  Mediterranean  coun-
tries,  international  competition  is hitting vulnerable sectors 
of  the  Community  economy  very  hard.  This  has  created  a  new 
type  of  unemployment  in  regions  long  considered as  centres of 
employment  and  now  faced  with  restructuring  problems.  Com-
munity  regional  requirements  are  thus  changing  and  becoming 
more  varied  and  less clear cut. 
The  Community  is  increasingly  taking  decisions  in 
spheres  which  were  previously  dealt  with  entirely or largely 
at  national  level.  Community  regional  policy  must  have  a 
minimum  of consistency with national  regional  aid and  develop-
ment  programmes  and  other  Community  policies  if it is to cope 
with  the  resultant new  responsibilities.  Above  all,  the  impact 
of  agreements  with  non-member  countries  cannot  be  assessed 
solely  in  terms  of  how  they  affect  the  Community  as  a  whole. 
The  potential  consequences  for  specific  regions  must  also  be 
taken  into  account.  The  Community's  regional  policy is there-
fore  assuming  a·  new  role  and  dimension. 
The  rna~ :l  concern  must  be  to  forge  closer  1 inks 
between  regional  policy  and  the  Community's  external  relations 
and  trade  strategies. 
In  this  connection,  the  world  economic  crisis  of 
recent years  has  structural  components  that  seem  here  to  stay. 
These  are  changing  the  terms  of  trade  between  the  Community 
and  its  partners  and  could  have  direct  repercussions  on 
regional  equilibria. 
The  Community  has  come  face  to  face  with  the 
regional  repercussions  of  tailoring  its  trade  policy  to  the 
new  scenario.  The  same  goes  for  its  development  co-operation 
policy  (GSP,  Lome,  Mediterranean  region,  etc.).  This  can 
sometimes  work  to  the  disadvantage  of Community  regions. - 126  -
To  date  the  Community  has  failed  to  identify 
clearly: 
- The  (beneficial  and  adverse)  regional  consequences  of  its 
trade  and  development  co-operation policies. 
- The  countervailing  action  to  be  taken,  whether it be  in the 
form  of  compensation  for  the  regions  affected,  support  for 
restructuring  or  changes  in  trade  and  development  co-
operation policies. 
It  was  only  a  short  time  ago  that  the  Commission 
woke  up  to  the  need  to  take  account  of all  aspects  of  the  Com-
munity  regional  policy.  It has  pointed  to  the  vital  need,  when 
framing  and  implementing  the  individual  Community  policies,  to 
evaluate  and  allow for their spatial  dimension  (1). 
The  Council  Resolution  of  6  February  1979  stated 
that  the  Council  intended  to  take  account  of  the  regional 
repercussions  of its policy decisions. 
The  Economic  and  Social  Committee,  for  its  part, 
emphasized  in  its  Opinion  on  the  Revision  of  the  ERDF 
Regulation  ( 2)  that  "the  regional  impact  assessment  of  other 
Community  policies  must  be  expanded"  and  that other Community 
Community  policies  "should  also  take  account  directly of par-
ticularly  adverse  consequences  which  they  may  have  for  the 
less-favoured  regions". 
Increasing  awareness  of  the  inter-relationship  be-
tween  the  Community's  regional  and  external  policies  has 
prompted  a  number of schemes,  notably  the  regional  development 
programmes  for  South-West  France  and  Southern  Italy,  in 
anticipation of the  impact  of enlargement. 
(1)  ARI:  Analysis  of Regional  Impact 
(2)  OJ  No.  C  185,  27  July  1981 - 127  -
For its part,  the  European  Investment  Bank  (EIB)  has 
concentrated on  underdeveloped or changing regions.  Two  thirds 
of  its  funds  have  been  allocated  to  ERDF  regions  and  the  bulk 
of  the  loans  provided  by  the  New  Community  Instrument· (ad-
ministered  under  Commission  supervision)  have  gone  to  infra-
structure  schemes  designed  to promote  regional  development. 
The  European  Social  Fund  is  likewise  devoting  more 
of its resources  to regional  aid. 
All  this  support  being  channelled  to  the  regions is 
additional  to  ERDF  subsidies,  for  which  more  than  1,000 
million u.a.  were  budgeted  in  1980. 
It  should  be  remembered  that  the  appropriations al-
lotted  for  such  regional  operations  still  fall  far  short  of 
requirements  and  are  not  commensurate  with  expenditure  on 
other  common  policies  - thereby  testifying  to  the  lack  of 
political  drive  and  Community  unity in such matters. 
Al  thoug·-~  a  Commission  task  force  has  been  active 
since  1977  in  c~-ordinating  common  funds,  each  Community 
instrument  still  tends  to  go  its  own  way  and  to  pursue  its 
individual  policy  regardless of the  others. 
In  addition,  Community  regional  assistance  all  too 
often plays  second  fiddle  to national  regional-aid  schemes  - a 
situation which  has  been little changed  by  the  introduction of 
an  ERDF  "quota-free section". 
If  something  is  to  be  done  about  this  state  of 
affairs,  ~he national  quotas  should  be  geared  more  closely to 
regional  programmes,  on  the  basis  of  Community  guidelines for 
trade policy,  etc. - 128  -
Monitoring of the  compatibility of national  regional 
programmes  with Community  guidelines is all the  more  important 
as  it  will  ensure  that  individual  programmes  do  not  have 
contradictory effects  (for instance  - in the  event  of enlarge-
ment  - on  the  competing Mediterranean  regions  of  (a)  Spain  and 
Portugal,  and  (b)  the  Mediterranean  regions  of  the  Ten).  It 
will  also  ensure  that  they  are  compatible  with  certain 
principles  of the  concerted  industrial strategy (for instance, 
in  the  old  industrial  areas  which  have  been  hit  by  the 
recession)  and of trade policy. 
target 
The  impact  of 
areas  (as  well  as 
Community  regional  aids  on  their 
that  of  national  schemes)  will  have 
to  be  evaluated  before  studying  the  linkage  between  Community 
regional  policy  and  Community  policies  in  trade  and  other 
areas. 
The  task  force  set  up  to  co-ordinate  financial 
instruments  has  only assessed  the  impact  of  Community  regional 
policy  on  the  five  top  priority  regions  (Ireland,  North  and 
South,  the  Mezzogiorno,  Greenland,  French  Overseas  Depart-
ments).  Much  remains  to  be  done  as  the  task  force  has  stated 
that,  even  for  these  regions,  the  basic  data  and  statistics 
are  incomplete. 
For  the  time  being  we  therefore  do  not  know  enough 
about  the  detailed ·regional patterns  to  allow us  to assess  the 
linkage  between regional  and  other Community policies. 
All  we  can  say  is that  there  is a  lack of systematic 
consistency  with  the  Community 
1 s  external  policy,  if  only 
because of the  disparities between national strategies in this 
field. 
* 
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CONCLUSIONS 
This  Study  is  intended  to  be  both  a  stocktaking  of 
the  results  of  the  Community's  External  Relations  and  an 
assessment  of  how  consistent  they  are  with  the  aims  which  it 
was  hoped  to  achieve. 
The  foregoing  chapters  III,  IV  and  V  contain  an 
analytical  appraisal  of  the  main  features  and  results  of  the 
Community's  relations  with  non-member  countries  or  groups  of 
countries,  classified according  to geographical  area. 
Chapter  II  contains  an  essentially  favourable  as-
sessment  of  the  Community  1 s  position  in  the  international 
scene.  It  is  more  than  twenty  years  since  the  Treaty  of  Rome 
came  into effect,  and  in that  time  the  Community  has  become  an 
acknowledged  world  leader.  It  is  the  major  international 
trading  bloc  anc:l  it  enjoys  growing  prestige  in  the  eyes  of 
third  countries,  particularly  the  developing  countries.  While 
there  may  have  been  disappointments,  in  the  sense  that 
achievements  have  not  always  lived  up  to  expectations,  the 
Community  has  nonetheless  established  a  sound  and  favourable 
position  in  the  sphere  of  international  relations,  and  has 
prospects  of making  an  even  greater impact. 
Seen  from  within  the  Community,  however,  it is  ap-
parent  that  the  Community  has  not  always  been  so  inconsistent 
in  the  aims  it  has  attempted  to  pursue  in  the  field  of 
external  relations,  and  moreover  it  has  been  far  from  uni-
formly  wholehearted  in its efforts. 
There  are  areas where  the  Community  has  concentrated 
its attention  and  resources  and  has  been prepared  to  take  ac-
tion,  and  where  positive  and  noteworthy  results  have  been 
achieved.  Significant  achievements,  which  have  enhanced  the - 130  -
Community's  prestige,  have  for  instance  been  obtained  in  the 
following  areas  :  the  multilateral negotiations  on  GATT  agree-\ 
ments;  the  creation of  a  generalized tariff preferences  scheme\ 
(GSP)  to  help  developing  countries  (though  the  scheme  is not 
without  its  anomalies);  relations  with  EFTA;  and  the  set-
ting-up of instruments for cooperation with ACP  countries. 
There  are,  however,  other  important  areas  where 
little has  been  done  and  where  the  Community  has been  somewhat 
passive  and  indifferent,  confining  itself to  ad  hoc  responses 
to external pressures .. 
Finally,  and  this  is  something  which  is  even  more 
serious,  there  are  some  areas  where  the  Community  has  vir-
tually taken  no  action at all. 
Since  these  are  intended  to  be  conclusions  it  is 
more  appropriate  to  attempt  to classify the  main  factors  which 
may  explain  the  inconsistencies  and  lack  of  homogeneity  in 
Community  action  on  the  external-relations  front,  rather than 
simply  list  the  consistencies  and  inconsistencies  which  have 
already  been  described  in  individual. paragraphs  of the  Study. 
Such  a  classification is worthwhile  even if it is acknowledged 
that it will  be  subjective  and  open  to  question. 
Four groups  of  factors  can be  identified 
a)  Decisions  not  to  engage  in  Community  action,  and  forced 
inactivity,  due  to  political  obstacles  and  conflict  with 
the foreign policies of the  individual  Member States  (whose 
aims  are  insufficiently coordinated); 
b)  Failures  to  act,  owing  to  limited  ability  to  adjust 
promptly  to  external  changes  (and  limited possibilities of 
doing so); - 131  -
c)  Failures  to  implement  proposed  programmes  and  aims  pro-
perly,  usually  because  of  the  inadequate  mobilization  of 
resources; 
d)  Incompatibilities  and  conflicts  between  objectives  pursued 
simultaneously by  the  Community. 
Some  of  the  situations  that  arise  can  be  explained 
by  a  combination of  factors,  so  that  our classification has  to 
be  empirical  and  avoid  rigidity.  Nevertheless,  it is felt  that 
the  classification  covers  a  considerable  number  of  the  un-
satisfactory  situations  and  instances  of -inconsistency  spe-
cified in the  Study. 
Decisions not  to act,  and  forced  inactivity,  in the  field of 
Community  external  relations 
The  first  point  to  make  is  that  the  Study  does  not 
deal  with  the  interrelations  between  national  external  policy 
positions  and  a~~ivities  on  the  one  hand,  and  Community  ex-
ternal-policy activities on  the other. 
This  is  not  because  the  area  was  deemed  to  be  of 
little  importance  it  is  because  of  the  complexity  of  the 
subject-matter  and  the  difficulties  there  would  have  been  in 
carrying  out  the  requisite  analyses.  The  Section  considers 
that  at  a  later  stage  the  Economic  and  Social  Committee  can 
and  must  devote  specific  attention  to  this  subject,  in  order 
to  contribute  to  the  understanding  of  an  extremely  delicate 
aspect  of the  Community's  policy on external relations. 
The  steps  taken  by  the  individual  Member  States are 
so closely interrelated with  the steps  taken by  the  Community, 
and  impose  such  heavy  constraints  on  them,  that in many  cases 
the  Community  is unable  to  pursue  a  policy  towards  third coun-
tries  that  is  autonomous  and  reflects  the  interests  of  the 
whole  Community. - 132  -
A  passing reference  will  be  sufficient,  since situa-
tions  of  this  kind  were  encountered  several  times  in  the 
course of the  analysis  made  in  the  preceding chapters. 
Important  examples  are  (a)  the  lack  of  Community 
initiatives  vis-a-vis  the  oil-producing  countries  (arising 
partly out  of  the  fact  that  it proved  impossible  to present  a 
common  front  in  defence  of  the  energy policy interests of  the 
Member  States),  (b)  the  Community's  hesitations  and  uncer-
tainty  in  contacts  with  the  COMECON  countries,  and  (c)  equi-
vocations  over Japan  (which  has  been  able  'to exploit  the  di  vi-
sions  between European  countries). 
A  further  examr·le  is  to  be  seen  in  the  way  Member 
States,  after  agreeing  in principle  to  hand  over  the  reins  of 
external  trade  policy  to  the  Community,  have  in  practice 
undermined  Community  policy  in  this  area  to  some  degree  by 
entering into bilateral,  inter-State agreements. 
There  is also  the  feebleness  of  the  Community's  ini-
tiatives  with  respect  to  developing  countries,  while  indi-
vidual  Member  States  (sometimes  in  competition  with  each 
other)  have  engaged  in  action under bilateral  agreements  which 
has  been  of much  greater political  and  economic  importance. 
The  Community  has  also  played  second  fiddle  with 
respect  to  certain  more  general  questions  regarding  the 
present  crisis  in  international  economic  relations  - monetary 
relations  for  instance.  The  Member  States  have  in  fact  kept 
this  entire  area  under  their  direct  control,  being  unwilling 
for  the  present  to  entrust  the  Community  with  the  task  of 
unifying  and  coordinating European  interests  (even  though  they 
have  not  achieved particularly satisfactory results). - 133  -
In  a  great  many  respects,  therefore,  the  limited 
impact  of the  Community's  external  measures  is attributable to 
its  record  of  delays  and  hesitations  in  bringing  about  the 
convergence  and  closer alignment of national policies,  in pur-
suit of  the  goal  of political union of the  Member States. 
Failures  to act,  owing  to  limited ability.to adjust  promptly 
to external  changes  and  limited possibilities of doing  so 
It  has  been  pointed  out  in  the  Study  that  the  Com-
munity  has  for  many  years  tended  to react  to urgings  and  pres-
sures  from  non-member  countries  rather  than  pursue  an  autono-
mous  external  relations  policy  based  on  a  strategy of its own 
devising. 
Furthermore,  in the  absence  of  a  masterplan  the  con-
crete  measures  implemented  by  the  Community  (e.g.  under 
cooperation  agreements  with  the  LDCs)  have  followed  their 
separate  courses  and  have  rarely  been  coordinated.  The  re-
sultant  imbalance~ and  lack  of cohesion are  hard  to  justify. 
It  is  therefore  embarassing  to  have  to  answer  the 
question whether  the  Community  is pursuing  a  consistent policy 
in its relations with the  LDCs  as  a  group. 
It  might  perhaps  be  appropriate  to  make· a  periodic 
review of the  fac~ors which  have  up  to  now  prompted  the  Commu-
nity  to  focus  attention  on  certain  regions,  which  are  given 
preferential  treatment  (the  ACP  first  and  foremost,  and  the 
Mediterranean  countries),  to  the  virtual  neglect  of relations 
with  other  areas  (e.g.  South  East  Asia  and  Latin  America) 
which  are  of  very  great  importance  for  international  economic 
equilibrium. 
It  is  just  as  debatable  whether  the  Community  is 
pursuing  a  clearcut  policy  in  its  relations  with  those  LDCs 
that  now  have  embarked  on  economic  expansion  and  in  some  cases - 134  -
are  achieving  very  high  growth  rates  (newly  industrializing 
countries  such  as  Brazil;  Mexico,  Indonesia,  Singapore,  South 
Korea,  Hong  Kong,  Taiwan). 
Community  industries are  in difficulties as  a  result 
of  competition  problems,  such  as  marked  differences in labour 
costs  due  to  inadequate  social  measures,  overt  forms  of 
protectionism  and  lack  of  reciprocity  in trade  relations.  In 
this  connection  it  is  worth  recalling  Section  6 .1.  of  this 
Study,  where  it was  stated  that  a  recession. like  the  one  that 
has  been  with  us  for  almost  a  decade  fundamentally  transforms 
the  entire  situation  and  makes  it increasingly  difficult  for 
markets  to  regain  equilibrium  spontaneously,  without  the 
backing  of  well-defined  policies  pursued  by  the  countries  and 
groups  of  countries with  the greatest  responsibilities. 
In  these  circumstances,  clinging  to  semi-obsolete 
economic  and  legal  instruments  created  during . an  era  of 
economic  growth could  have  serious  repercussions. 
What  is  needed  is  a  drive  to  renew  and  adjust  Com-
munity  external  relations  to  the  rapidly evolving realities of 
the  world  today  (the  following  issues  spring  to  mind  here  : 
relations  with  the  US,  Japan  and  OPEC  countries;  energy  pro-
blems;  monetary  problems,  etc.). 
In  this connection,  it is also worth bearing in mind 
the  Study's  comments  on  the  drawbacks  of persisting in an  out-
dated  approach  in  relations  with  major  commodity  suppliers 
such  as  Australia,  Canada  and  Argentina.  Greater  attention 
should  be  given  to  exploiting  the  scope  for  complementarity 
between  these countries and  the  Community. 
The  uncertain,  precarious  state  of  the  Community's 
relations  with  the  Mediterranean  countries,  on  account  of the 
prospect  of  Spanish  and  Portuguese  accession,  is  a  further 
sign  of  its  inadequacy  in  forecasting  the  implications  of  new 
developments  and  the  need  for adjustment  to  them. - 135  -
Similar  comments  could  be  made  on  the  steady  con-
traction  of  the  Community's  working  population  engaged  in 
agriculture,  which  is  to  some  extent  du~  to  increasing 
imports. 
Failure  to  implement  proposed programmes  and  aims  properly 
The  se~tion of  this  Study  concerned  with  relations 
with  the  ACP  and  the  Mediterranean  countries contained  a  short 
critical  assessment  of  the  extent  to  which  EEC  policies  had 
achieved  their objectives. 
This  assessment  gave  a  disturbing picture  of inade-
quacy  due  largely  to  the  Community's  inability  to  mobilize 
funds  commensurate  with  the  tasks  or the  magnitude  of  the pro-
blems  involved.  This  factor  has  to  be  seen  in conjunction with 
earlier  comments  on  the  bilateral  assistance  being  given  by 
individual  Member  States  to  LDCs,  which  is  on  a  scale  far  in 
excess  of  the  Community's  development  cooperation  and  as-· 
sistance effort. 
The  same  applies  to  the  Community  contribution  to 
food aid and  to  attempts  to  combat  famine  in  the  world. 
All· in all,  the  Community  is having  to  tackle  a  mam-
moth  task  with  very  limited  resources.  This  evidence  of 
inconsistency  should  give  the  Member  States in particular food 
for  thought.  They  should  identify  more  precisely  which  tasks 
they  really  wish  to  assign  to  the  Community  Insti  ti  tutions, 
and allocate  the  requisite  resources. 
However,  even with  limited  resources at its disposal 
the  Community  should strive  to be  as  consistent  as possible  in 
its  use  of  these  resources,  identifying  and  eliminating 
long-standing  ancmalies  and  preventing  the  occur-rence  of  new 
inconsister.cies. - 136  -
The  Commission,  in  its  turn,  has  run  into  admini-
sLrative  difficulties  because  it  lacks  the  staff  to  keep 
proper  track  of  the  main  issues  because  of  the  ill-defined 
demarcation  line  between  its  Directorates'  responsibilities 
and  because  of  the  changing  allocation  of  tasks  between  them. 
In  addition,  the  DirectorateE  have  often  been  guilty  of  poor 
liai~on and  coordination with  each  other. 
Further,  it  has  been  pointed  out  that  in  some  in-
stances  the  Community  has  embarked  on  short-ter·m  initiatives 
or  has  pursued  the  ephemeral  success  attaching  to  the  con-
clusion  of  prestigous  agreements,  without  subsequently  paying 
much  attention  to  giving  concrete  form  to  the  general  com-
mitments  entered  into.  The  agreements  with  ASEAN  and  the 
Andean  Pact  are  cases  in point. 
Inconsistencies  and  difficulties due  to  incompatibilities  and 
conflict between objectives pursued  simultaneously by  the 
Communi_!::l 
This  is  one  of  the  mcst  serious  and  disturbing fea-
tures  of  the  Community's  external  relations  policy.  In  all 
probability  it  ultimately  stems  in  part  from  the  actual  text 
of  the  Treaty  and  in  part  from  the  guidelines  subsequE·ntly 
laid  down. 
This  Study  has  repeatedly  referred  to  Community  ini-
tiatives  directed  towards  specific  aims  which  appear  incompa-
tible,  inconsistent  and  uncoordinated  when  appraised  in  the 
light of  certain other official  Community  objectives. 
Among  the  specific examples  cited in connection with 
cooperation with  the  LDCs  are  the  GSP  tar·iff concessions with 
the  countries  of  the  Third  World,  Asia  and  Latin  America. 
These  have  been  criticized  by  the  ACP  and  Mediterranean 
countries  as  eroding  the  preferential  treatment  which  the - 137  -
Community  had  agreed  to  grant  them.  Moreover  the  non-member 
countries  not  covered  by  the  Community's  policies  involving 
preferential  treatment  for  certain  regions  are  demanding 
equality  of  treatment  by  the  Community.  The  same  holds  good 
for  the  anticipated  impact  on  the  Mediterranean  area(and the 
friction which will be  caused)  of decisions  in connection with 
the  admission of Southern European  countries to  the  Community. 
The  inconsistencies and  discrepancies highlighted  in 
the  section  dealing  with  the  interaction  between  the  Commu-
nity's  external  and  internal  policies  are  perhaps  even  more 
marked.  The  complications  produced  by  the  internal. and  ex-
ternal  components  of  the  Common  Agricultural  Policy speak  for 
themselves  (the difficulty in reconciling  the  smooth operation 
of  the  CAP  with  commitments  to  import  products  which  only 
serve  to  increase  existing  Community  surpluses;  friction 
created  by  the  sale of  farm  surpluses;  disputes with countries 
that  are  traditional  exporters of  farm  products and  so  on). 
The  same  applies  to  a  number  of production ventures 
in  the  LDCs  which  have  run  up  against  the  constraints and  re-
strictions  on  Community  imports  of  finished products. 
Extremely  serious,  because  of  its  social  impli-
cations,  is  the  conflict  between  the  aims  of  protecting  free 
trade  (as  opposed  to  resorting  to  destructive  protectionism) 
and  of  safeguarding employment  in the  Community  at  a  time  when 
entire  sectors  of  production,  already  grappling  with  struc-
tural  problems,  are  gravely  threatened  by  increasing  imports 
from  industrialized and  developing  non-member  countries. 
This  Study  draws  attention  to  other  relevant 
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The  prolonged  acute  recession and  the  Member States' 
failure  to  coordinate  their  (sometimes  conflicting)  national 
economic  policies effectively have  had  a  direct adverse  effect 
on  the  cohesiveness  of  the  external  action  taken  by  the  Com-
munity. 
Generally  speaking,  the  discussions  brought  out  how 
difficult it is  for  the  Community  Institutions  to control  the 
impact  of  specific  external  policy  measures  and  in particular 
any  side-effects on other Community  policies. 
The  interrelationships  between  problems  and  situ-
ations  have  in fact  become  so  complex  as  to  raise  the  question 
whether  there  is  any  real  chance  of  achieving  a  satisfactory 
level  of  coherence,  given  the  limited  legal  and  administrative 
instruments  currently  available  to  the  Community  as  a  result 
of  institutional  situations,  which  are  marked  by  increasing 
weakness  with  the  passage  of  time. 
Unfortunately, 
situations  may  be  even 
reasons  for  such  unsatisfactory 
more  deep-rooted.  The  contradictions 
and  inconsistencies  of  Community  policies  and  actions  also 
stem  from  the  lack  of  a  general,  broad  framework  for  the 
action which  the  Community  has  been  taking  on different  fronts 
over  the  last  decades. 
There  has  never  been  any  exhaustive,  realistic 
political  debate  on  the  Community~s  fundamental  objectives  (a 
point  made  clearly  in  the  chapter  on  the  relationship between 
external  policy  and  social  and  employment  policy). 
It  is  therefore  essential  to  establish  a  scale  of 
·target priorities  which  the  Community  will  have  to  observe  in 
all future  measures  (and not  only  those  in the  external  policy 
sphere);  a  scale  of  priorities,  however,  can  only  be  drawn  up 
if basic  long-term  strategies are clarified. - 139  -
This  decision  has  to  be  taken  immediately  without 
further  delay,  since  it  is  now  an  inescapable  fact  that  the 
European  Community  will  have  to  acquire  a  more  clearcut 
identity  in  the  political  and  other  spheres  if  it  is  to 
resolve its current crisis. 
In  conclusion,  the  political  will  must  be  found  to 
adopt  a  courageous  approach  to  the  future  of  the  Community,  to 
promote  real  economic  convergence  and  to  eliminate  conflicts 
between  economic  and  other  interests  conflicts  which, 
although  sometimes  hidden  beneath  the  surface,  have  in prac-
tice been  a  feature  of relations between·the  Member  States and 
strongly  influenced  the  whole  life of the  Community. 
The  Section hopes  that  the  frequent  reference  in the 
Study  to  the  importance  of  coherence  will  help  and  further 
this  cause.  Since  the  concept  has  been  the  main  theme  of  the 
Study it would  be  well  to  recall  what  the  dictionary says  :  . 
"Co he rent: e  holding  together,  keeping  together  the 
parts  of  something,  concord,  harmony,  congruity, 
connectedness". 
Done  at Brussels,  8  December  1981. 
The  Chairman 
of  the 
Section for  External  Relations 
Jean  de  PRECIGOUT 
The  Secretary-General 
of  the 
Economic  and  Social  Committee 
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113  142  343  <00  416  504  766  998 
185  244  194  334  360  397  518  649 
671  863  l  424  ,  507  ,  567  1 645  2 27A  3 576 
89  109  228  218  234  278  313  460 
271  376  530  558  745  871  'I  122  1 466 
169  159  407  <53  510  555  675  793 
95  155  305  357  390  504  637  705 
105  185  351  431  476  547  655  835 
47  83  150  175  1/2  ,.  218  228 
347  349  377  408  385  435  582  912 
585  688  876  914  682  772  1 07i  2 126 
115  167  103  121  !37  193  192  423 
8  342  1 973  2 214  2 207  l  688  1 985  4 651 
107  137  157  205  201  14l  193  264 
94  112  109  109  9B  96  134  145 
98  1l2  103  116  !01  145  117  255 
52  5B  170  118  207  l19  270  319 
102  205  400  401  373  409  554  740 
172  151  210  189  148  152  213  261 
388  421  588  817  1  191  1 l93  l  491  3 826 
94  137  183  186  157  165  218  352 
38  75  105  tiS  137  159  2:0  494 
<02  278  688  757  5l7  495  806  \  136 
41  58  100  108  113  121  159  201 
593  589  339  343  432  660 
549  :?15  ,  30:.4  1 283  1 228  I  320  1 6E4  2  :300 
241 787  308 570  319 972 
117 336  i 46 9SO  168 229 
125 45t  159 590  17i 743 
50 326  15 818  .E!2  357 
20 245  24  8130  l8 038 
5 880  7 896  d 920 
24 129  29 707  30 03'7 
54 976  70 0~121  75  2782) 
8 716  10 49.0  12  502 
263  JOB  333 
546  547  417, 
9 237  12  36231  13 3263) 
8 470  11  29'1  12  301 
911  t  388  78l 
2 747  3 197  3 779 
fi  368  7  794  8 068 
,  784  2 399  2 752 
5 751  6 796  7 938 
2 673  3 649  lj  348. 
853  924  1 004 
.  2 997  J 974  4  771 
1 0.41  1 459  l 569 
,  169  ,  417  1 517 
566  873  820 
3 Bl6  5 522  6 199 
463  583  590 
1 593  1 976  2 138 
8l5  988  1 072 
692  851  1  DOG 
868  1 092  1 008 
19~  256  162 
808  840  838 
2 048  2 153  2 099 
357  4i1  56i 
2 628  4 033  3 863 
319  676  703 
169  123  215 
.l.52  326  350 
261  338  366 
694  1  011  ·,oA 
246  325  462 
2 840  32<.9- 3 479 
298  368  526 
374  378  432 
694  910  1 082 
178  271  5l2 
409  405  460 
~ 967  3 856  4 675 
362 176  4:39 429 
183 790  221  418 
178 386  218 011 
'82  750  1 ,, 814 
>2  838  40 673 
qgn.:  '2 118 
J2 250  38 937 
71  1922)  as 04B21 
1\ 892  14 770 
341  333 
334  560 
1.: ooa3)  l7 7293! 
12 854  16 143 
436  420 
5 39l  6 206 
8  537  10 284 
2 962  3 B69 
9 521  12 355 
5077  6 085 
l  175  I 611 
5 AS5  6 674 
'588  1 961 
:  725  2 202 
836  9<2 
6 464  8 418 
645  717 
2 256  2 437 
l  094  1 283 
'012  '256 
~on  1  sao 
lB9  405 
845  1 011 
2 006  2 76i 
569  790 
3 275  4 876 
945  1 183 
21C  168 
217  250 
390  404 
\  3.69  ,  406 
428  .  341 
3 36'7  5 339 
58<  611 
440  550 
1 106  1 094 
402  377 
308  526 
6 147  6 971 
518 916 
247 36J 
271  552 
134. 101 
<8 882 
13 174 
50 359 
114 562 
18 923 
345 
733 
21  942 
19 621 
947 
8317 
11  474 
4 427 
~5 419 
6 937 
1 961 
a  o5o 
2 057 
2 301 
996 
,, 105 
854 
2 6/0 
1 453 
1 365 
1 716 
411 
1 169 
4027 
t  098 
6 373 
1 746 
166 
192 
464 
l  411 
39\ 
7 872 
712 
776 
1 318 
456 
561 
5 063 
\ 
1 
! 
1)  F1gures lor trade by Germany (Fed_ Rep.) w1th I  he German Oemocrat•c Republic and the Sovrel sector ol Berhn are g1ven at the bolt  om olthzs table. bul are not rncluded H'l any of theda 
gr~o•en elsewhere m thiS  publicauon on trade by Germany (Fed.  Rep) and the European Communrt1es.  · 
2)  Excludmg Cuba 
3)  lncludmg Cuba. GENERAL  SUMMARY 
Value  m M•o  ECU  import 
Tradmg partners  1958  1  1960  1  1963 l  1969  1  1970  1  1971  l  1972  1  1973 !  19741 1975  1  19761 1977 J  1978 l  1979 J  1980 
Un11ed  Stales ol  Ame"c~  3 952  5 645  6 689  10 473  12 300  11  an  11  50.:1  14 669  20 342  20  598  25 342  25  736  28  276  33 853  ..  250 
Canada  1 314  ,  519  1 51\  2 078  2 950  2 719  2 464  2 862  4 006  3 530  4 365  4 301  3 975  5 085  6 108 
Mex•co  132  163  178  214  '39  131  133  175  349  321  376  433  387  446  1 063 
Panama  7  8  15  33  40  69  63  110  63  95  106  131  104  199  148 
Cuba  92  64  101  49  61  57  51  75  93  73  129  105  124  161  247 
Nelherlands An11Hes  121  109  149  59  60  73  53  59  155  213  255  107  91  215  424 
Colomb1a  64  134  122  173  204  200  210  236  320  416  566  715  615  877  1 060 
Venezuela  46i  405  504  378  392  437  346  352  764  755  810  510  576  9.51  1 710 
Peru  126  221  274  308  345  301  280  2?1  337  260  297  306  262  422  527 
Briwl  343  393  484  914  I 079  l  085  1 345  1 978  2 275  2 214  2 754  3 440  3 046  3 597  4 134 
Ch•le  178  256  230  597  654  473  361  378  666  512  698  650  721  1 065  1 316 
Argen11na  612  750  860  866  981  925  951  1 150  1 313  873  1 348  1 810  1 977  2 095  1 777 
Svr•a  71  103  155  69  93  141  78  106  245  465  650  604  509  611  930 
1raq  525  611  67£  7  ~ 1  687  817  682  95i  2 624  2 827  3 657  4 077  4 534  5 968  7 909 
lran  399  416  505  738  887  I  327  l  553  2 289  6 779  6 557  8 345  7 473  6 760  4 346  2 771 
Israel  69  103  167  291  310  380  418  460  543  573  816  \  000  1 186  1 350  1 599 
Saud•  Arab•a  3•3  377  325  980  1  27'!  )  098  2 655  3 708  10 855  9 130  11  889  1? 806  5 940  14  265  24 520 
Kuwa•t  918  898  1 005  1  \54  1 268  1 595  1 613  1 662  3 123  2 526  2 533  2 690  2 991  4 526  4 036 
Qatar  87  50  70  171  187  250  287  388  862  734  1 236  830  752  870  1 475 
Umted Arab  Em~rates  555  467  732  2 217  2 409  2 942  3 067  2 567  3 1, 7  4 375 
Oman  136  108  344  384  370  145  193  159  352 
P'aktstan  186  250  223  258  271  293  376  441 
lnd1a  506  544  556  469  460  478  517  663  884  916  ,  421  1 650  1 612  1 831  1 799 
T'ha•land  39  54  81  '22  140  148  154  217  358  336  582  755  914  1 015  1 237 
1ndones•a  187  167  119  158  247  249  255  360  457  415  G39  853  853  1 083  1 192 
Malays1a  306  415  280  316  392  365  371  639  886  na  1 156  1 340  1 310  1 679  1 788 
S•ngapore  74  76  69  107  122  135  172  359  353  370  514  634  640  950  1 859 
Ph•hPp•nes  80  112  125  107  97  149  159  205  261  350  454  552  575  722  820 
Ch1na  163  235  165  370  348  362  418  544  721  661  860  853  940  I  313  1 889 
Soutl'l  Korea  2  3  6  37  59  7l  114  238  459  619  1 014  1 265  1 424  1 686  1 972 
Japan  24i  304  510  I  212  1  650  2 091  2 654  3 399  4 376  4 826  6 399  7 669  8 730  9 678  12 462 
Ta•wan  7  11  23  94  143  194  262  454  625  684  878  1 082  1 208  1 632  2 165 
Hong Kong  96  156  268  549  609  738  838  1 074  1 266  1 372  1 960  2 010  2 as  2 885  3 602 
Austra.l•a  959  1 001  ,  061  ,  171  ,  227  \  252  ,  3<17  \  520  \  659  ,  605  2 244  2 105  1 S90  2 36B  2 472 
New Zealand  573  581  565  591  652  705  759  830  735  678  837  912  975  1 069  1 090 
lnt<;or ·zone uad~ 1)  204  267  256  421  545  636  666  812  1 055  1 096  1 377  1 495  1 526  1 828  2 210 
1)  F1gures for trade by Germany (Fed  Rep ) w1th the German Democratic Repubhc and the Sov1et sector of  Berlin are g1ven at the bottom ot this table, but are not mcluded many ot the da 
g1ven  elsewhere m  th1s  publ1cat1on  on  trade by  Germany (Fed  Rep.)  and the  European Commun1t1es of EC  trade by country 
Value 1n  Mio ECU  export 
Trading partners  1958  1980 
GRAND TOTAL  33 665  ~, 976  51  833  97 140  112 !78  12.4  925  137 725  170 70'3  23\  290  23-9  571  292  651  332 J89  359 669  418 863  41S 055 
JNTRA-EC lEUR 9)  11  563  16 098  23 427  48191  56 465  63 505  71  971  90031  117 066  118 359  151  351  \68 50\  185 177  224 681  250 610 
E)(TRA-EC  22 102  25 879  28 408  4B 591  55 712  61  420  65 754  80 673  114 Z24  1'21  212  141  300  164 288  173 893  194 182  224 446 
Class 1  n  194  13132  16 629  30 034  34 743  38 129  40 844  49 785  66 531  s2  sor>  74 131  85 643  89 983  104 941  11$978 
£FTA incJudmg Fin/and  .4  4t4  5  719  7 344  11  732  14 134  15 188  16 802  20 861  27  948  27 135  3~ 486  38 302  39 198  47 518  57 023 
Other Western European countries  1 118  1 306  1 969  4 064  4 814  5 388  6 070  7 813  11  005  1! 338  12 735  14 556  14 015  \7 403  18 641 
USA and Canada  J411  4 269  4 578  10 021  10770  12 360  13 219  14 775  18 443  15 752  19 022  23 543  26 328  28 406  2~ 953 
Clan 2  9 440  1D 279  9 799  14 665  16 2B\  181-41  19 045  22  948  35 213  44 058  50 951 z,  e1  an2~  66 5132)  69 6JQl)  8>389 
ACP (59 COi  .. lnlnes)  2 047  2 193  2 287  2914  J  507  3 932  4 [)41  .4  462  6 122  B 12:A  9 888  12 519  12 723  11  807  15 684 
DOM  103  108  153  300  333  327  349  507  5?4  695  806  914  995  1 278  ,  432 
TOM  282  254  192  461  580  315  435  504  541  583  672  91J  753  754  744 
CIDiiiO  3 \)  1 :Z57  1  6S7  1 706  3 840  4  259  4 515  5 215  7 212  10 929  13 0\.d  14 2383)  14 5403)  15 4363)  17 2663)  IS 721 
Easlcrf'l  Eutope l ~  683  1 322  1 5~5  J 355  3 7BJ  4 104  4 824  5 508  9 905  11  ?26  12 544  13 226  13 421  14 673  16 375 
Miseolloneous  100  210  273  ...  412  450  635  650  729  1 550  \  Ei25  1 980  2 230  t  9SI  2 305  J 359 
Moin countries: 
Nom'a)"  Sl!3  122  896  '  325  1 535  1 610  1 699  2 251  2 7q6  J 267  4 152  4 79/  J 861  4 361  5136 
Sweden  ,  311  1 621  1 959  3177  3 690  J. 686  3 969  4 839  7 014  1 221  s 575  B 960  B 180  TO 449  11  663 
Finland  J12  510  533  S35  1 003  1 103  1  149  1 39:6  1 972  2 021  2 085  2 139  2 065  2 557  3 45.S 
Sw1tzorland  I 168·  1 629  2 443  3 177  4 605  5 0/J  5 796  7 183  9 347  8 344  10 19/"  12 OS:l  14 504  17 757  22 275 
Austria  652  888  1 128  1 889  2 33S  2 741  3 170  3 859  4 890  4 903  5 655  8 215  a 409  9 7S2  , 1 272 
Por1ugal  <59  310  334  673  811  869  92::!  1217  1 737  1 225  1 649  1 952  1 922  2 230  2 895 
Spain  338  3J2  830  1 555  1 795  1 934  2 411  3 179  4 355  4 088  4 816  5 335  5 001  6 525  7 581 
Yugoslavul  219  334  348  1 008  ~  389  1 557  1 435  I  785  2 S2B  2 783  2 sas  3 567  :nos  4 410  4 131 
GteecE!  290  284  430  806  963  1 175  I 301  1 534  ,  916  2 173  2 465  2 897  3 139  -4  077  4 214 
Turkov  182  lJJ  272  434  50~  556  743  949  ,  5~1  , -so.:.  2 292  215-7  i  563  1 see  I 82l 
Soviet Umon  366  575  579  1 312  1 375  1 330  ,  541  2 160  3 337  4 S18  5 184  5 8&2  5 630  6 313  7 51B 
Gorman Oemoc!alu: Repubhc 1)  S4  92  99  159  199  235  304  298  427  459  557  475  035  746  806 
Poland  196  200  296  548  5J5  66J  971  1 639  2 451  2 649  2 836  2 553  2 507  2 479  2 776 
Czechoslovakra  12J  164  135  422  538  632  632  J45  1 005  I 021  1 237  '236  1211  l  277  1 313 
Hungary  69  126  176  ,,  394  494  533  6<8  1 066  958  1 055  1 337  1 $45  ,  478  1 550 
Romo~~mo~~  52  101  183  465  478  510  616  752  1 09.9  \  036  1 0.95  119-3  1 423  1 742  I 641 
Bulg;:ma  27  ss  70  164  209  215  212  273  491  551  574  542  538  599  728 
Morocco  282  182  265  336  375  378  369  504  JSE  1 047  1 Jn  1 537  t  343  ~  !\76  1 479 
Atger11J  l 025  ,  142  593  687  857  836  947  1 ne  2 057  2 824  2 759  3 677  3 638  3 812  .a  710 
Tun1s1a  121  158  145  161  187  209  274  344  550  711  837  978  1121  1 233  l  541 
L1bya  62  107  151  406  311  423  650  901  I 625  1 970  2 136  2 563  2 623  3 38:8  d  146 
Egypt  193  259  298  280  331  301  278  398  814  1 352  l  519  1 6B2  1 821  2 324  3 105 
Sudan  65  80  134  91  86  9Z  100  112  184  299  412  481  48'  401  413 
Sencgul  114  !34  137  124  136  165  189  252  ns  357  397  3J2  418  444 
Liber1a  76  110  113  90  19J  210  318  380  337  807  661  792  334  375  334 
!\lory Coest  83  143  218  249  258  291  359  A<B  485  €56  851  991  1 no  l  165 
GhEina  137  204  186  158  "' 
204  94  147  :ns..  ,.,  330  41 a  419  285  315 
N1geua  265  342  J01  351  509  695  694  771  l  148  2 405  3 320  4  60.4  4 67""  J 550  8-010 
Cameroon  70  53  76  141  162  153  162  174  238  286  330  427  485  619  742 
Gabon  ,  30  57  64  88  91  120  209  327  448  454  268  279  394 
Zarre  155  103  89  244  296  342  310  354  510  475  40Ft  445  391  428  508 
Kenya  82  95  95  186  205  248  214  222  327  273  311  448  822  521  750 
Zambul•  132  154  190  \80  172  275  281  253  240  208  236  313 
RapuCitc:  or South Africa  805  737  922  1 497  1 831  2 013  '603  2 030  3 179  3 295  3 153  2 815  3.211  3 290  5042 
1)  Figures for trade bv Germanv ( F.e 
Ql'ven  e~sewhere m thrs publlcu! 
2)  Exc!udmg Cuba 
3)  lnc~udmg Cuba. 
. ~--~·-......,;...~,.,..J ..... ~~~ )f  EC  trade by country 
Value  m M•o  ECU 
Tradmg panners 
Un•ted States ol  Amenca 
Canada 
MelC•co 
Panama 
Cuba 
Netherlands Ant tiles 
Colomb•a 
Venezuela 
Peru 
Br-e:z:•' 
Chrle 
Argentma 
Svr•a 
!raq 
Iran 
ls•ael 
Saud•  Arab•a 
Kuwa•t 
Oat a• 
Un•ted Arab Em•rates 
Oman 
Pail.tstan 
!nd•a 
Tharland 
lndones•a 
Malaysta 
S•ngapore 
Ph•I•PP•nes 
Chma 
SoL!Ih  Korea 
Japan 
Ta•wan 
Hong  Kong 
Auslraha 
New Zealand 
Jnt~r-zone trade  t 1 
1)  Frgures for trade by Germany (Fe 
gtven  ejsewhere tn  th•s  publ•ca 
1958  1 
2 622 
789 
1~8 
69 
97 
100 
89 
422 
84 
333 
82 
399 
B6 
165 
3!6 
153 
80 
96 
15 
892 
92 
146 
159 
134 
o7 
384 
57 
198 
17 
141 
841 
407 
191 
1960  1  1963  1  1969  1 
3 344  3 785  8 524 
925  834  1 498 
206  211  417 
68  57  133 
68  34  162 
54  43  79 
118  11B  130 
317  252  391 
101  16B  186 
363  335  610 
158  146  206 
470  345  531 
97  65  113 
152  109  156 
328  257  692 
197  230  631 
65  87  306 
90  129  230 
14  15  25 
767  687  445 
99  143  244 
192  140  !70 
181  221  216 
145  167  242 
78  118  226 
331  153  432 
66  32  173 
296  512  1 086 
?1  22  82 
199  267  452 
1 009  923  1 170 
396  380  363 
228  215  577 
1970  1  1971  1 
9 306  10 569 
1 464  1 791 
484  491 
141  134 
215  183 
143  100 
173  198 
•25  507 
169  204 
726  993 
225  257 
564  5B6 
95  124 
163  181 
726  856 
669  784 
263  281 
219  214 
29  54 
144 
461  649 
244  213 
214  239 
267  292 
318  383 
210  214 
461  397 
155  207 
1 384  1 339 
116  173 
57~  556 
,  409  1 403 
404  439 
660  685 
export 
1972  1  1973  1  1974  1  1975  11976  1  1977  1  1978  1  1979  1  1980 
, 1 315  12 BOO  15 911  13  201  16 247  20 499  23 142  25 048  26 564 
\  904  1 974  2 532  2 552  2 775  3 044  3 186  3 358  3 389 
497  6\6  933  969  971  801  1 281  1 544  2 180 
190  133  217  342  373  241  265  JOB  334 
112  128  353  436  370  342  242  248  438 
93  135  125  120  190  256  291  282  238 
194  200  315  311  310  435  437  534  561 
560  614  BOO  1 OB2  1 36B  2 106  1 86B  1 3B9  1 551 
196  247  349  507  346  294  255  4B1  417 
1 202  1 447  2 617  2 309  2216  2 209  2 117  2 373  2 535 
260  221  283  236  230  302  346  498  596 
595  504  827  799  727  1 01 i  1 095  1  741  2  221 
152  214  477  584  1 032  85B  BOO  . 1 053  1 245 
219  222  784  1 851  1 995  I  765  1 915  2 667  3 816 
995  1 381  2 198  •  056  4 715  5 387  5 912  2 267  321! 
879  1  134  1 428  1 298  1 287  I 484  1 6]4  1 777  1 676 
323  420  876  ,  467  3 077  4 557  5 659  6 392  7 283 
206  236  433  590  957  1 236  1 300  1 353  1 474 
53  67  90  191  304  382  355  417  392 
106  187  410  768  1 175  l  544  1 BOO  1 790  2 079 
66  72  173  320  291  384  304  382  394 
234  363  425  502  665  641  805  890 
715  688  845  1 089  1 140  1 395  1 856  2 006  2 298 
217  266  449  346  348  535  584  764  726 
245  389  639  764  1 088  1 081  945  803  1 252 
250  342  552  453  481  559  729  840  1 035 
398  509  762  681  781  917  1 058  \  321  1 713 
153  180  334  329  406  442  543  616  591 
loS  607  807  1 153  '  186  796  1 489  2 101  1 725 
166  184  2"/1  474  532  659  1 001  1 245  941 
I  491  2 306  2 769  2 227  2 722  3 093  3 727  4 632  4 569 
161  343  481  412  482  489  666  819  872 
556  691  753  717  946  ,  167  1 650  1 877  2 133 
1 239  1 523  2 426  2 129  2 407  2 678  2 833  2 946  3 080 
422  478  762  627  607  656  670  748  670 
818  91  ~  ,  190  1 286  1 516  1 640  1 770  1 880  2 097 